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ABSTRACT 
The upsurge in the number of public protests in most South African municipalities, including 
the City of Cape Town, continues unabated. While public protest is a democratic right, 
provided for in the Constitution (RSA 1996), the violent nature and persistence of protests at 
municipal level are a cause for concern. The associated violence often leads to the destruction 
of both public and private property, disruptions in economic activities, loss of lives and 
severe injuries to innocent victims.  
The prevalence of public protests continues despite the fact that the new democratic 
dispensation ushered in a paradigm geared for transforming local government from a racially-
segregated institution into a democratic and autonomous sphere of government, with a broad 
developmental mandate. This new dispensation gave birth to the “invited spaces” of 
participation, which are aimed at providing scope for the public to influence, direct, control 
and own the development and decision-making processes. 
In order to determine factors that contribute to public protests in Khayelitsha the study 
adopted a qualitative research paradigm.  Personal interviews, focus group discussion and 
participatory observation were some of the research methods used to collect primary data. 
The study indicates that lack of authentic and empowering public participation opportunities 
in the decision-making processes of the City of Cape Town alienates the public and leads to 
public disengagement from available municipal processes. 
It has been during this period of alienation that the public have been “inventing own spaces” 
of participation, in the form of public protests demanding that public voices be heard. The 
study also indicates that poverty, unemployment and glaring gaps of social inequality, 
reinforced by comparison to available examples in the neighbourhood, are root causes of 
public protests. 
The new public participation model that has been developed from this research should be 
adopted by South African municipalities as an essential public participation strategy. It 
empowers the public to negotiate a new “social contract” with the authorities primarily based 
on the public’s terms. It is only when authentic and empowering public participation is 
practised by municipalities that violent public protests can be minimised. Such authentic and 
empowering public participation provides latitude for the public to influence, direct, control 
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and even own their “own” development and decision-making processes. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die toename in voorvalle van openbare protes in byna alle Suid-Afrikaanse munisipale 
gebiede, insluitend die van die Stad Kaapstad, duur onverpoosd voort. Terwyl openbare 
protes weliswaar ’n demokratiese reg is wat in die Grondwet (RSA 1996) verskans word, is 
die huidige ingeburgerde en gewelddadige aard daarvan rede tot ernstige kommer. Hierdie 
gewelddadigheid lei dikwels tot vernietiging van sowel openbare as private eiendom. Ook 
ekonomiese aktiwiteite word ontwrig; daar is lewensverlies en ernstige beserings aan 
onskuldige slagoffers . 
Die hoë voorkoms van openbare protes duur voort, ondanks die feit dat die nuwe 
demokratiese bestel ’n paradigmaskuif ten gunste van transformasie in die plaaslike 
regeringstelsel beteken het. Alles was in plek om weg te beweeg van rasgesegregeerde 
instellings na ’n demokratiese, outonome regeringsfeer met ’n breë, ontwikkelingsgedrewe 
mandaat. Hierdie nuwe bedeling het “genooide ruimtes” vir deelname geskep, wat 
geleentheid sou skep om invloed en rigtinggewende beheer te verkry oor daardie prosesse 
van besluitneming wat deelnemers se eie lewens raak. 
Om die faktore te bepaal wat tot openbare protes in Khayelitsha bydra, is ’n kwalitatiewe 
navorsingsparadigma gekies. Persoonlike onderhoud, fokusgroepbespreking en deelnemende 
waarneming is van die navorsingsmetodes wat ingespan is om primêre data te versamel. 
Hierdie navorsingstudie het bevind dat, ondanks die “genooide ruimtes”, daar steeds ’n 
gebrek aan egte en bemagtigende openbare deelnemingsgeleenthede in die 
besluitnemingsproses van die Stad Kaapstad bestaan, en dat dit die publiek vervreem en 
daartoe lei dat burgers hul aan die beskikbare deelnemingsgeleenthede onttrek. 
Gedurende hierdie periode van vervreemding het die publiek van Khayelitsha hulle eie 
“geskepde ruimtes” ontwikkel. Dit was gegiet in die vorm van openbare protes, waar die 
stemme van die algemene publiek gehoor kon word. Die studie het ook aangedui dat 
armoede, werkloosheid en opvallende voorbeelde van sosiale ongelykheid (te vinde in die 
onmiddellike omgewing) aanleidende faktore vir protesaksie was.  
Die nuwe openbare deelnemingsmodel wat uit die navorsing ontwikkel is, kan aan alle Suid-
Afrikaanse munisipaliteite ’n onontbeerlike geleentheid bied om ’n doeltreffende openbare 
deelnemingstrategie te ontwikkel. Dit bemagtig die publiek om ’n nuwe onderhandelde 
“maatskaplike kontrak” met die owerhede, hoofsaaklik op die publiek se terme, te sluit. 
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Slegs wanneer die publiek aan egte, bemagtigende openbare deelname blootgestel word, sal 
daar sprake van ’n vertrouensverhouding met die owerhede wees en sal gewelddadige 
protesaksie tot die minimum beperk kan word. Sodanige egte en bemagtigende openbare 
deelname skep ruimte vir die publiek om hulle “eie” ontwikkeling te beïnvloed en mede-
beheer te bekom oor die besluitnemingsprosesse wat daarmee gemoeid is. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to my thesis supervisor, 
Mr Francois Theron for his astute guidance, input and motivation. 
 
Thank you to Ms Jennifer Saunders for assistance with technical editing and Mr Pierre Du 
Preez for language editing.  
 
I am indebted to the research participants i.e. the public in Khayelitsha, City of Cape Town 
Councillors and officials for their zeal to participate in the study. 
 
I would like to thank the library staff at Stellenbosch University Bellville campus for their 
kind assistance with the relevant study material. 
 
Lastly, thank you to my friends and relatives for your encouragement and support. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION......................................................................................................................ii 
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................iii 
OPSOMMING..........................................................................................................................v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................................................................................xii 
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS........................................................................................................xiv 
SCHEMATIC PLAN OF RESEARCH..............................................................................xvi 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH                                                        
PROBLEM  
1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………. 1 
1.2 Problem statement…………………………………………………………………... 5 
1.3 Research hypotheses………………………………………………………………… 7 
1.4 Research design and methodology………………………………………………….. 9 
1.5      Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts………………………. 11 
1.6 Limitations to the study…………………………………………………………….13 
1.7 Outline of chapters………………………………………………………………….14 
    1.8     Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..15 
CHAPTER TWO: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT  
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………... 16 
2.2 Defining public participation………………………………………………………. 17 
2.3  Factors that influence authentic and empowering participation…………………… 22 
2.3.1 Principles of public participation – The International Association of Public                                        
Participation(IAP2)……………………………………………………………22 
2.3.2 The Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable     
Developmen.......................................................................................................27 
2.3.3  The African Charter of Public Participation in Development and                                           
Transformation(1990)…………………………………………………………28 
 2.4 Public participation as an instrument to democratise local government in South 
Africa......................................................................................................................... 29 
         2.4.1     Democratising local government through decentralisation…………………....34 
         2.4.2     Democratising local government through participatory governance……….....36 
2.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………. 41 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ix 
CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION  
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………... 42 
3.2 Public participation and the building block of development………………………. 43 
3.2.1 Public participation…………………………………………………………… 45 
3.2.2 Social-learning process approach……………………………………………... 47 
3.2.3 Capacity-building……………………………………………………………... 48 
3.2.4 Empowerment………………………………………………………………… 49 
3.2.5 Sustainability………………………………………………………………….. 50 
3.3 Typologies and modes of public participation……………………………………...51 
3.4 Obstacles to public participation…………………………………………………... 65 
3.5 Benefits of public participation……………………………………………………. 66 
3.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………. 69 
CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY CONTEXT, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………... 71 
4.2       Public perceptions of local government…………………………………………... 73 
4.2.1    Citizens' knowledge of participatory mechanisms (WCs)……………………… 74 
4.2.2    Participation in the IDP process………………………………………………… 79 
4.2.3    Efficacy/ perceived influence on local government……………………………..82 
4.2.4    Voting in the municipal elections………………………………………………. 86 
4.3 Review of local government legislative framework……………………………….. 91 
4.3.1    The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996)…………………………………………….. 92 
4.3.2    White Paper on Local Government (Notice 423 of 1998)……………………… 95 
4.3.3    Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998).........................97 
4.3.4    Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)………………….. 98 
4.3.5    The Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003)…………………... 100 
4.4       Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….. 100 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
x 
CHAPTER FIVE: PUBLIC PROTESTS IN CONTEXT  
5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………. 102 
5.2 The meaning of public protests……………………………………………………103 
5.3 Are protests about service delivery or public service?............................................ 110 
5.3 Theories of public protests……………………………………………………….. 112 
5.4 The reasons/causes of public protests…………………………………………….. 115 
5.5 The violent nature of protests…………………………………………………….. 125 
5.6 The management of protests……………………………………………………… 131 
5.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………... 135 
CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 144 
6.2 Analysis of the COCT official’s responses ............................................................. 146 
6.3 Analysis of the focus group’s responses ................................................................. 148 
6.4 Analysis of Khayelitsha social movement’s responses ........................................... 150 
6.4.1 Abahlali Basemjondolo .................................................................................... 150 
6.4.2 South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) .................................. 152 
6.5 Analysis of Khayelitsha Councillor’s responses ..................................................... 154 
6.5.1 Ward Councillors (ANC) responses ................................................................ 154 
6.5.2 Proportional Representation (PR) Councillors (DA) responses ...................... 156 
6.6 Researcher’s observation......................................................................................... 158 
6.7 Research findings .................................................................................................... 159 
     6.8    Generalisations …………………………………………………………………...155 
CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 162 
7.2 Recommendations on how public protests can be better managed ......................... 162 
7.2.1 The practice of public participation ................................................................. 162 
7.2.2 The functioning of invited spaces of public participation ............................... 163 
7.2.3 The recognition and effective utilisation of social movements and community      
 organisations .................................................................................................... 163 
7.2.4 Management of public protests ........................................................................ 164 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xi 
7.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 165 
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………. 159 
ANNEXURES……………………………………………………………………………... 179 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic representation of what this study will attempt to do.................9 
Figure 1.2 Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts...........................11 
 
Figure 2.1 Translating “voice” into “influence”...............................................................33 
Figure 2.2 Key factors influencing participatory governance...........................................40 
 
Figure 3.1 Building blocks of development......................................................................45 
Figure 3.2 Spectrum of Public Participation......................................................................54 
Figure 3.3 Mchunu Public Participation Model................................................................60 
Figure 3.4 The Spectrum of Public Participation..............................................................61 
Figure 3.5 Advantages of public participation in government decision-making...............67 
 
Figure 4.1 Average mean, political efficacy by province..................................................83 
Figure 4.2 If you felt that you could not vote for the political party that you  
  normally support, would it be wise to...? By race (N=3851)...........................90 
 
Figure 5.1 Major public protests by year (2004 – July 2012)........................................117 
Figure 5.2 Public protests by province (January - July 2012).........................................118 
Figure 5.3 Public protests by province (2004 – Quarter 1, 2012)...................................118 
Figure 5.4 Western Cape protests by district: February 2007 – May 2011.....................123 
Figure 5.5 Public protests by month in Western Cape (to end September 2009)............123 
Figure 5.6 Dimensions of public protests........................................................................126 
Figure 5.7 Proportions of public protests turned violent - winter versus                          
rest of the year................................................................................................127 
  
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: Comparative analysis: participation as a means and/or as an end....................55 
Table 3.2: Comparisons of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder and Pretty’s et al. (1995)  
  typologies of public participation against Oakley and Marsden’s (1984)  
  modes of public participation...........................................................................56 
 
Table 4.1: Perceptions of ward councillor’s ability to deal with public  
  development issues in Khayelitsha..................................................................76 
Table 4.2 Knowledge of Ward Committees.....................................................................76 
Table 4.3 Knowledge of Ward Committees by type of settlement..................................78 
Table 4.4 Two political types...........................................................................................81 
Table 4.5 Knowledge of Integrated Development Plans..................................................81 
Table 4.6 Attitudes to local government..........................................................................82 
Table 4.7 Voting attitudes................................................................................................83 
Table 4.8 Perceptions of personal agency in relation to government and  
  political leaders in Khayelitsha......................................................................84 
Table 4.9 Attitudes to social mobilisation........................................................................85 
Table 4.10 Levels of participation in organised groups in Khayelitsha.............................86 
 
Table 5.1 Definitions of protests....................................................................................105 
Table 5.2 A model for understanding collective violence.............................................130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xiv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ANC  : African National Congress 
CBO  : Community Based Organisation 
COCT  : City of Cape Town 
COJ  :  City of Johannesburg 
COGTA : Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
COSATU : Congress of South African Trade Unions 
DA   : Democratic Alliance 
DEAT  : Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
DLG  : Developmental Local Government 
DPLG  : Department of Provincial and Local Government 
DWAF : Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
FOCOS :  Forum of Chairpersons of Sub-Councils 
GGLN  : Good Governance Learning Network 
HSRC  : Human Sciences Research Council 
IAP2  : Internal Association of Public Participation 
IDASA : Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
IDP  : Integrated Development Plan 
IEC  : Independent Electoral Commission 
IJR  : Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 
IKS  : Indigenous Knowledge System 
KDF  : Khayelitsha Development Forum 
LGTS  : Local Government Turnaround Strategy 
MOU  : Memorandum of Understanding 
NEDLAC : National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NGO  : Non-Governmental Organisation 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xv 
NPC  : National Planning Commission 
NT  : National Treasury 
OWS  : Occupy Wall Street 
PAGAD : People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 
PAR  : Participatory Action Research 
POS  : Political Opportunity Structure 
PR  : Proportional Representative 
RD  : Relative Deprivation 
RDP  : Reconstruction and Development Programme 
RM  : Resource Mobilisation 
SANCO : South African National Civic Organisation 
SARBS : South African Reconciliation Barometer Surveys 
SASAS : South African Social Attitudes Surveys 
TAC  : Treatment Action Campaign 
UN  : United Nations 
WC  : Ward Committee 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
xvi 
SCHEMATIC PLAN OF RESEARCH 
(See section 1.7: outline of chapters) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK & 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
PRIMARY SOURCES: 
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS, FOCUS 
GROUPS & OBSERVATION 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN POOR PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION AND PROTESTS 
INTRODUCTION, RESEARCH 
PROBLEM & METHODOLOGY 
SECONDARY SOURCES: 
LITERATURE: BOOKS, JOURNALS, 
INTERNET, NEWSPAPER 
ARTICLES, THESES, COCT 
DOCUMENTS 
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
DATA ANALYSIS & PRESENTATION 
PUBLIC PROTESTS IN 
CONTEXT 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1.1 Introduction 
From the 1980’s, the South African apartheid government was faced by a number of protests 
aimed at bringing about change in the political administration. The objective was to install a 
democratic dispensation.  During the apartheid era, participation of blacks in policy decision- 
making processes was severely lacking and was mainly limited to compliance (Masango 
2002:54). In other words, the public, particularly blacks were subjected to “participation in 
the form of a tyranny” (Cooke & Kothari 2001:1). 
The marginalisation of blacks led to perceptions that government was undemocratic, and as a 
result, government was viewed as illegitimate. This brought about frustration which was 
often manifested through public protests (Masango 2002:54).  Phago (2008:239) points out 
that public participation from the previously disadvantaged backgrounds was achieved 
through mass movements.  Heller (2009:18) concurs and contends that besides the critical 
role the social movements played, “they entered democratic era with significant 
organisational capacity, enormous popular support and a lot of momentum”. 
The enactment of the Local Government Transitional Act (209 of 1993) (RSA 1993b) 
marked the beginning of the new local government dispensation. This legislation ushered a 
new paradigm geared at transforming local government from a racially segregated institution 
into a democratic and autonomous sphere of government with a broad developmental 
mandate. The new dispensation sought to radically create new democratic arenas (Cornwall 
& Coelho 2007:9) that would include the grass-roots in decision-making processes. 
The White Paper on Local Government (Notice 423 of 1998) (RSA 1998a) put the 
Constitution’s (RSA 1996) developmental agenda into practice as it crystallised “the vision of 
a developmental role for local government centred on working with the public1 to find 
sustainable ways to meet their needs and to improve the quality of their lives” (Davids & 
Maphunye 2009:60). 
                                                 
1 The terms public, community, citizens and people will be used interchangeably in the text, although attempts 
will be made to use “public” throughout the text 
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Democratic transition was further galvanised in 1996 by the local government elections in 
seven of the nine Provinces (Harrison 2008:323). The democratically elected representatives 
faced a mammoth task of building democracy and ensuring the equitable distribution of 
resources to all of the City of Cape Town (COCT) public, including ensuring their 
meaningful participation in the decisions affecting their lives. This necessitated the creation 
of democratic participatory strategies and capacitating the public to ensure their ability to 
influence, direct, control and even own development and decision-making processes (Hickey 
& Mohan 2004:3). 
To give effect to the above and to pave the way for authentic and empowering public 
participation (the latter seemed to be lacking at local government level), legislation was 
enacted to create instruments suitable for public participation. At a national level of 
government, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the five 
Presidential Working Groups and sectoral bargaining councils were established (Edigheji 
2006b:8).  
 
At local government level, the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) (RSA 1998b) 
provided for the establishment of Ward Committees (WCs) to create a bridge between the 
public and municipal councils and to bring government closer to the public. Further 
legislation was the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) (RSA 2000) which introduced the 
principle of Integrated Development Planning (IDP). This measure would allow the public’s 
views and aspirations to be integrated into municipal development plans. 
 
To further enhance public participation at a municipal level, the International Association of 
Public Participation2 (IAP2) (2002) formulated public participation principles that 
development change agents should observe and integrate into municipal public participation 
strategies. This would ensure that the beneficiaries of development were at the centre of 
development affecting their lives. This approach was in line with The Manila Declaration 
(1989)3, which called for the adoption of a people-centred developmental approach, so that 
the beneficiaries of development would influence, direct, control and own those 
developmental interventions.  
 
The measures above were meant to guarantee authentic participation of the previously 
                                                 
2 Website: www.iap2.org. 
3 The Manila Declaration on People’s Participation and Sustainable Development (1989), Phillippines, ANGOC. 
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disenfranchised in the decisions that were intended to shape citizens’ future and ensure they 
benefit economically. The success of public participation would have been attributed to the 
change agent’s understanding and effective implementation of the Manila Declaration 
principles (Theron 2009b:117). However reality at grass-roots level indicates low levels of 
public participation and measures intended to enhance the participatory process are 
seemingly ineffective.  
 
Despite the above mentioned legislative and international strategic interventions to ensure 
authentic public participation at a municipal level, Khayelitsha, like townships in most 
municipalities in South Africa, is still plagued by public protests. These protests could be 
caused by lack of authentic and empowering public participation, which could be attributed to 
the authority’s complete disregard of public participation legislation and principles as 
espoused by IAP2 and the Manila Declaration (1989). To this end, Oldfield (2008:493) 
argues that people’s “patience to work within state driven and controlled processes has 
withered and oppositional protests tactics have become routine”.  
 
Based on the researcher’s observation, Khayelitsha’s vulnerability to public protests could 
also be explained in terms of the worst possible socio-economic conditions under which 
people are living there. Khayelitsha Township was established in 1983 as a result of a 
plethora of apartheid legislation aimed at restricting the number of blacks in urban areas 
(Thompson & Nleya 2010:228). The intention was to forcefully remove black people from 
urban centres and exclude them from participating in decision-making processes. The forced 
relocation of people was met with resistance in the form of mass mobilisation.  According to 
Thompson and Nleya (2010:228), the remnants of these past struggles of black people are 
still evident today. The current public protests in Khayelitsha should therefore be interpreted 
as the culmination of a series of historical continuities that embedded poverty along racial 
lines in distinct geographical areas (Thompson & Nleya 2010:228). 
A myriad of studies have been conducted in an attempt to explain the problem of persistent 
protests. Commentators point out that reasons for protests vary. On the one hand, Ramjee and 
Van Donk (2011:11), Van Donk (2012) and Nleya (2011) argue that perpetual protests in 
Khayelitsha are exacerbated by COCT’s failure to respond effectively to repeated community 
grievances and their ineffective utilisation of mandatory participation channels i.e. IDPs and 
WCs.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
On the other hand, Allan and Heese (2008) and Mathekga and Buccus (2006:4) assert that 
communities are venting their anger in protest over unsatisfactory delivery of basic services. 
In response to this protest stalemate, authorities have emerged with different interventions i.e. 
declaring Khayelitsha a Presidential Urban Renewal Node, Project Consolidate, the Planning, 
Implementation and Management Support Programme, Project Viability and most recently, 
the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTS) and Business-adopt-a-Municipality 
campaign (De Visser 2009:18; Ramjee & Van Donk 2011:11). All the above mentioned 
interventions are meant to reverse past imbalances, build municipal capacities and contain 
escalating public protests. But do they allow authentic and empowering public participation?  
The origins and reasons for the violent nature of the protests need to be carefully studied. In 
order to manage these protests properly, thorough understanding is a necessity. It is clear that 
the public in Khayelitsha is perturbed, as Theron (2009b:113) remarks, “we see frustrated and 
disillusioned beneficiaries going to the streets to protest, and resolution after the other new 
resolution to get the people to participate, but how this challenge will be met in South 
Africa”?  
The violent nature of the protests could be explained by means of psychological and 
sociological analysis. On the one hand, Gurr (1968:250) asserts that violence associated with 
protests is caused by “relative deprivation”, i.e. exclusion from the polity, unemployment, 
poverty and other related factors. According to Gurr (1968:250) and Hough (2008:1), relative 
deprivation functions as a precondition for violence and, if it is severe, the greater the 
probability and intensity of violence. 
Burger (2009:2) utilises the theory popularly known as the “Davies J curve” to explain the 
incongruity between reality and expectations of humans about levels of progress. He argues 
that, under normal circumstances, the situation the individual finds himself or herself in does 
not result in “conflict” or “frustration”, but it is only when there is a sudden change that a 
huge gap is created between expectations and reality. This gap leads to “frustration” and 
“discontent” and, ultimately, to protests. The situation regarding public protests in 
Khayelitsha could therefore be explained as a sudden change which has not been addressed 
by the COCT or properly explained to the public.  Prolonged frustration as part of apartheid 
legacy, on the part of the public has now boiled over into violent protests. 
A study needs to be conducted to assess the extent to which the lack of public participation 
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contributes to public protests. As few studies have investigated how the level of public 
participation contributes to public protests, it is the intention of this study to fill the 
information gap that exists in literature. 
1.2 Problem statement 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (2006:16), scientific investigation can only begin once 
the statement of the problem has been defined. This will then serve to guide the research 
process. 
The upsurge in public protest in the COCT, particularly in Khayelitsha, continues unabated. 
While protests are a democratic right and provided for in the Constitution (RSA 1996), their 
persistence and violent nature at municipal level are a cause for concern. This violent nature 
often leads to the destruction of public and private property, disruptions in economic 
activities, loss of life and severe injuries to innocent victims.  
The prevalence of public protests is despite the fact that the democratic local government 
legislation i.e. Constitution (RSA 1996), White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), 
Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) and Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) explicitly 
emphasise the importance of public participation in the activities of the municipality.  The 
persistence of public protests indicates that a gulf exists between public participation theory 
(WCs and IDPs strategies) and practice (implementation by change agents4) (Cooke & 
Kothari 2001:4). 
The legislation referred to above emphasises that development must be people-centred and 
participatory in nature, premised on the notion that people can and are able to drive their own 
development in line with their aspirations (Theron & Ceasar 2008:104). Furthermore, 
legislation provides for the public to participate through electoral representation, WCs and 
IDPs to ensure that the public is able to influence, direct, control and even own development 
interventions. This is the ideal situation, meant to distinguish between apartheid and a 
democratic system of governance, but this seldom happens in practice, as the people of 
Khayelitsha prefer to ignore these “invited spaces” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) of 
participation. When the system seemingly fails, the public become disillusioned and mobilise 
                                                 
4 As per Theron (2008:1-22), change agent refers to government (local) officials in this study 
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against the COCT authorities and “invent own spaces” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) for voicing 
their dissatisfaction with the COCT participation mechanisms (invited spaces).   
Numerous researchers have been conducting studies with an aim of finding the causes and 
answers to the problem. Findings indicate a myriad of factors that contribute to public 
protests i.e. slow pace of delivery of basic services, governance factors, including lack of 
public participation (Van Donk 2012:21, Mathekga & Buccus 2006:11; Allan & Hees 
2008:1). Moreover, among the factors put forward as reasons for public protests, are issues 
about services that can be delivered by other government spheres, for example the provincial 
and national government. This indicates that anger over the (alleged) failure by other 
government spheres is vented within the local sphere and could be a symptom of  lack of 
purposeful cooperative governance between the three spheres, as envisaged by the 
Constitution (RSA 1996). 
The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which public participation contribute to public 
protests in Khayelitsha.  The assessment will assist the COCT and other municipalities in 
South Africa in dealing and responding effectively when confronted by public protests.  
The study will seek to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To analyse the developmental approaches that underpin public participation in local 
government. 
2. To evaluate the theoretical and legislative framework currently in place for public 
participation in local government. 
3. To determine the extent to which the perceived lack of public participation in the 
COCT contributes to public protests. 
4. To analyse the probable factors that cause public protests to be violent. 
5. To assess if public protests are set to remain the preferred public participation tool, so 
that management of such protests can be improved on.      
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1.3 Research hypotheses 
 
According to Bless et al. (2006:39), a hypothesis “is a suggested, preliminary, yet specific 
answer to a problem, which has to be tested empirically before it can be accepted as a 
concrete answer and be incorporated into a theory”. Moreover, Brynard and Hanekom 
(2006:21) posit that, a hypothesis seeks to establish a relationship between at least two 
variables i.e. dependant and independent. In this instance, the hypothetical position of this 
study is that “until such time that authentic and empowering public participation is practiced 
at local government level, public protests will persist”. Authentic and empowering public 
participation will enable the public to influence, direct, control and own development and 
decision making processes. 
 
The two variables identified in this study are public participation and public protests. The 
independent variable in this instance is public participation, through the available channels 
i.e. WCs and IDPs. Authentic and empowering public participation has been selected in order 
to determine its relationship with public protest, which constitutes a dependent variable. 
This study seeks to empirically test the relationship between public protests and lack of 
authentic and empowering public participation. The study utilises a deductive hypothesis as it 
starts from an existing theoretical point of view, namely that lack of authentic and 
empowering public participation causes public protests.  
Gwala and Theron (2012:2) argue that authentic and empowering participation entails the 
creation of participatory spaces in which the participating public, as beneficiaries of a 
particular programme, project or process, can (i) influence (ii) direct (iii) control (iv) own the 
process. If legislation promise the above, but the practice delivers something completely the 
opposite, can we blame the public if they take the protest route? 
The public protests and their violent nature in Khayelitsha can be attributed to the continuous 
lack of authentic and empowering public participation through the “invited spaces” of 
participation. This has led to disillusionment on the part of the public in Khayelitsha, which 
has prompted them to “invent own spaces” for participation.  
The State reports such as Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA): The 
State of Local Government Report (COGTA 2009b:8-10), National Treasury’s Local 
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Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011:24) and the National Development Plan 
of the National Planning Commission (NPC) (2011:365) confirm the assertion that lack of a 
municipal-public interface is what causes the public to “take to the streets” to protest and 
recommend that the WC model, for example, be refined to give effect to participatory 
democracy at local government level (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18; Van Donk 2012:21).   
The shortcomings of the “invited spaces” (WCs and IDPs) defeat their good intentions, in the 
sense that, if people feel that they are ineffective and take political sides, people will lose 
hope, disengage and resort to other means of making their voices heard such as engaging in 
public protests. The current situation in South African municipalities necessitates the public 
to adopt a more proactive approach (i.e. protest) to demand an increase in the present levels 
of their participation impact and resulting influence in decision-making.  
From the researcher’s observation, it is at the tokenism-participation level in Arnstein (1969) 
ladder of public participation and the Gwala and Theron (2012) levels of public participation 
that the public in Khayelitsha demand that their voices be heard by utilising protest action as 
a public participation strategy.  In light of the ever-escalating public protests in Khayelitsha, 
it is high time that protest action is viewed and documented in statutory literature as a public 
participation strategy.  
If public participation practitioners or the change agents in the COCT can adhere to IAP2 
(2002) and Manila Declaration (1989) principles, the problem of public protests could be 
minimised. The COCT has a legislative obligation to direct its “change agents” (officials) to 
empower the public to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the municipality and to 
engage on issues that affect their lives. A participatory planning structure and partnership 
between the COCT's change agents and the public will go a long way in ensuring efficient 
and effective delivery of services (Theron 2008:29).  
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Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic representation of what this study will attempt to do 
Source: Adapted from Bless et al. (2006:16) 
1.4 Research design and methodology  
 
According to Mouton (2001:55) a research design serves as a plan or “blueprint” of how 
research will be done. Webb and Auriacombe (2006:589) state that research design is the way 
proposed by the researcher on how the hypotheses will be tested. Qualitative research is 
suitable for this study because, in order for the researcher to be able to test the hypotheses, 
the study requires that the researcher have direct contact with the public in Khayelitsha to 
gather information on their views. Qualitative research in the form of Participatory Action 
Research (PAR), particularly observation will be used for this study and primary data will be 
analysed (Burkey 1993, Chambers 1997). 
 
Schurink (2009:803) argues that qualitative research provides the researcher with flexibility 
in terms of manipulating the size of the sample to suit the requirements of the study.  Brynard 
and Hanekom (2006:37)  states that “qualitative  methodology allow the researcher to  know 
the respondents personally, to see them as they are and to experiment their daily struggles 
when confronted with real life experiences of people”.  This will enable the researcher to 
Facts 
Authentic and empowering public 
participation as an essential element 
in minimising public protests in 
Khayelitsha 
Research Problem 
There is a lack of authentic and 
empowering public participation in the 
City of Cape Town, which has led to 
public protests in Khayelitsha 
 
Hypothesis confirmed 
Presentation of results and 
recommendations 
Hypothesis 
Until such time that authentic and 
empowering public participation is 
practiced at a local government level, 
public protests will persist 
Determination, evaluation and assessment 
Determine contributors to public protests, evaluate, assess and observe public 
participation strategies employed in the City of Cape Town and their impact on 
public protests in Khayelitsha 
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interpret and describe the actions of the public. Webb and Auriacombe (2006:592) further 
state that “the advantage of qualitative methods is that they generate rich, detailed data that 
leave the participant’s perspective intact and provide a context for understanding behaviour”.   
 
The limitation is that the collection and analysis of data will require many resources and is 
time consuming. The researcher may encounter challenges in setting up appointments for 
personal interviews with the COCT officials due to their busy work schedules. It may also 
prove to be difficult to get the public in Khayelitsha to attend focus group discussions.  The 
researcher will take precaution for a possible shortfall by recruiting more respondents to 
attend the focus group discussions.   
 
As of 2005, Khayelitsha had a population of 406 779 and twelve wards (COCT 2005:72). 
Four personal interviews will be conducted with four COCT officials and four with Ward 
Councillors, two Councillors from the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic 
Alliance (DA) respectively.  Theron and Saunders (2009:180) states that interviews provide 
an opportunity for the researcher to “probe more deeply” on the questions posed to the 
interviewee. The interviews will be administered in order to assess the respondent’s views 
regarding the reasons for public protests, whether the lack of authentic and empowering 
public participation have any bearing on them and to solicit suggestions on how the problem 
of public protests could be addressed.  Among the COCT townships, Khayelitsha had on 
several occasions been plagued by public protests.  
 
Theron and Saunders (2009:182) maintain that focus groups are advantageous in the sense 
that they provide a platform where questions are discussed and answered in a dynamic and 
mutual social learning context.  Therefore focus group discussion comprising of Ward 
Councillors, WC members, civic organisations, religious groups, disabled, ratepayers’ 
associations, businesses, general public and local economic development forums will be 
utilised. There will be four focus groups comprising members from each organisation.  Each 
focus group will be made up of ten participants who will be purposively selected. The 
researcher as an employee of the COCT will conduct observations in the IDP consultation 
workshops and on how public protests are started in Khayelitsha.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
To further add to the credibility of the study and in supplementing other research techniques, 
secondary data in the form of academic books and journals, dissertations, academic papers, 
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newspaper articles, COCT documents, internet searches and South African legislative 
provisions will be consulted. 
 
1.5 Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.2 Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts 
 Source: By Author (2012) 
 
According to Brynard and Hanekom (2006:62), a mind map is valuable in the sense that it 
“enables the researcher to identify topics (data) critical to the particular investigation, it helps 
to simplify the search for, and the collection of, topic relevant data needed for in-depth 
analysis”. 
Moreover, it is important to clarify and explain key concepts that are used in this study, these 
are: 
1. Developmental local government: Local government which is committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community so as to find sustainable ways 
to meet their social, economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their 
lives (Parnell et al. 2002; Van Donk et al. 2008; White Paper RSA: 1998a).  
2. Mobilisation: This refers to the mobilisation of the civilian population as part of 
contentious politics. Mass mobilization is often used by grassroots-based social 
movements, including revolutionary movements, but can also become a tool of elites 
and the state itself. The process usually takes the form of large public gatherings such 
as mass meetings, marches, parades, processions and demonstrations. Those 
gatherings usually are part of a protest action (See Occupy Wall Street Movement). 
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3. People-centred development: Korten (1990:67) defines people-centred development 
as a “process by which the members of a society increase their personal and 
institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable and 
justly-distributed improvements in their quality of life, consistent with their own 
aspirations”. For Theron (2009b:121), a people-centred development approach is a 
means of bringing development to its rightful owners (the public) since they are, as a 
consequence, capable of driving their own development in line with their desires. 
Kotze and Kellerman (1997:36) further argue that in a people-centred development 
approach, government policy will give confidence and even support the public’s 
endeavours and ensure that they have ownership and control of their own 
development. 
4. Self-reliance: Refers to the positive effects derived from participating in a 
development intervention. The knowledge that one has the know-how and means to 
perform certain actions and duties independently, out of one's own ability. People’s 
participation in a programme/project helps “break the mentality of dependence” 
(Oakley 1991:17). In this way people begin to have confidence in their own abilities 
(knowledge and skills), identification of problems, providing solutions and improving 
the quality of their own lives (Burkey 1993:50). 
Self-reliance can be seen as an end product that can be derived from Meyer and 
Theron’s (2000) building blocks of development i.e. public participation, social 
learning, capacity building, empowerment and sustainable development. 
5. Participatory development: Is defined as “…the self-sustaining process to engage 
free men and women in activities that meet their basic needs and, beyond that, realise 
individually defined human potential within socially defined limits…” (Gran 1983: 
327). This means that beneficiary communities themselves must be able to control 
their own development (Theron 2009b:108) and that they must be able to influence, 
direct and ultimately own the development intervention (Theron & Ceasar 2008:100-
123). 
6. Participatory governance: Is described as “a regulatory framework in which the task 
of running public affairs is not solely entrusted to government and the public 
administration, but involves co-operation between state institutions and civil society 
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groups” (Institute of Labour Studies 2005 in Friedman 2006:4; Cooke & Kothari 
2001). 
7. Protests: The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defines “protest” as a 
“formal statement or action of dissent or disapproval, it is a demonstration of 
objection to official policy”. This can take the form of a protest march where citizens 
mobilise and hand over a memorandum or petition to the (local) authorities. Francisco 
(1995:270) in Nam (2007:98) defines protest as “an act of defiance, challenging the 
political or economic regime”. 
8. Service delivery: It is related to the provision of basic services to residents in the 
municipality, i.e. water supply, street lighting, parks and recreational facilities, roads 
and storm water, electricity and gas supply, health services, refuse removal, sewage 
collection and disposal. Job creation and housing are the most common issues 
demanded by citizens from the municipalities, even though these are primarily 
competencies of both Provincial and Central Government.  
9. Social movement: Is defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represent preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 217-18). 
10. Violence: Refers to the use of unnecessary and unwanted physical force against the 
bystanders or non-participants, police, officials and/or property during the collective 
or mass action. Violence usually takes various forms, i.e. physical attack against other 
people and/or destruction of private and public property.  
1.6 Limitations to the study 
 
The limitation to the study relates to the inability of the researcher to secure appointments 
with top management of the COCT for interviews. It also proved difficult to get the previous 
WC members whose term of office has expired and who were more experienced to 
participate. However the researcher managed to conduct interviews with the IDP and public 
participation practitioners who are involved with public participation on the daily basis. The 
researcher also had to conduct focus group discussions with the new WC members together 
with the public, to make up for lack of experience. As a result of this, inferences about the 
population from the sample data can be made for other communities. 
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1.7 Outline of chapters (See schematic plan of research , p. xvi) 
 
Chapter 1 serves to introduce the research topic of the study. This chapter contains the 
introduction, problem statement and objectives of the study, hypothesis, research 
methodology, limitations to the study, clarification of key concepts and the chapter outline.                            
Chapter 2 deals with public participation in the international context. This chapter will 
explain public participation as a concept. It will also examine the factors that influence 
authentic and empowering participation, i.e. principles of public participation by the 
International Association of Public Participation (IAP2), the Manila Declaration on Peoples 
Participation and Sustainable Development, and the African Charter for Public Participation 
in Development and Transformation (1990). Lastly, public participation as an instrument to 
democratise local government in South Africa will be discussed. 
Chapter 3 will examine the South African context of public participation. This will be done 
by unpacking public participation and the building blocks of development and typologies and 
modes of public participation. Obstacles to public participation and the benefits of public 
participation will also be discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 examines the local government policy context and regulatory framework that 
encourages public participation in South Africa, i.e. the Constitution (RSA 1996), the White 
Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998), the 
Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 
2003). This chapter will also examine the public perceptions of local government in light of 
the persistent public protest engulfing most municipalities in South Africa. 
Chapter 5 examines public protests that have been a cause for concern in Cape Town and 
Khayelitsha in particular. This chapter will provide definitions of protests and social 
movements.  The theories of protests will be discussed in order to provide a theoretical 
grounding of protests. It will seek to explain whether protests are about service delivery or 
public service, the reasons behind public protests and the linkage between public 
participation and public protests. This chapter will attempt to provide mechanisms through 
which public protest can be managed. 
Chapter 6 focuses on data presentation and interpretation of research results. 
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Chapter 7 provides the summary, recommendations and conclusions reached in the study. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented arguments as to why it is relevant and crucial for this study to be 
conducted. It pointed out that the upsurge in public protests in Khayelitsha is as a result of the 
lack of authentic and empowering public participation. The chapter argued that the state 
sponsored (invited spaces) public participation tools such as the WCs and IDP participation 
fall short of the ideal and as a result the public invent own spaces for participation as 
mechanisms to champion their cause. 
This chapter argued that the persistence of public protests, particularly those that turn violent 
pose a threat to the public and private property and has a potential of disrupting business and 
schooling activities. While protests should be used as a public participation strategy, better 
management mechanisms for public protests must be found, to mitigate protest risks. 
This study will advocate for the acceptance and adoption of public protests as one of the 
public participation strategies at a local government level. A new public participation model, 
adapted from Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of public participation will be developed to motivate 
why public protests should be one of the public participation strategies. 
 
The study will test the finding in every chapter against the stated hypothesis of this study that, 
until such time that authentic and empowering public participation is practiced at a local 
government level, public protests will persist. 
The next chapter deals with public participation in the international context. This chapter will 
explain public participation as a concept. It will also examine the factors that influence 
authentic and empowering participation, i.e. principles of public participation by the 
International Association of Public Participation (IAP2), the Manila Declaration on Peoples 
Participation and Sustainable Development, and the African Charter for Public Participation 
in Development and Transformation (1990). Lastly, public participation as an instrument to 
democratise local government in South Africa will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
With most countries the world over abandoning autocratic governance to follow democratic 
practices, public participation becomes a way of life. On the one hand, such participation 
raises hopes of a positive future, especially for the poorest of the poor and the marginalised. 
This means that the manipulative participatory approaches as alluded to by the so-called 
“tyranny debate” (Cooke & Kothari’s 2001:1) are being replaced by authentic and 
empowering participatory approaches, that will enable the marginalised to “enter and engage 
in participatory arenas” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007:9).   
Governments around the world are realising that allowing the public to shape decisions that 
affect their lives is of paramount importance. Governments are increasingly becoming aware 
that public participation is not only beneficial to the public, but  can go a long way in 
ensuring that the governments are seen as responsive to the public needs and  improves the 
quality of public services. Moreover, Van der Walt (2007:28) in Mzimakwe (2010:509) 
asserts that “established democracies around the world have found that public participation is 
essential for transparency and accountability in governance.” 
To this end Theron (2009b:112) argues that the international and national rationale for 
promoting public participation rests on the belief that, if the public take part in development 
interventions, the latter will be viewed as legitimate and will stand a better chance of being 
sustainable. The upsurge in the so-called “Arab Springs, Occupy Movements” and public 
protests provides sufficient proof that participatory approaches are not living up to the 
promise of empowerment and transformative development for marginal people (Hickey & 
Mohan 2004:3). 
Furthermore, it is argued by Chambers (1997), Korten (1990) and Theron (2008) that if the 
beneficiaries of development are made part of the decision-making processes, “they will 
become self-reliant, empowered and assertive about their ability to become masters of their 
own development” (Theron 2009b:112). This calls for a “local government-beneficiary 
planning partnership”, which must utilise social capital and local knowledge systems of the 
beneficiaries and a promise of incorporation of the public’s contribution in future interactions 
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(Gwala & Theron 2012:2). The resultant ideal situation will be the ability of the public to 
influence, direct, control and eventually own development interventions meant for them 
(Hicky & Mohan 2004:8), in line with the principles of the Manila Declaration (1989) and 
IAP2 core values of participation (Gwala & Theron 2012:2). 
This chapter discusses the international rationale of public participation; in particular, it 
explores factors that influence authentic and empowering public participation, i.e. IAP2 
(2002), The Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable Development 
(1989) and The African Charter of Public Participation in Development and Transformation 
(1990). This is done in order to learn about international public participation practices and in 
the light of public protests that plague Khayelitsha, as well as to determine the extent to 
which these can assist in improving the quality of public participation in the COCT. 
2.2 Defining public participation 
 
Cooke and Kothari (2001), Hickey and Mohan (2004), Cornwall and Coelho (2007), (see 
Kotze and Kellerman 1997:37; IAP2 2002; 2007:4, Theron 2009b:115) assert that public 
participation is a complex and elusive concept. This implies that it is difficult to package as a 
single concept, thus opening it up to different interpretations. Theron (2009b:115) argues that 
this is positive, as concepts like “public participation” should not be seen as “blueprints” but 
as a “social learning process”, facilitating dialogue at the grass-roots level.  
According to Kotze and Kellerman (1997:43), the social learning process embraces a 
“bottom-up decision-making and a partnership approach”, where stakeholders (beneficiaries 
of development and the State) are brought together. Through this approach, the success of 
participation will be assessed by the levels of influence that the public are able to exert over 
development and governance issues affecting their lives (Mzimakwe 2010:502). The public’s 
levels of influence should ideally translate to and enable them to direct, control and even own 
the development and decision-making processes. 
 
In the light of the absence of a widely accepted definition of public participation, public 
participation scholars, as will be seen below, have done extensive research on the concept, 
which has broadened our understanding. It is therefore important that different definitions 
and contextualisation be explored with an aim of contributing to the public participation 
discourse to ensure that it becomes more than a buzzword (Leal 2010: 89-100). 
In this vein, IAP2 (2002) defines public participation as “the process by which an 
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organisation consults with interested or affected individuals, organisations and government 
entities, before making a decision”.  In essence, participation gives “voice” to the voiceless 
and “agency” to attend to the needs of the marginalised, in this way the public’s needs come 
first through positive development (Govender et al. 2011:186). Moreover, “public 
participation is a two-way communication and collaborative problem-solving tool, with the 
goal of achieving better and more acceptable decisions” (IAP2 2002).  
 
Creighton (2005:7) defines public participation as “the process by which public concerns, 
needs and values are incorporated into governmental decision-making; a two-way 
communication and interaction with the overall goal of better decision-making, supported by 
the public”. Mzimakwe (2010:503) emphasises the point that a two way process provides 
more scope for the public to influence decisions as compared to consultation.  
 
The World Bank (1996:3) defines participation as “a process through which stakeholders 
influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources 
which affect them”. The starting point here, is to acknowledge that the largest possible way 
through which the public can participate in decision-making processes, is the acceptance and 
embrace of the principle, that the public have a democratic right to participate in decision-
making that impacts on their lives, including governance issues (Gildenhuys & Knipe 
2000:126 in Mzimakwe 2010:503). 
 
According to Kumar (2002:23), public participation means different things to different 
people, depending on the context in which it is used. Kumar (2002:24) argues that this is 
evidenced by the Economic Commission for Latin America (1973) which welcomes 
voluntary contribution to public programmes/projects, but the public have no say in decision-
making. Nanz and Dalferth (2010:3) defines public participation as “the deliberative process 
by which interested or affected public, civil society organisations, and government actors are 
involved in policy-making, before a political decision is taken. It is collaborative problem-
solving with the goal of achieving more legitimate policies”. This means that the participants 
actively participate in an initiative and action that is inspired by “their own thinking and 
deliberation and over which they can exert effective control” (Mzimakwe 2010:502). In this 
respect Siphuma (2009:20) contends that what constitutes (popular) participation is a 
collective effort by the participants to pool their efforts and resources for the attainment of 
the set goals.  
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According to Siphuma (2009:21), the UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs 
(1963:4) asserts that participation by the public, in efforts to improve their living standards is 
expressed in programmes, planned to accomplish a broad range of specific improvements. In 
this respect, participation and development need not to be separated.  For the above to be 
achieved, the public must be part of development planning from the outset through to 
implementation, rather than after choices have been committed (Nzimakwe & Reddy 
2008:669).  Govender et al. (2011:193) posit that “dialogue is the first necessary engagement 
to deliberation as it enables participants to navigate through differences brought together in 
groups and subgroups”. This means that dialogue lays a foundation for deliberations to take 
place.  
The Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) in Govender et al. (2011:193) defines 
deliberation as “a discursive approach to decision-making in which the public come together 
in a non-coercive environment to identify and discuss public problems and possible 
solutions”. However, Theron et al. (2007:8) assert that in South African municipalities, the 
opposite is happening, consultation is promoted and linked with development planning which 
is very problematic. This is so because consultation simply asks the public to give input, but 
the problem and solution is defined by change agents, thus leaving the public out of the 
participation process meant to change their lives. 
As public participation is interpreted differently in various quarters, it has prompted the 
development of typologies and modes within which public participation can be judged. For 
IAP2 (2002) in Theron (2009b:117), public participation should be “presented along a 
spectrum that shows progression from passive participation (public told what to do) at one 
end and self- mobilisation (public control) at the other”. This interpretation of public 
participation is in line with Oakley’s (1991:7) interpretation of the concept as a means to an 
end, which can be equated to passive participation and an end in itself, classified as active 
participation (Theron 2009b:117). 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) (2001:iv) defines public 
participation as “an on-going interaction between role players that is aimed at improving 
decision-making during the planning, design and implementation of DWAF’s development 
projects and processes. It requires the involvement of all stakeholders; including groups that 
are often marginalised, such as women and the youth. Decision-makers have to consider the 
views of stakeholders during the decision-making process”.  
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Furthermore, DWAF (2001: iv) state that “the nature of the planned public participation 
process will depend on what is planned and the goal of public participation. This means that, 
in some instances, the public needs to be informed about certain initiatives or aspects.  Other 
initiatives require public opinions in order to improve decisions and sustainability of the 
initiative. This implies that there is no “one size fits all”, each development intervention 
requires a specific and/or a set of public participation strategies suitable for that particular 
initiative (Gwala & Theron (2012) refers to this as an “appropriate mix”. 
The definitions above emphasise that public participation is a two way process and that 
collaboration between the authorities, public and interested and affected parties in finding 
solutions and making decisions is necessary. Collaboration thus is an essential element of the 
IAP2 spectrum of public participation, the seven typologies of Pretty et al. (1995) and the 
four modes of Oakley and Marsden (1984).  
 
According to Theron and Ceasar (2008:120), Nzimakwe and Reddy (2008:669), the aim of 
collaboration is to be in partnership with the public at each level of decision-making, from 
exploring different options to the problem of finding the solution, in order to ensure the 
transfer of skills, knowledge and ownership of the process to the public (Draai & Taylor 
2009:114). This means that democracy is deepened to the actual citizens since they are given 
a say in the making of decisions that have an impact on their well-being.  
 
As DWAF (2001:1) points out, public participation does not mean that decisions are made by 
the State and the public combined, but that the State reserves the right to take final decisions 
after considering public views and opinions. Mzimakwe (2010:503) disagrees with the notion 
of the State being the final decision-maker and cautions that the essence of authentic 
participation is that “power” is shared between the public authority and the participating 
public. The question is whether the power holders will willingly relinquish power and share 
with the public, which is merely regarded as the recipient of services (Gutas 2005:35). The 
researcher is of the view that the DWAF (2001:1) approach is more relevant in the event 
where technical decisions need to be taken. In this respect Osmani (2006:21) cautions that 
“participation may sometimes be injurious to technical efficiency, if people do not have the 
capacity to make informed judgments on technical matters”.  
 
According to Osmani (2006:21), participation is valued for both intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons. On the one hand, “the intrinsic value refers to the idea that the act of participation is 
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valuable in itself, quite apart from any value it may have in helping to achieve other good 
things”. On the other hand, the instrumental role of participation is that it can reduce conflict 
during policy-making and decision-making processes (The Deliberative Democracy 
Consortium 2004:3 in Govender et al. 2011:193).  
 
The instrumental rationale of participation can be further clarified by examining its 
relationship with two other concepts, namely empowerment and social capital, which also 
features prominently in the Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) rationales of 
deliberation (Govender et al. 2011:193). “These two may be thought of as intermediate 
variables through which participation promotes efficiency and equity” (Osmani 2006:21).   
 
According to Theron (2008:9), social capital refers to people and public assets (access, 
information and influence) acquired by people through social cohesion and relationships they 
form and sustain among themselves. This implies that public participation plays a central role 
in the creation of social capital. Osmani (2006:26) asserts that social capital is not only 
established within and between community members, but it is also strengthened by networks 
of relationships between different individuals and groups operating outside the market sphere. 
This means outsiders, such as consultants are expected to impart their expert knowledge and 
skills to community members. The Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) in 
Govender et al. (2011:193) sums this up succinctly by stating that in the process of building 
social capital, public participation “cultivates a mutual understanding, builds bonds of trust 
among citizens, decision makers and governing institutions, and can effect changes in 
political attitudes and behavior”. 
 
Through the very act of bringing people together and allowing them to interact with each 
other in the course of decision-making activities outside the market,  participatory 
governance gives people an opportunity to strengthen these networks and build new ones 
(Osmani 2006:27). The intrinsic value of public participation mirrors authentic public 
participation as it emphasises social capital and empowerment. These two are crucial to the 
attainment of sustainable development.  
 
For Govender et al. (2011:183) “participation should be viewed from a perspective of 
representative democracy and its off-shoot, deliberative democracy”, where the former means 
that the public participate through representatives elected in the periodic elections and the 
latter emphases “consensus seeking or trade-offs on policy issues”.  Tshabalala and Lombard 
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(2009:397) see public participation “as a means of empowering people by creating a space for 
them to engage in developing their skills and abilities to negotiate their needs in the face of 
forces that often appear to obstruct and discourage them”. 
 
As stated previously, it can be confirmed that public participation is interpreted differently in 
accordance with the context within which it is used. This makes it necessary that the 
researcher formulates a working definition in line with the hypothesis of this study and as a 
point of departure, that “until such time that lack of authentic and empowering public 
participation is practiced at local government level, public protests will persist”.  
 
According to Google.com., a working definition is devised in the event where an established 
definition is not known, in this regard the author utilise a working definition to clarify the 
meaning of the concept or phrase to avoid misunderstandings, as well as to indicate what 
he/she thinks, what it should mean, despite of the current common usage. In the light of the 
above, the researcher defines public participation as a collaborative effort among the 
mobilised public, to rightfully demand from the authorities a stake in the decisions affecting 
their lives. It is a public demand for the rights to influence, direct, control and eventually to 
own the development and decision-making processes that affects their lives.  
 
2.3 Factors that influence authentic and empowering participation 
2.3.1 Principles of public participation – The International Association of Public 
Participation (IAP2) 
 
 The international community has contributed to the public participation debate by 
formulating strategies and guidelines to ensure that public participation is rooted in 
the communities whose lives it is meant to change.  IAP2 (2002), spells out a “Code 
of Ethics” that guides public participation practitioners on how they should conduct 
themselves during public participation facilitation. 
 
According to Theron (2009b:114) and IAP2 (2002) developed seven core values of 
public participation, to be used in the development and implementation of public 
participation processes, namely: 
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1. The public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their 
lives 
 Briad (2011:1) notes the prescriptive form of this core value (value 1) in comparison 
to other core values. This could indicate the importance attached to incorporating 
public views in the decision-making process. In essence this means that public 
participation should not only be limited to voting for public representatives during 
local government elections, but to all issues that have an impact on people’s lives. 
This can be anything from what is perceived to be insignificant by some in authority, 
such as allowing the public to choose the public good that meets their needs and 
aspirations. Clearly this is not happening, as the public in Makhaza (Khayelitsha), for 
example, alleged that the decision to erect open toilets was taken unilaterally by 
COCT, not in participation with the community (Silber & Peter 2010:4). 
The researcher, as an employee of the COCT, observes that this claim, that the public 
do not have a say in the affairs that affect their lives is true, as this is evidenced by the 
prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha. The public in Khayelitsha embark on 
protest to demand that the COCT allow them to influence, direct, control and own 
decision-making and development interventions. Theron et al. (2007:6), point out that 
“the amount of say that the public have, and the extent of their influence, are 
negligible, if not non-existent”.  
2. It should include the promise that the public’s contribution will influence 
the decision 
Core value 2 is well intentioned. However, the persistent public protests in 
Khayelitsha could indicate that potential public input has not yet been incorporated 
into decision-making, because primary input was lacking. 
The researcher observed during the IDP consultation workshops convened by the 
Mayor of the COCT, that the meeting, meant to solicit public views on development 
planning, ended up in chaos after the projects presented by the Mayor were disputed 
by the public in Khayelitsha. In the first place “consultation” does not imply that the 
public views will be incorporated into decision-making (Theron et al. 2007:8). In this 
instance these workshops tended to be “window dressing” and an act of compliance 
with the legislative requirements as it was the case with the Mayor’s Listening 
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Campaign (Gutas 2005:61). 
Briad (2011:3) asserts that to be given an opportunity to participate in decision-
making is not enough, as this does not ensure that the public will participate 
effectively. It is necessary for the authorities to ensure that beneficiaries of 
development are competent to participate and/or coaxed into participating in decisions 
that affect their lives.  
3. It promotes sustainable decisions by recognising and communicating the 
needs and interests of all participants, including decision-makers 
Sustainability depends on the notion of responsible decision-making. The inclusion of 
all stakeholders in the decision-making process encourages robust debate between 
stakeholders. A robust debate enables stakeholders to be receptive to voices of 
dissent. This means that voices of dissent are accommodated by reaching compromise 
and, subsequently, reaching consensus. This implies that the final decision binds all 
stakeholders and such decisions are unlikely to impact negatively on future 
generations as there is complete “buy-in” from all stakeholders.  
The lack of authentic and empowering public participation in the decisions affecting 
the public in Khayelitsha is evidenced by public protests. This is also confirmed by 
the study undertaken by Gutas (2005:56) titled the Mayor’s listening campaign in the 
Integrated Development Planning Process. This study found that there is lack of 
communication and accountability by some Councillors and officials. The question 
that arises is whether the blatant lack of communication will in any way lead to 
sustainable decisions. It can thus be argued that the public in Khayelitsha embark on 
protests to demand that their voices be heard, for them to be able to influence, control, 
direct and own the development process aimed at improving their lives. Once this is 
achieved, decisions will have some degree of credibility and to a certain extent be 
sustainable. 
4. It seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially affected by 
or interested in a decision to be taken 
Core value 4 is problematic as it includes “involvement” which does not guarantee 
that the views of those potentially affected by or interested in a decision will be 
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included in final decision-making. Theron (2009b:119) argues that such 
“involvement” is “associated with co-option, placation, consultation, informing and 
similar slippery concepts”, which manifest itself through protests in Khayelitsha.  
The COCT authorities and officials must go out of their way to solicit the views of 
those who are potentially affected by or interested in a decision. A dedicated 
municipal Councillor or official will not only rely on official participation channels, 
but will utilise the public’s “invented spaces” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) of 
participation to solicit public views and see that they become part of the record.   
As the “Street Committees” are the most popular form of public participation in 
Khayelitsha, the COCT should work with this structure in order to address the 
problem of lack of public participation. This could also go a long way in addressing 
the problem of protest, as it can be argued that it is through this grassroots structure 
that public protests emanate and are planned. Briad (2011:3) submit that, the essence 
of democracy centres on the notion that all those who will be affected by the decision 
must be part of the decision-making process. 
5. It seeks input from participants in designing how they should participate 
According to Thompson and Nleya (2010:224), the most popular form of political and 
social organisation in Khayelitsha is “Street Committees”.  The COCT must recognise 
and legitimise this form of community organisation too. Street Committees are 
powerful public structures, where issues are discussed and decisions taken; as 
opposed to WCs which the public view as dysfunctional. This implies that crucial 
information could be gathered through this structure and utilised in the process to 
avert public protests. 
The researcher has observed that, besides WCs’ perceived dysfunctionality, the 
appointment of WCs alone has some shortcomings. WCs are drawn from the existing 
community organisations, which is problematic as not all wards have community 
organisations.  By virtue of being not represented in the WC structure, therefore 
means that those wards are left out of the public participation process. It is the 
researcher’s view that, should the COCT have undertaken to establish the best 
possible participation design from the public itself, it would have re-looked at the 
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procedure for the appointment of WCs rather than just switching from the only COCT 
“Ward Forum” title, to popularly used WCs. 
Furthermore, the COCT would have learned from the public in Khayelitsha that the 
effective way of getting the public to participate in the affairs of the COCT would be 
to go to public transport interchanges, taxi ranks/interchanges, train stations, 
makeshift selling stands where the public spend the better part of the day fending for 
their families. Gutas (2005:44) assert that the COCT must realise the importance of 
“using public social networks i.e. pub/shebeen or beauty parlour to get the public to 
participate in grassroots decision making”.  In this way the COCT will be in a better 
position to gain input to inform its design of participation strategies thus curbing the 
escalation of public protests.  
6. It provides participants with the information they need to participate in a 
meaningful way 
Core value 6 calls for the empowerment of the public to allow them to participate 
meaningfully in decisions affecting their lives. Friedman (2006:22) argues that the 
best way of empowering the public to participate meaningfully in government affairs, 
is to inform them of government actions in a way that will make them understand the 
choices the public can make.  
As argued above, for Khayelitsha residents to participate meaningfully in the 
decisions that affect their lives they must be able to influence, control, direct and own 
the decision-making process. Gutas (2005:56) warns that as long as the COCT relies 
on a top-down approach to participation as opposed to a bottom-up approach, the 
public in Khayelitsha will continue to feel disempowered and alienated in the 
decision-making processes.  It is the researcher’s view, that the public’s inability to 
participate meaningfully in municipal affairs will prompt them to invent their own 
spaces for participation, where protests will be used as a weapon to demand 
meaningful participation in decision-making. 
7. It communicates to participants how their input affected the decision  
This core value calls for constant contact between authorities and the public in 
Khayelitsha. This could be in the form of regular public meetings that in most 
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instances occur under intense police presence and end in chaos like the Mayor’s IDP 
consultation workshop referred to above. These public meetings will provide feedback 
to the public on progress made.  
Gwala and Theron (2012:1) and Gutas (2005:44) caution that public meetings alone 
are incapable of ensuring meaningful public participation. A combination of 
participation strategies must rather be adopted. Having highlighted the manner in 
which the COCT can get the public in Khayelitsha to participate, the COCT,  in 
addition to its current communication strategies needs to select the most effective 
strategies appropriate for Khayelitsha from the IAP2’s (2006) and the World Bank’s 
(1996) participation toolboxes. 
2.3.2 The Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable 
Development  
 
 According to Theron (2009b:113), the Manila Declaration (1989) provides four public 
participation principles which are echoed in the African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation5 (1990). These are: 
1. Sovereignty resides with the people, the real actors of positive change. It is the 
people themselves who know what is best for them and what will bring about 
positive change in their lives. If sovereignty resides with people, development 
must be community driven, community led and community owned (Korten 
1990:44).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2. The legitimate role of government is to enable the people to set and pursue 
their own agenda. This calls for the recognition from government officials that 
people are not passive recipients of change, but active participants in their own 
development. The ideal situation is a partnership between government and the 
beneficiaries of development whereby government empowers people to 
implement their own development successfully. The opposite of this can be 
described as mobilisation rather than empowerment (Korten 1990:44, Theron 
2008:41-73).  
                                                 
5  Africa’s development thinking since independence – a reader.  2002.  Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa (pp 295-309) 
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3. To exercise their sovereignty and assume responsibility for the development of 
themselves and their communities, the people must control their own 
resources, have access to relevant information and have the means to hold the 
officials of government accountable.  
4. Those who would assist the people with their development must recognise that 
it is they who are participating in support of the people’s agenda, not the 
reverse. The value of the outsider’s contribution will be measured in terms of 
the enhanced capacity of the people to determine their own future. 
2.3.3  The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and                                           
Transformation (1990) 
 
The International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development 
Process in Africa was held in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, from 12 to 16 
February 1990. This was a rare, collaborative effort between African people’s organisations, 
the African Governments, non-governmental organisations and United Nations Agencies. 
The aim of the conference was to search for a collective understanding of the role of popular 
participation in the development and transformation of the region (Davids et al. 2009:215). 
The conference also provided an opportunity for delegates to articulate and give renewed 
focus to the concepts of democratic development, people’s solidarity, creativity and self- 
reliance and to formulate policy recommendations for national governments, popular 
organisations and the international community in order to strengthen participatory processes 
and patterns of development. 
According to Davids et al. (2009:215), the objectives of the conference were as follows: 
1. To recognise the role of public participation in Africa’s recovery and development 
efforts. 
2. To sensitise national governments and the international community to the dimensions, 
dynamics, processes and potential of a development approach, rooted in popular 
initiatives and self-reliant efforts. 
3. To identify obstacles to public participation in development and define appropriate 
approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes. 
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4. To recommend actions to be taken by governments, the United Nations system, as 
well as public and private donor agencies in building an enabling environment for 
authentic popular participation in the development process and encourage people and 
their organisations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives. 
5. To facilitate the exchange of information, experience and knowledge for mutual 
support among people and their organisations, and  
6. Propose indicators for the monitoring of progress in facilitating public participation in 
Africa’s development.   
It has to be noted that the conference took place during the apartheid era when popular 
participation was non-existent in South African governance. Since the dawn of a democratic 
dispensation in South Africa, progress has been made towards the implementation of the 
recommendations of the conference, for example, various legislations have been enacted to 
encourage popular participation. However, a lot still needs to be done to ensure that authentic 
popular participation in development initiatives is realised, as it is currently non-existent. 
2.4 Public participation as an instrument to democratise local government in South 
Africa 
The optimism brought about by the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa has given way to 
pessimism among the public since democracy was attained (Van Donk 2012:12). The hard-
won democracy continues to be an elusive reality, particularly at the grass-roots level, as 
evidenced by the ever-increasing public protests (Hough 2008:2; Atkinson 2007:54). These 
public protests can be attributed to what Van Donk (2012:12) calls the “governance deficit”.  
This is in stark contrast with the optimism expressed by former President Mbeki (2006) in his 
State of the Nation address, that the South African public “is convinced that our country has 
entered its Age of Hope” (Roberts et al. 2010:1). By this he meant that, the public appreciate 
that the country was in the right path towards the achievement of a developmental state. 
Tseola (2012:167) argues that public participation is central to a democratic developmental 
state, as it holds the view that “the delivery of public services is contingent upon the full 
exercise of citizenship”. Once the above has been achieved, arguments about the attainment 
of the developmental state could be made. 
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The present democratic government inherited an assortment of “administrative, financial, 
economic and political structures emanating from the legacy of decades of apartheid rule” 
(Mogale 2003:271), of which its remnants are still evident today. The previous oppressive 
regime discouraged any form of participation, particularly at the grass-roots level, in 
decision-making; instead, participation was defined along racial lines (Edigheji 2003:68).   
The new democratic government had to reverse the ills of apartheid, including the inheritance 
of non-participation at local government level by many. This was to be done by enacting 
social and economic policies geared at “promoting cooperative governance and shared 
growth that will benefit all South Africans irrespective of race and gender” (Edigheji 
2003:68). According to Edigheji (2003:68), cooperative governance involves building a 
strong relationship between social partners (civil society and trade unions) and government.   
At local government level the democratisation process began with the enactment of new 
legislation. The new legislation sought to make public participation compulsory in 
governance processes. The introduction of the principle of developmental local government, 
declaring local government an autonomous sphere of government through decentralisation 
and democratisation, as well as instilling a culture of participatory governance, proved the 
seriousness of government in attempting to reverse the apartheid scourge (Parnell et al. 2002; 
Van Donk et al. 2008). The question is whether these ideals have been achieved?  
As noted above, South African democratic local government is built on the foundation of 
various legislation, such as the Constitution of South Africa (1996), White Paper on Local 
Government (RSA 1998a), Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) (RSA 1998b) and the 
Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) (RSA 2000) (See chapter 4). These are aimed at 
transforming local government from segregated and non-responsive state machinery to an all-
inclusive, participatory and developmental local government that effectively responds to the 
development needs of the people, particularly the previously disenfranchised. The latter was 
the ideal. What has since transpired is far from ideal. 
The White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) gave practical meaning and content to 
the Constitutional provisions by bringing the DLG principle to the fore. The White Paper 
(RSA 1998a) stresses the importance of a partnership between government, the public and 
community organisation in finding viable and long lasting ways that will address their 
economic, social and material needs and consequently bring about improvements in their 
well-being (Davids & Maphunye  2009:60).  
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According to Pearce (2004:484), the levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality in South 
Africa, like those in Latin American countries, put more strain on democracy. This means 
that a partnership between government and the public, as envisaged in the White Paper on 
Local Government (RSA 1998a), is undermined by these deficiencies (poverty, 
unemployment and inequality) as evidenced by high levels of disillusionment among the 
public and the subsequent protests. This shows that the public want citizenship. As Pearce 
(2004:484) argues: public participation in democratic elections alone is insufficient; 
“democracy requires civic participation and social citizenship (a society free from inequality, 
poverty)”.  
CIVICUS6 (2011:31) supports this view and adds that democracy involves participation in 
decision-making processes that affect the lives of the public, between elections, through a 
wide variety of means and mechanisms. These are “community forums, interface meetings 
with government and participatory planning, budgeting and evaluation mechanisms” 
CIVICUS (2011:31), as well as holding a public meeting at which the Councillors explain to 
the public how they spent the money entrusted to them for the benefit of the community 
(Osmani 2006:6).   
In clarifying the concept of democratisation, Cornwall (2008:13) differentiates between three 
components that underpins it, i.e. “franchise” – both public officials and community 
representatives should possess the necessary skills and experience i.e. listening, articulating, 
negotiation and collaboration to be able to increase the number of people to participate in 
decision-making, this requires capacity-building. “Scope” relates to boundaries of public 
engagement, for example, the public may be part of technical decision-making but cannot 
have a final say. The public may make use of mass mobilisation tactics to demand the 
expansion of engagement scope.  
The last component of democratisation “authenticity of control”, involves demands for 
decentralisation and power-sharing between government and the public. In essence Cornwall 
(2008:13) identified three critical issues, i.e. capacity-building, boundaries in decision-
making and decentralisation and collaboration. For the above to be achieved, change in 
organisational culture, attitudes and behaviour of the authorities is required, while local 
                                                 
6CIVICUS is not an acronym. It is a Latin term meaning "of the town" or "of the community." The first Board 
of Directors of CIVICUS believed that this term adequately reflected the values and mission of CIVICUS when 
it was formed. 
 Website: https://www.civicus.org 
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government champions must be innovative in seeking ways of engaging and empowering the 
public for local government to be democratised (Theron et al. 2007:2).  
Another important element in the local government democratisation process is the legitimacy 
of government. Diamond (1994:5) opines that for government to be seen to be democratic, 
the public must view it as legitimate, particularly if it is based on the “rule of law”.  To this 
end, the mass mobilisation that characterised the fight against apartheid and orchestrated by 
political formations, organised labour, church groups, individuals at a grass-roots level and 
from civil society, could indicate that public viewed the apartheid regime as illegitimate 
(Phago 2008: 239). Fortunately, the public in Khayelitsha still view the COCT as legitimate, 
as they are able to vote in periodic democratic elections, hand over petitions and engage in 
collective action. 
The researcher is of the opinion that, if the prevailing lack of public participation in the 
COCT persists, legitimacy approval can be short-lived. For the COCT to maintain its 
legitimacy status, new thinking, as proposed by Theron et al. (2007:2), is required. This “new 
thinking” calls for the democratic regime to distinguish itself as having removed itself from 
the apartheid dispensation by continuously encouraging authentic and vibrant public 
participation in the affairs of governance. This is in line with Friedman’s (2006:1) argument 
that the struggle against apartheid necessitated the incorporation of both grass-roots citizens 
and affluent interests in decision-making. In essence, the struggle against apartheid was a 
demand for authentic participation in decision-making processes. 
Davids (2005:18) asserts that for democracy to prevail, it is essential that the public 
participates “especially if the society in question is a developing society in a process of 
consolidating its democracy”. Davids (2005:18) argues that in South Africa public 
participation has two objectives to fulfil, (i) “upholding the principles and systems of 
participatory democracy and ensuring the legitimacy of the state at local level through the 
public as voters being encouraged to participate in formal political processes, such as 
elections and referendums” and (ii) participation in local government aims to aid the 
development of the public to alleviate poverty through the delivery of services and local 
economic development (Davids 2005:18). For these objectives to be realised, the public, in 
order to give them control over development and governance processes and outcomes and to 
achieve greater administrative efficiency, must be empowered to participate.  This way, will 
enable the public to become self-reliant. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
According to Edigheji (2006a:94), COGTA (2009:9) and Atkinson (2007:53), South African 
municipalities are under such strain that it is impossible for them to meet the above-
mentioned objectives. Figure 2.1 below depicts an ideal situation where the public, according 
to Davids (2005:19-20), can have a meaningful say in “development and governance”; where 
their voices would be heard and responded to (the authorities having both administrative and 
financial capacity to respond to their grievances).  
     
Figure 2.1: Translating “voice” into “influence”  
Source:  Davids (2005:20) 
Davids (2005:20) posits that when the above is achieved, “voice becomes influence”. 
However, Davids (2005:20) warns that “for the voice to be translated to influence, there has 
to be action from below and from above”.  Here municipalities are responsive to the public’s 
needs and the public having meaningful influence over policy decisions. This can be referred 
to as authentic public participation. Authentic public participation, through participatory 
partnerships, will result in the reduction of poverty, improved service delivery, see grievances 
attended to and new policies accepted (Davids 2005:20, Theron 2008: 41-73).  
2.4.1 Democratising local government through decentralisation 
Decentralisation is another instrument that can be used to democratise local government. 
Schonwalder (1997:757) argues that popular participation enhances decentralisation at a local 
government level, particularly when the public mobilise local resources for their benefit, thus 
aiding decentralisation efforts. The Department for Communities and Local Government 
(2010:2) argues that “the best contribution that central government can make is to devolve 
power, money and knowledge to those best placed to find the best solutions to local needs”. 
This means that the public should be empowered to do things for themselves and where they 
Outputs and Outcomes 
New policies 
Poverty reduction 
Improved service delivery 
Redress of grievances 
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are lacking, the government should build their social capital to enable them to influence, 
direct, control and own development meant for their betterment, in the process establishing 
participatory partnerships. 
According to Schonwalder (1997:757), one way of democratising local government through 
public participation is political decentralisation. This means allocating central government 
powers and resources to the lower sphere, which has happened in terms of South African 
local government. Manor (1999:55) in Pieterse (2002:2) supports this view and adds that 
South African local government legislation has all four ingredients necessary for successful 
decentralisation. These are: 
1. The public is able to influence policy decisions at a political level (through voting for 
their preferred political party during elections), including development interventions. 
2. The local government sphere receives a fair share of budget allocation from central 
government for development purposes. 
3. Local government has administrative capacity to exercise its duties, and 
4. There are sufficient checks and balances to ensure accountability. 
The Department for Communities and Local Government (2010:2) adds to ingredients that 
local government can use to give power back to the public, i.e. opening up government to 
public scrutiny by releasing government information into the public domain, so that the 
public can know how their money is spent, how it is used and to what effect.  The burden of 
bureaucracy must be lifted – by removing the cost and control of unnecessary red tape and 
regulation, whose effect is to restrict local action (The Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2010:2). 
Despite good intentions and promising decentralisation in South Africa, there is still an 
astonishing high level of public protests that continue to plague municipalities, which 
according to Heller (2009:3) is caused by the little leverage that be public have over political 
society (local government). This means that the public is not yet participating fully in the 
affairs of governance due to democratic practices that have been eroded, and the public finds 
itself politically disempowered (Heller 2009:3) 
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According to Edigheji (2006a:94), decentralisation has emerged as important arenas of 
political participation. However, municipal councillors and officials lack capacity to meet the 
new responsibilities being entrusted to them, as well as to represent their people effectively. 
“They also lack the skills and knowledge to set implementable goals, undertake financial 
planning and human resource development, consult with local communities and promote 
sustainable development” (Edigheji 2006a:94). This defeats the purpose of decentralisation, 
being that of deepening democracy, bringing government closer to the public and ensuring 
that they are able to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making 
processes. In this vein, Heller (2009:5) posits that “democratic deepening requires striking a 
delicate balance between the aggregate logic of political society and deliberative logic of civil 
society.” 
Schonwalder (1997:757) cites benefits associated with decentralisation, i.e. decreasing 
dependence from the central government, leading to administrative efficiency; local 
governments are perceived to be more responsive and accountable to the people and 
decentralisation opens up new channels for popular participation at grass-roots level, 
supplementing electoral participation brought about by representative democracy. This will 
serve to include the popular masses as part of the political system, providing what he calls 
“practice grounds for democracy”. These will allow for direct input from popular and social 
movements (One World Action 2008:4; Schonwalder 1997:757).   
Given their participatory and democratic character, social movements can be used to 
safeguard issues such as corruption and maladministration. In this way persistent violent 
public protests could be minimised in areas such as Khayelitsha. Boisier (1987:134) in 
Schonwalder (1997:761), argues that “local and regional governments are seen as places 
where a potential social contract between the state and civil society can be negotiated”, owing 
to their proximity to grass-root citizens, but this seldom happens in South African local 
government. 
The researcher argues that after the demise of the apartheid government, the South African 
population had an expectation that the negotiated settlement will yield a democratic state 
sympathetic to the plight of the poor. This was expected to be even more so, in recognition of 
the sweat equity lent to the struggle against apartheid through mass mobilisation. The reward 
expected by the masses was not in monetary terms, but for their voices to be heard and for 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
full inclusion of their views in decision-making processes. Simply put, the reward was to be 
fully included in a form of participatory governance.  
 
2.4.2 Democratising local government through participatory governance 
 
Edigheji (2006b:2) assert that participatory governance “is seen as a means to overcome 
governmental deficits, reduce information gaps and to build consensus around policy, lead to 
smoother implementation of state policies, ensure accountability and transparency in 
governance, as well as to enhance the credibility and sustainability of programmes, and to 
enhance developing countries’ global competitiveness”.  
The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) (2010:3) states that participatory 
governance seeks to ensure active and total participation of the public in governance matters 
as one way of enhancing democracy at a local level of governance. Participatory governance 
means the inclusion of the public or groups in policy-making and implementation processes 
(Friedman 2006:4).  Participatory governance is about empowering the public to influence 
and share control in processes of public decision-making that affects their lives (CIVICUS 
2006:4). It has to be noted then, that though this is one of the reasons why people fought 
against apartheid, they still find themselves in a similarly powerless situation today. 
A notable participatory structure in South Africa, born out of the negotiated settlement, is the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).  NEDLAC, established in 
1995 as a bargaining council to deliberate on economic policies, is composed of organised 
labour, business and government (Friedman 2006:4). It is not clear how much of a voice the 
grass-roots groups have in this structure, as it is composed mostly of organised social 
formations. The grass-roots in most cases are not organised; instead they have their own self-
invented spaces of participation, which could mean they are effectively excluded. Friedman 
(2006:1) supports this view and argues that the biggest mistake was to assume that the public, 
particularly the unorganised grass-roots groups, are properly represented in this structure by a 
single organisation.  
 
A development chamber was established in response to concerns of the possible exclusion of 
the poor, particularly the unorganised. These are now represented by key civil society 
organisations that are assumed to be representative (Edigheji 2003:78).  This practice is in 
conflict with the ideals of participatory governance. Participatory government is biased 
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towards ensuring social inclusion of the often marginalised societal groups and individuals 
(women, poor people, rural people, children and people with disabilities) (CIVICUS 2006:4). 
 
Since the extent to which the grass-roots groups are able to influence decision-making in the 
above-mentioned structure is not known, it can be assumed that they are participating. 
Tadesse et al. (2006:6) caution that the existence of public participation in governance alone 
is not enough, but the significance exists if there is authentic public participation. In other 
words, representative democracy (i.e. periodic voting in the elections) does not guarantee 
public participation in policy formulation and implementation. Therefore participatory 
governance seeks to address the shortcomings of representative democracy by “reducing 
information gaps and building consensus around policy, smoother implementation of state 
policy, ensuring accountability and transparency in governance as well as to enhance the 
credibility and sustainability of programmes” (Edigheji 2006b:2).  
 
In giving credence to the above, Pimbert and Wakeford (2001: 23) in Creighton (2005:2), 
argue that democracy without citizen deliberation and participation is ultimately an empty 
and meaningless concept, hence the need to ensure authentic public participation in the 
COCT. If this happens, the public in Khayelitsha will be empowered to do things for 
themselves and ultimately become self-reliant. They will be in a better position to influence, 
direct, control and even own the development and decision-making processes meant for their 
betterment. 
 
Besides NEDLAC, another participatory governance tool that the COCT can use to reach out 
to the grassroots is the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). The COCT defines an IDP as a 
principal strategic planning instrument, which guides and informs its ongoing planning, 
management and development actions (COCT IDP 2007-2012). Pieterse (2002:5) states that 
the IDP is the “chief democratisation instrument in local government and it also provides the 
integrative logic for almost all the components of the new policy dispensation”. The public is 
expected to take centre stage in the development of the IDP, but this seldom happens.  
 
Furthermore, the advantage of the IDP is that it distinguishes between the new democratic 
dispensation and the old one. It does this by bringing together democratising elements, such 
as “democratic governance, participatory planning and efficient, modern, managerial 
practice” (Pieterse 2002:5). This seems not to be happening in most municipalities, however.  
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The intentions of the IDP are clear and look good on paper.  However, the critics point to a 
number of shortcomings, for example, Harrison (2008:327) sees IDPs as reinforcing a top-
down approach; they tend to be prescriptive and are driven by municipalities which then 
exclude the input of the beneficiaries from the ensuing development. Pieterse et al. (2008:7) 
adds that IDPs were meant as platforms through which the public will be engaged with regard 
to policies and programmes, but instead the public is being fed with information, rather than 
seeking their input. In the difference between informing and consulting lie the public 
appearance and the ideal, authentic public participation process (Theron 2009b:119). Local 
government seldom engages in public participation which empowers the public: it mostly 
informs or consults the public. 
According to Pieterse (2002: 7), the Rio Summit of 1992, which was sponsored by the United 
Nations (UN), crystallised significant principles aimed at democratising local government, 
i.e. participation by the poor in decisions affecting their lives, safety nets for poverty 
reduction, economic growth, labour intensive production methods, democratisation, 
localisation, environmental protection and sustainability, etc. These democratisation 
principles emerged during this era, together with the argument that they provide answers to 
the expectations that local government is responsive to the public’s needs and can provide 
participation opportunities, particularly for the poor.  
It was during this Summit that two strands of expected participation characteristics emerged, 
i.e. that participation is crucial for legitimising state actions and compliance. The other strand 
focused on the empowerment of the public, to give them the confidence to take charge of 
their own development and see state democratisation as the primary function of participation 
(Pieterse 2002:7).  This is the ideal situation, as noted above, but although these terms look 
good on paper, they are hardly practised in South African municipalities. The reality at grass-
roots, i.e. IDPs in municipalities, is that consulting and involving strategies are higher 
regarded than those which empower the public, i.e. authentic public participation. 
Section 72 of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) provides for the establishment of 
WCs to enhance participatory democracy within the local government sphere. WCs can only 
be established by categories A and B municipalities (Cameron 2005:335) in Phago 
(2008:240). WCs are meant to create a bridge between the public and the political and 
administrative structures of municipalities. According to Buccus and Hicks (2008:526) and 
Oldfield (2008:490) like IDPs, WCs are fraught with problems ranging from politics of 
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representation at WC level, structural limits to WC powers and WCs being involved in party 
politics. 
 
The above-mentioned shortcomings of WCs defeat their good intentions in the sense that, if 
the public feel that they are ineffective and take political sides, they will lose hope and resort 
to other means of making their voices heard such as engaging in protests. Gwala and Theron 
(2012:3) argue that authentic and empowering participation entails the creation of 
participatory spaces (see Cornwall & Coelho:2007:2-25), in which the participating public, as 
beneficiaries of a particular programme, project or process, can (i) influence (ii) direct (iii) 
control and (iv) own the process. If legislation promises the above and the practice delivers 
something completely opposite; can we blame the public if they take the protest route? 
 
Moreover, Oldfield (2008:493) contends that “patience of some community organisations and 
movements to work within state-driven and controlled participatory processes has withered 
and oppositional protests tactics have become routine”.  Buccus and Hicks (2008:52) sum this 
up succinctly by stating that participation approaches will fail if people believe that their 
contribution is used to “rubber stamp” the decisions that have already been made or if they 
feel that their contribution will not be considered, which is happening in COCT. 
 
CIVICUS (2006:4) puts forward factors that can support or hinder the success of 
participatory governance approaches, i.e. social, cultural, political, institutional, legal, and 
economic. Figure 2.2 (below) depicts conditions that influence the success of participatory 
governance interventions, which CIVICUS seeks to promote. These conditions are relevant in 
the South African context and need to be enhanced, i.e.  (i) the capacity of civil society and 
(ii) government actors in promoting the development of (iii) effective and innovative 
systems, mechanisms and tools.  
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Figure 2.2: Key factors influencing participatory governance  
Source:   CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) (2006:5) 
Having put forward the key factors influencing participatory governance, it is important to 
note that government and the public stand to gain by working in a collaborative and 
harmonious manner.  In this vein, Friedman (2006:4) provides justifications for government 
to allow civil society groups in governing, i.e. prevention of resistance from organised 
groupings as their exclusion will frustrate the government goals it seeks to achieve, to 
oversee policy implementation and sell it to constituencies.  
According to Friedman (2006:4), these are not meant to deepen democracy but to make 
government “smoother”, because only the already organised voices are heard. Another 
rationale is a genuine commitment from government to “broaden/deepen democracy”. In this 
rationale the grass-root groups are engaged though their structures, such as the Street 
Committees in Khayelitsha and WCs (where they are properly functioning). 
Other examples of participatory governance through context specific public participation 
strategies that can enhance democracy at a local government level, are participatory planning, 
participatory tax collection, participatory budgeting, public posting and reporting of local 
expenditures, participatory community score cards and citizen oversight committees 
(CIVICUS 2006:3) (see also IAP2 Public Participation Toolbox 2006; World Bank 
Participation Toolbox 1996).  Friedman (2006:4) sums this up succinctly by stating that 
social policy is hampered by a “representational gap in which the needs of the poor are 
unknown”, and that “participatory governance should seek to deepen democracy through 
grass-roots not the organised”. Friedman cites the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)\as one 
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example of participating in government, as it was able to force government to provide 
antiretroviral drugs. The protest march that was led by COSATU in Johannesburg against 
labour broking and e-tolling is the recent case in point. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The success of public participation will depend on effective utilisation and application of 
public participation ideals as spelt out by the IAP2 (2000) core values and the Manila 
Declaration (1989). The South African government will be forced to adhere to these 
principles only if it agrees to regard protest as one of the public participation strategies 
propounded by Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) (2002:3) and 
supported by the researcher.  
This chapter argued that for local government to be democratised, participation should be 
supplemented by democratisational instruments, such as adhering to developmental 
principles, as envisaged in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), political 
decentralisation and participatory governance. There is also a need to strengthen the “vehicles 
for public participation” (IDPs and WCs) in an attempt to deepen democracy and to achieve 
authentic and empowering public participation.  
Theron (2009b:132) sums this up by stating that IDP in South Africa provides an opportunity 
for the communities to “reclaim their stake in government” and that public participation is a 
cornerstone principle in the democratisation process and good governance. 
The following chapter discusses public participation in a South African context. The 
discussion will focus on the building blocks of development, typologies and modes of public 
participation by locating protest action in the spectrum of public participation. A new public 
participation model will also be developed. This will be done to establish whether it can be 
used as a public participation strategy. Potential benefits and obstacles of public participation 
will also be discussed in this chapter. Protest action has become a common practice in South 
African municipalities and Khayelitsha in particular.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to the introduction of a democratic dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid system of 
governance was hostile towards the inclusion of the public in decision-making. The hostility 
meant that the benefits of public participation were enjoyed by one race group only, to the 
detriment of the majority. This deprived the majority of citizens of a history of authentic 
public participation in policy-making and implementation (Masango 2002:52).  
The democratic government had the responsibility to transform local government into an 
inclusive, democratic, developmental oriented and participatory sphere, which effectively 
responds to the needs of the public. As Davids (2009:18) points out, the democratic 
government's policy reflects an “integrated, people-centred, development approach” and 
commitment to promoting a “democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society”, characterised by 
integration between decision-makers, private and voluntary sectors and the intended 
beneficiaries of development. 
This chapter discusses the South African context of public participation in relation to the 
ideals of a “people-centred development approach”, formulated as the building blocks of 
development and its impact on the grass-roots masses that are often marginalised. As public 
participation lies at the heart of democracy, it is important that public participation strategies 
are discussed i.e. typologies and modes of public participation, as well as the obstacles and 
benefits they bring.  
This chapter will also attempt to locate “protest” within a newly constructed public 
participation model.  Moreover, “protest” will be located within an IAP2 public participation 
model to motivate why “protest” should be seen as a public participation strategy. This will 
go a long way in ensuring that the change agents and the intended beneficiaries of 
development will practise a brand of authentic public participation that will benefit even the 
poorest of the poor. 
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3.2 Public participation and the building blocks of development 
 
According to Theron (2009a:105) and Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:9), the new local 
government dispensation has ignited the development debate that has seen various 
approaches, such as community development, people-centred development, participatory 
development and capacity-building with bottom-up approaches coming to the fore. Theron 
(2009a:105) asserts that the development debate is as a result of the failure of development 
agents and the development industry at large to accept that “authentic,  micro-level  
development means that people themselves must take  centre stage in the development debate 
and its philosophy, theory, strategy and policy”. 
Davids (2009:18) asserts that the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development of 1994 
redefined the development principle, leading to an “integrated people-centred development” 
approach,  to such a degree that it has become a buzzword in the development fraternity (Leal 
2007:539, Leal 2010: 89-100) .  Korten (1990:67) defines people-centred development as a 
“process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional 
capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable and justifiably distributed 
improvements in their quality of life, consistent with their own aspirations”.  
Theron and Ceasar (2008:104) argue that for a people-centred development approach to yield 
the desired result, the public must be capacitated to be able to participate in the development 
process, so that they are ultimately able to drive, control and even own the end product. 
Theron (2009b:121) and Theron and Ceasar (2008:104), see a people-centred development 
approach as bringing development to its rightful owners (the public) since they are, as a 
consequence,  capable of driving their own development in line with their desires.  
Kotze and Kellerman (1997:36) further argue that in a people-centred development approach, 
government policy will add confidence and even support for the public’s endeavours, 
ensuring that they have ownership and control of their own development. This implies that 
the “beneficiaries of development” have full participation in decision-making processes and 
have capacity to make informed decisions. Fokane (2008:36) maintains that this is possible, 
as a people-centred development approach, provides the public with the freedom to unleash 
their creative capabilities, as opposed to being passive recipients of development. 
Oakley (1991:4) maintains that public participation requires a move away from using external 
agents to steer change to the locals, but that the locals themselves should steer change. 
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Theron (2009a:107) clarifies that “participation means dismantling the top-down, prescriptive 
and often arrogant one way knowledge transportation and communication styles, which are 
imposed on communities by outsiders”.   
From the arguments raised above, it is clear that the exclusion of the public from 
development interventions, or imposing it on them, cannot be regarded as development. It is 
this confusion that has led to the debates on what participatory development means (see 
Cooke & Kothari 2001-“tyranny debate”; Hickey & Mohan 2004; Cornwall & Coelho 2007). 
Oakley (1991:6) foresaw this confusion, as he puts it bluntly:  “It has now become impossible 
to come up with a development strategy that is not participatory”. This call fell on deaf ears 
and now seems to be happening in Khayelitsha where lack of public participation has 
contributed directly to the growing and persistent level of public protests. This implies that 
the change agents7 fail to understand that public participation forms an integral part of the 
people-centred development approach.   
Davids (2009:17) maintains that the principles of a people-centred development approach are 
premised around Meyer and Theron’s building blocks of development, which are public 
participation, social learning, empowerment and sustainability. According to Theron 
(2009b:123), “people centred development, like the principle of developmental local 
government, shifts the emphasis in development interventions to the public and away from 
objects, service delivery and production”.  It does this by enhancing public skills and 
capacity, through acknowledging and utilising “own context specific indigenous knowledge 
systems (IKS) and social capital”, for the public to be able to participate in its own 
development (Theron 2009b:123). 
Numerous postgraduate students8 have also used the building blocks of development as 
analytical guidelines to contextualise public participation.  In the same vein the building 
blocks of development features prominently, as one of the nine themes of development 
(Theron 2008:229). This makes it necessary that the change agents and beneficiaries of 
development should “conceptualise and contextualise the building blocks towards planning a 
development process” (Theron 2008:229).  
Theron (2009b:121) cautions that the building blocks of development are logically connected, 
meaning it is a step-by-step process.  Meyer and Theron (2000:4) assert that “in whatever 
                                                 
7 As per Theron (2008:1-22), change agent refers to government (local) officials in this study 
8 Gutas (2005:9), Nampila (2005:10), Davy (2006:5), Nekwaya (2007:25) and Siphuma (2009:45) 
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context the complex development concept is used, it must be seen as a building block” as 
shown below:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Building blocks of development 
Source:  Meyer and Theron (2000:5) 
 
3.2.1 Public participation 
 
According to Theron (2008:14), “the holistic nature of development has, as one of its first 
point of departure to development planning and facilitation the building block of 
participation”. This is attributed to the fact that public participation is a critical element in the 
process of human growth, hence it has been placed deliberately as the first building block of 
development (Theron 2009b:122). This implies that the process of public participation is as 
complex as human nature itself, because it is an integral part of human development (Theron 
2009b:122). Moreover, Liebenberg and Theron (1997:124-127) assert that when Max-Neef 
(1991) analyses fundamental human needs, he identifies public participation as one of the 
nine basic human needs that must be satisfied by the development process.  
As noted above, for a development intervention to be regarded as authentic, people 
themselves must take centre stage in the development process in an endeavour to satisfy a 
basic human need. Authorities thus have an obligation to ensure that every individual, 
particularly the poorest of the poor, is part of the decision-making mechanism regarding 
development (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:50) due to inherent Constitutional rights that 
Public Participation 
      Social Learning 
      Capacity-Building 
      Empowerment 
       Sustainability 
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apply.  For basic human need to be satisfied by a developmental intervention, the public and 
the development agents alike must be empowered to enable them to make informed 
decisions. Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:51) warn against the elite wanting to use 
participation for their own benefit, at the expense of the poor. Should this happen, 
participation will be reduced to mere “co-option”. Hickey and Mohan (2004:9) and Cooke 
and Kothari (2001:5) argues that these actions of the elite defeat the purpose of participatory 
development, i.e. that of counteracting the “shortcomings of top-down development 
approaches”. 
Participatory development has an important role to play in ensuring that a development 
intervention impacts on basic human needs. This is more so because participatory approaches 
to development seek to make the public “central to development by encouraging beneficiary 
participation in interventions that affect them and over which they previously have limited 
control or influence (Cooke & Kothari 2001:5). This means that participatory development is 
biased towards increasing participation of the socially and economically marginalised public 
in decision-making over their own lives. 
As noted above, Gran (1983:327) refers to participatory development as a “self-sustaining 
process” where development is driven by the community for its betterment (Theron 
2009b:120).  For Burkey (1993:58), “participatory development implies a collective process 
of self-improvement”. This implies that people who have the same goal come together to 
share ideas for the attainment of that particular goal.  
Furthermore, people learn from their mistakes and end up being experts in their own 
development. Theron and Ceasar (2008:104) assert that participatory development starts with 
a smaller group, or “the ring leaders”, and gradually reaps the rewards which attract and 
encourage other members to join in the project. Mosse (2001) in Theron and Ceasar 
(2008:105) argues that “the key principle of participatory development is the incorporation of 
local people’s knowledge into programme/project planning”. The ultimate goal of 
participatory development will be for the public to become self-reliant. Cooke and Kothari 
(2001:5) sum this up succinctly, that participatory approaches to development are “justified 
in terms of sustainability, relevance and empowerment”. 
Oakley (1991:17) states that self-reliance refers to the gains that people derive as a result of 
participating in development efforts. For self-reliance to come to the fore, people need to feel 
that they are driving their own development (Burkey 1993:50). Participation empowers 
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people to gain confidence in their own knowledge and skills and their ability to identify 
problems and find solutions in order to make improvements (Oakley 1991:17, Burkey 
1993:50). This implies that by participating in a programme/ project, the public will learn 
from their mistakes and eventually become masters of their own development. 
3.2.2 Social-learning process approach 
 
As noted above, the building blocks of development are logically connected, meaning it is a 
step-by-step and incremental process (Theron 2009b:121). In line with this, is the social-
learning process approach; the second building block of development.  According to Korten 
(1990:484), the social-learning process approach aims to meet the need for “... a flexible, 
sustained, experimental, action-based, capacity-building style of assistance...”  This approach, 
according to De Beer (1997:28), extends the principle of bottom-up planning by avoiding the 
restrictions of a blue-print (top-down) approach.  Theron (2009b:123) argues that public 
participation, through change agents and development organisations, should adopt a learning 
attitude for programme/ project initiation.  
The COCT needs to adopt this approach to ensure that the beneficiaries of development are 
not brought in as spectators in the social learning process, but as active participants in their 
own development (Theron 2009b:123). Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:33) argue that, to 
ensure that change agents and development organisations adhere to a social learning process 
approach, change agents must be sent to communities with an “empty agenda”. In other 
words, they should approach the public with “empty slates”, ready to instil the culture of the 
learning process in them. The World Bank (1996:2) supports this assumption and states that: 
Over time development experience has shown that when external experts alone acquire, 
analyse and process information and present this information in reports, social change 
usually does not take place, whereas the kind of social learning that stakeholders generate 
and internalise during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a development 
activity does enable social change. 
To instil the culture of social mutual learning and partnership between the public in 
Khayelitsha and the COCT, as highlighted by Korten (1983:213-214) in Theron (2009b:123), 
three elements must be integrated into project design, planning, implementation and 
monitoring, i.e. 
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1. The community and the development intervention: The wishes of the community and 
the project’s output must be compatible and integrated. 
2. The community and the organisation (COCT): The formulation of the needs and 
grievances by the people and the decision-making process of the organisation should 
be integrated. 
3. The programme and the organisation (COCT): The programme objectives must be in 
line with the capacity of the organisation. 
The social-learning process approach provides the beneficiaries of development with an 
opportunity to contribute in the design of a development intervention through their IKS, 
social capital and local, context-specific knowledge (Theron 2009b:124).  
3.2.3 Capacity-building 
 
The third building block of development is capacity-building. Swanepoel and De Beer 
2011:26) assert that capacity-building means the strengthening of personal and institutional 
ability to undertake tasks. According to De Beer (1997:21), capacity-building “rests on the 
premise that people can lead their own change processes”. This can be achieved by adopting 
a learning-process approach, aimed at capacitating the beneficiaries of development to 
eventually take control of their own development (Korten 1980:502 in De Beer 1997:21). 
This calls for collaboration (planning together and learning from each other’s mistakes) 
between the beneficiaries of development and authorities.  
According to Mohaneng (2000:135), capacity-building comprises three main components. 
Firstly, it provides access to information and knowledge, social mobilisation and the material 
and financial resources required for meaningful participation by the public in decisions that 
affect their lives. DWAF (2001: 20) stresses the need for the previously disadvantaged to be 
part of public participation processes because they possess “experience and knowledge, both 
indigenous knowledge and modern,” and they know their own situation better than external 
change agents (Theron 2008:1-22).  
The second component involves making productive resources available to the 
underprivileged, entailing equitable distribution of economic resources and access to land and 
financial resources. In this way the negative effects, emanating from the imbalances of the 
past, are minimised and the public gradually realises its potential. Of significance is that the 
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capacity-building process must take into consideration and accommodate the variety of 
societal, economic and cultural differences found in that particular community, while it must 
also be grounded in the contextual realities applicable in the particular municipality 
(Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:26). 
The last component of capacity-building relates to the effectiveness of both administrative 
and institutional structures (Bryant &White 1992:15).  In essence this means that a municipal 
political structure must be accountable and responsive to the needs of the people. It must be 
free from corruption and services must be delivered in an efficient manner.  
According to De Beer (1997:22), government, primarily, must bring about capacity-building, 
but only as an enabler, not hands-on. “Non-governmental organisations, voluntary 
organisations, community-based organisations and the private sector” must also assist in 
capacity-building, depending on the extent of their participation in development interventions 
(De Beer 1997:22). This assistance, according to Korten (1990:484), must be part of a 
learning process characterised by a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based, capacity-
building approach. The observation by Parnell et al. (2002) and Van Donk et al. (2008) 
however shows that the “development” ideal in “developmental local government” is 
currently just an ideal. 
Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:26) warn that, while it is important that the capacity-building 
process be developed in participation with the participants, there must be a structure 
capacitated by capable people, to avoid the danger of attracting ill trained trainers with no 
support system to assist them.  If training proceeds under such conditions, participants will be 
frustrated and resort to protest action. 
3.2.4 Empowerment   
 
The fourth building block of development is empowerment. According to Watt et al. 
(2000:120) in Theron (2009b: 124), the issues of public participation and empowerment in 
the planning process for service delivery are essential to sustainable development. This 
implies that, for sustainable development to take place, the public should have power to drive 
its own development. Because, according to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:52), people 
empowerment is a process fed by information, knowledge and experience which leads to the 
public having confidence in their own abilities. This is in line with Liebenberg and Theron's 
(1997:124) assertion that the process of empowerment is aimed at increasing personal and 
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institutional capacities of the public, in order to mobilise and manage resources towards 
meeting their basic needs.  
According to Theron (2008:16), empowered participation entails the requirement through 
participation of “leverage” for the participants in a development process. There are two 
conditions for this to occur (Oakley 1991:9), (1) the public is empowered through their skills 
and abilities, for them to be able to do things for themselves, i.e. management and negotiation 
skills, (2) the public is equipped to be able to take decisions and to take actions in a 
development process. Once this is done, the public must be continuously supported, by 
providing necessary information to make good decision-making possible (Swanepoel & De 
Beer 2011:52). This ensures that the public is empowered to be able to assume power in 
development interventions and decisions.  
It is important that the public in Khayelitsha, for example, have the means to assume the 
power that they end up demanding through public protests. Public protests are mainly about 
the demand to be able to influence, direct, control and eventually own the development 
intervention. This calls for information systems and training opportunities to be put in place, 
as Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:30) put it, “empowerment is a mixture between the right to 
make decisions and the ability to make decisions”.  
3.2.5 Sustainability 
 
Sustainability is the last building block of development. The World Commission on 
Environment and Development (1987:43) defines sustainable development as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (Theron 2009b:125, Treurnicht 2000:63).  
According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:53) sustainability issues are a result of a 
“revolutionary paradigm shift in science and development practice”, which they call the 
“view of holism”. This means that human nature and the rest of nature form a oneness, a 
whole, which if not properly managed, all living things will diminish (Swanepoel & De Beer 
2011:53). This calls for the revitalisation of knowledge systems that help to sustain 
environmental systems over long periods of time and be shared in a reciprocal way 
(Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:53).  
“Sustainable development is not a destination, but a dynamic process of adaptation, learning 
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and action. It is about recognising, understanding and acting on interconnections - above all, 
those between the economy, society and the natural environment” (UN 2012:8). Swanepoel 
and De Beer (2011:55) warn that “learning for sustainable development must be open ended 
and people should realise that collectively and individually they seldom have the knowledge 
to approach development with confidence”.  
Liebenberg and Theron (1997:126) argue that participation and empowerment are central 
components of sustainable development on the basis that sustainable development should be 
based on advantageous realisation of access to and mobilisation of resources by the 
marginalised, in order to tackle their basic needs.  
Saide (2006:32) correctly points out that the other four components of the building blocks of 
development form an integral part of sustainable development, i.e. participation, social-
learning, capacity-building and empowerment. Sustainable development at local government 
level in South Africa will not be achieved if municipalities do not manage to establish local 
government-community planning partnerships (Khan & Cranko 2002:262-275), through 
which the public are empowered to influence, direct, control and own their “own” 
development. 
3.3 Typologies and modes of public participation 
 
Theron's (2009b:114) assertion that “today it is almost impossible to suggest a development 
strategy which is not in some way participatory”, suggests that public participation occupies a 
central place in development thinking and practice (Kumar 2002:23). This, however, does not 
mean that development practitioners, policy makers or the public agree on what public 
participation is and how it should be implemented (Theron 2009b:115). Public participation 
is understood, interpreted and enlisted differently, depending on the context in which it is 
used (Theron 2008:106; Kumar 2002:24; Chambers 2005:104). According to Theron 
(2009b:116), this has prompted researchers like Arnstein (1969) and Pretty (1994) to develop 
typologies of public participation within which public participation can be conceptualised and 
put into practice. Chambers (2005:105) cautions that typologies, ladders and modes of public 
participation are not cast in stone, but act as a guide and can be adapted to suit the prevailing 
situations, contexts and needs.  
In assessing the value of typologies and models of public participation, the researcher’s 
contention is (see building blocks) that the public should be able to influence, direct, control 
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and “own” their own development.  
Pretty et al. (1995) provide the following typologies of public participation: 
1. Passive participation: Authorities unilaterally take decisions on the public’s behalf, 
in other words, the public have no say in, nor get to know about, projects meant for 
their development. They are told only once a decision has already been taken or are 
told beforehand what is to be decided. This is in contrast with the core values of IAP2 
(2000), i.e. the public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their 
lives. 
2. Participation in information giving: The public participate by answering questions 
posed in questionnaires or respond to telephone interviews or similar “participation 
strategies” mostly utilised by external change agents. The public do not have the 
opportunity to influence proceedings as the findings are neither shared nor evaluated 
for accuracy. 
3. Consultation: The public participate by being consulted by external people (i.e. not 
members of their community). These change agents, in a top-down manner, define 
both the problems and possible solutions and may modify these in the light of 
responses gathered. This type of a consultative process does not give the public a 
share in decision-making nor are the external change agents under any obligation to 
incorporate the input received (See Gutas 2005). 
4. Participation for material incentives: The public participate by being provided in 
return for food and cash or other material incentives. This is prevalent in the farming 
community where farmers provide the fields but the public is not involved in the 
experimentation or the process of learning. People have no stake in prolonging the 
activities when the incentives end. 
5. Functional participation: The public participate by forming groups to meet 
predetermined objectives related to the project, which may involve the development 
or promotion of externally-initiated social organisations. This type of involvement 
tends not to occur at the early stages of project cycles or planning, but only after 
major decisions have been taken. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
6. Interactive participation: The public participate in joint analysis, development of 
action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen 
as a right, not just a means of achieving project goals. 
7. Self-mobilisation: The public participate by taking initiatives, independent of 
external institutions and change agents. They develop contacts with external 
institutions for resources and the technical advice they need, but retain control over 
how resources are used. Such self-initiated mobilisation and collective action may or 
may not challenge existing inequitable distribution of wealth and power.  
Oakley and Marsden (1984) provide four modes of public participation (which overlap with 
Pretty et al.’s (1995) typologies above). The four are: 
1. Anti-participatory mode. Public participation is considered a voluntary contribution 
by the public to a programme/project which will lead to development, but the public 
is not expected to take part in shaping the programme/project content and outcomes. 
2. Manipulation mode. Public participation includes involvement in decision-making 
processes, implementing programmes/projects, evaluating such programmes/projects 
and sharing the benefits. 
3. Incremental mode. Public participation is concerned with organised efforts to 
increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations 
for groups or movements excluded from such control. 
4. Authentic public participation. Public participation is an active process by which 
the public influence the direction and execution of a programme/project with a view 
to enhancing their well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance or 
other values which they cherish.  
For Theron (2009b:117) public participation should be “presented along a spectrum that 
shows progression from passive participation (public told what to do) at one end and self-
mobilisation (public control) at the other” as shown if Figure 3.2 below. The ideal situation is 
when the public is able to influence, direct, control and own the decision-making process and 
the development intervention. 
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                             Giving Consultation              Incentives 
       Figure 3.2: A Spectrum of public participation 
 Source:  Kumar (2002:25) 
 
The striking phenomenon in this spectrum is the variation in the participation process control 
between the public and outsiders. For example, moving from passive participation to self-
mobilisation, outsiders dominate the process, while control of local people is minimal if not 
non-existent (Kumar 2002:26).  At the other end (self-mobilisation), local people have total 
control, as opposed to outsiders’ minimal control. This can be regarded as authentic 
participation.  
From the researcher’s observation, it is at the “participation by consultation” level that the 
people of Khayelitsha demand that their voices be heard by utilising protest action as a public 
participation strategy.  Protest action is used to draw the attention of the COCT authorities to 
their endeavours and to compel the Council to include them in development planning and 
implementation. This inclusive approach is currently non-existent. 
Following Kumar (2002:26), the public in Khayelitsha is demanding that power be 
transferred to them. In other words, they are demanding interactive participation and 
participation through self-mobilisation,  as they view these options as empowering and being 
the only way to gain control over their resources and lives (Kumar 2002:26). This 
interpretation/distinction of public participation is in line with Oakley’s (1991:7) 
interpretation of the concept - a means to an end which can be equated to passive 
participation and an end to itself, classified as active participation, as depicted in Table 3.1 
below (Theron 2009b:118). 
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  Table 3.1: Comparative Analysis: Participation as means and/or as an end 
Participation as a means Participation as an end 
Implies the use of participation to achieve some 
predetermined goal or objective 
Attempts to empower people to participate in their 
own development more meaningfully 
Attempts to utilise existing resources in order to 
achieve the objective of programmes/projects 
Attempts to ensure the increased role of people in 
development initiatives 
Emphasises achieving the objective rather than the 
act of participation itself 
Focuses on improving the ability of the people to 
participate rather than just achieving the 
predetermined objectives of the programme/project 
More common in  government programmes/project, 
where the main concern is to mobilise the 
community and involve them in improving the 
efficiency of the delivery system 
Finds relatively less favour with government 
agencies. NGO’s in principle agree with this 
viewpoint 
Generally a short term process 
 
Generally a long term process 
Appears to be a passive form of participation Relatively more active and dynamic than 
participation as a means 
  Source:  Kumar (2002:26) 
In addition to the above distinctions and in demonstrating different conceptions of public 
participation, it is also important to differentiate between “involvement” and 
“empowerment”.  
According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:28), participation does not mean involvement. 
They argue that: “When we involve people in projects, we allow them in, under certain 
conditions, to take part in certain actions in a prescribed way”. This, according to Theron 
(2009b:118) is a “weak form of participation which can be equated to co-
option/mobilisation/an anti-participatory and manipulative mode of participation / placation 
/consultation / informing and other slippery concepts”. The strong interpretation of 
participation equates participation to empowerment (Bryant & White 1982:16, 205, De Beer 
2000:272 in Theron 2009b:119). Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:31) argue that 
“empowerment does not necessarily mean possessing certain skills and token representation 
in, for example, a committee, but to have “decision-making power” (Taconni & Tisdell 
1993:413 in Swanepoel & De Beer 2006:30). 
In the light of the above presentation it is important to note the different purposes of public 
participation conceptions and strategies.  In the same vein, Cornwall (2008:270) argues that 
“typologies are a useful starting point for differentiating degrees and kinds of participation”. 
This is shown by, for example, the Arnstein's (1969) ladder of public participation that seeks 
to measure the extent of the public contribution in the public participation process, as 
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opposed to Pretty et al.’s (1995) demonstration of different conceptions of public 
participation,  as well as Oakley and Marsden’s (1984) depiction of ranges or bands of public 
participation. This confirms the assertion that public participation is a complex concept and 
approach and that it is understood, interpreted and enlisted differently, depending on the 
context in which it is used (Theron 2008:106, Kumar 2002:24, Chambers 2005:104). 
However, it is important to note that all three models are able to show non-participation at the 
extreme left (bottom) and authentic participation at the extreme right (top).  
Comparing Pretty et al.’s (1995) seven typologies and Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of 
participation against Oakley and Marsden’s (1984) modes of public participation, there is an 
overlap that can be deduced, i.e. an anti-participatory mode can be associated with Arnstein’s 
(1969) manipulation and Pretty et al.’s (1995) passive participation. Manipulation is equated 
to Arnstein’s (1969) placation, consultation, informing and therapy and Pretty et al.’s (1995) 
functional participation and participation in information giving. Oakley and Marsden’s 
(1984) incremental mode is similar to Arnstein’s (1969) delegated power and Pretty et al.’s 
(1995) interactive participation. Lastly, authentic public participation is similar to public 
control and partnership (Arnstein 1969) and Pretty et al.’s (1995) self-mobilisation as 
depicted in Table 3.2 below.  
Table 3.2:  Comparison of Arnstein’s (1969), ladder and Pretty et al.’s (1995) 
typologies of public participation against Oakley and Marsden’s (1984) 
modes of public participation 
 Source: By Author (2012) 
In a South African context, public participation is concentrated on two modes, i.e. anti-
participatory mode and manipulation mode which closely overlaps with the “involvement” 
and “consultation” strategies often used. This is evidenced by the fact that most 
municipalities find it difficult to adhere to the principles of the IDP, which is supposed to be 
 1.Anti-participatory mode • Manipulation 
 
• Passive participation 
 2. Manipulation mode • Placation 
• Consultation 
• Informing  
• Therapy 
• Functional participation 
• Participation in 
information giving 
 3.  Incremental mode • Delegated power 
 
• Interactive participation 
 4. Authentic public participation • Public control 
• Partnership 
 
• Self-mobilisation 
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the embodiment of participation in the municipality.  According to Theron (2009c: 141) an 
IDP “is the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, 
budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality”. It is an all-encompassing 
instrument that also acts as a participation vehicle at a local level of government.  
Public participation in the IDP process comprises of five phases, through which the public 
must take part (Tshabalala & Lombard 2009:397). These phases according to Tshabalala and 
Lombard (2009:397) range from the analysis of local needs, identification and establishment 
of priorities, leading to the definition of the local vision, project design and integration with 
other programmes, to the final adoption of the IDP. It has to be noted that public participation 
should form an integral part of all these phases.  
The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) spelt out participatory obligations for local 
government and imposed a new concept of IDP over various other pieces of legislation. The 
reality however is, that public participation of the intended beneficiaries at municipal level in 
South Africa seldom reaches the ideals presented in the above models. What is referred to as 
“public participation” in the majority of IDPs, seldom go beyond “involving” and 
“consulting” the public. 
As a public participation vehicle (IDPs), it is expected that local authorities will ensure the 
integration of public views and aspirations into an IDP, in line with the provisions of the 
Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000). This seldom happens. The intentions of the IDP are 
clear and look good on paper, however the critics point to a number of shortcomings. Tseola 
(2012:165) argues that “IDP service delivery planning has alienated the public by closing 
down the scope for political deliberations and thwarting the potential for joint supply, non-
rivalness, non-excludability and non-rejectability”.  
Furthermore, Harrison (2008:327) and Tshabalala & Lombard (2009:397), state that IDPs 
reinforce a top-down approach, tend to be prescriptive and are driven by municipalities, thus 
excluding the input of the beneficiaries of development.  According to Tseola (2012:165), 
this is caused by the “hegemonic planning approach” underlying municipal IDPs, which 
allow programme/project planning to supersede public views, needs and wishes. This brings 
about anger and disillusionment on the part of the public and protests follow.  Pieterse et al. 
(2008:7) add that IDPs were meant as platforms for engaging the public regarding policies 
and programmes. However, rather than seeking their input, the public is being fed 
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information which is equivalent to the anti-participatory mode discussed above. In this lies 
the difference between “informing” and “consulting” the public (i.e. the manipulation mode) 
and the ideal, authentic public participation (Theron 2009b:119).  
This confusion on what constitutes “public participation”, according to Theron (2009b:120), 
could primarily be attributed to Arnstein’s (1969) level 5: consultation (manipulation mode), 
which is often the point of departure in IDP (Watt et al. 2000:121 in Theron 2009:120). 
Tshishonga and Mbambo (2008:772) add that “from the Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of public 
participation, it is evident that those who pay lip service to the notion of participation 
subjugate communities in consulting, informing, therapeutic as well as manipulative modes 
of participation”. The dangers associated with this practice are that the public’s culture to 
engage critically, is eroded and people are used to rubber stamp decisions that has already 
been made (Tshishonga & Mbambo 2008:772).  
The above emanates from a “new culture”, as argued by Theron (2009b:120) that the manner 
in which “consultation” is used in South African policies, is as if it will ultimately result in 
“social equity”. The researcher argues that it is during the non-participation (anti-
participatory mode) and degrees of tokenism (manipulation mode) levels, that the public is 
“fed up” and utilise protest power to forcefully graduate to public power (see Mchunu Public 
Participation Model below). At this level (protest power) of the ladder, the public mobilise 
and protest to demand their right to influence, direct, control and own development and 
decision-making processes. Tshishonga and Mbambo (2008:772) succinctly sum this up by 
stating that “power to the people results from continuous engagement and challenging power 
relations that extend the tendencies of relegating the poor and disenfranchised outside the 
decision-making and power structures”. 
As explained above, public participation is a complex concept that is understood and 
interpreted differently, depending on the context within which it is used; the same applies to 
its strategies. According to Theron (2009b:127) public participation strategies must not be 
seen as “blueprints”, instead they must be used to suit the prevailing circumstances, as each 
public participation process will necessitate “specific, relevant, or a combination of 
strategies”.  In other words it is of the essence “to pay closer attention to who is participating, 
in what and for whose benefit” (Cornwall 2008:269).  
Having analysed Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of public participation, Oakley and Marsden’s 
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modes of public participation and Pretty et al.’s (1995) typology, the distinction lies in a 
power struggle between the public’s attempt to influence, direct, control and own 
development and decision-making processes that rightfully belong to them and the municipal 
authorities avoiding and resisting public power.  
The researcher has developed the Mchunu Public Participation Model.  Protest in the Mchunu 
Public Participation Model is located between “public power” and “tokenism”, indicating that 
the public’s frustrations and disillusionment caused by non-participation and tokenism 
compels them to protest and demand public power.  Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:50) argue 
that tokenism is practiced when the public is mobilised and then having its participation 
limited or prescribed. Moreover, when we involve people in programmes/projects, we allow 
them in, under certain conditions, to take part in certain actions in a prescribed way. 
According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:50), this therefore means that the whole process 
is pre-planned by the change agents and authorities.  
The ideal situation is when the public is mobilised to participate fully and in all aspects of the 
development programme/project, which leads to the public being part of the decision-making 
and planning of the programme/project. In other words, the public is part of the 
implementation and evaluation of the programme/project and have meaningful participation 
in the management of the development intervention (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:50).  
Figure 3.3 below provides an outline of the public participation model which is advocated by this 
study and within which public participation will be evaluated. 
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Levels of 
participation 
Types Characteristics 
 
Public power 
Public control 
              
Delegated power 
             
Partnership 
The public is in a position to influence, direct, control and 
own development and decision-making processes. 
Decisions are taken through negotiations between the public 
and authorities. The public has majority stake and have 
delegated authority. 
Decisions are no longer taken unilaterally but the public and 
authorities have equal decision-making power. 
                                  
Protest power 
          
Protest 
The public is frustrated with “tokenism” and as a last resort; 
peaceful protests are staged to demand authentic and 
empowering public participation. 
The public mobilise to demand the right to influence, direct, 
control and own development and decision-making 
processes. 
If all else fails, the public resort to violent protest action to 
draw the attention of the authorities to its plight.   
 
             
           Tokenism 
Placation 
           
          
Consultation 
 
              
Informing 
The public demands are ignored and the public is beginning 
to have some little influence. Members of the public are 
handpicked and co-opted to serve on committees, but the 
authorities still retain the power to make final decisions. 
The public is given an opportunity to make input in 
decisions but there is no guarantee that their input will be 
incorporated into final decisions. The public input is used to 
legitimise decisions that have already been taken. 
The public is informed about development that is taking 
place in their locality. Emphasises a one way flow of 
information with no mechanisms to channel feedback. This 
level can be equated to “window dressing”. 
 
   Non-participation 
Therapy 
         
Manipulation 
The public is used to mask therapy as public participation, it 
is dishonest and arrogant. 
The members of the public are co-opted to serve on Ward 
Committees but are used to rubber-stamp Council decisions. 
Participation is used as pretence since the public is unable to 
influence, direct, control and own decision-making 
processes. 
  Figure 3.3:  Mchunu Public Participation Model  
  Source: By Author (2012) 
In the same vein IAP2 (2007) provides the “spectrum” of public participation which is aimed 
at increasing the impact of the public in making decisions. This “spectrum” clarifies various 
forms of public participation: 
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The above-mentioned overview emphasises a need for public officials to keep contact with 
the public in a manner that increases the levels of influence, direction, control and ownership 
of the public. DEAT (2002:3) asserts that the IAP2 (2007) spectrum for public participation 
provides a starting point for addressing confusion surrounding the concept of public 
participation. This relates to the levels of influence that the beneficiaries of development 
should exert in decision-making processes. DEAT (2002:3) is of the opinion in that the IAP 2 
spectrum must be modified by adding in “protest” as the first level in the spectrum (see figure 
3.4 below). 
 Figure 3.4: The spectrum of public participation 
 Source:  DEAT (2002:4) 
DEAT (2002:3) argues that in most instances “protest” is viewed as emanating from the 
breakdown of trust between the beneficiaries of development and authorities, yet “protest” is 
a useful strategy of ensuring that the public will have an impact on decision-making 
processes.  Van Donk et al. (2008:152) contend that “the upsurge in popular protests and 
non-violent, direct action is an integral part of participatory local democracy and fully in line 
with the scope for democratic expression envisaged in the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 
2000)”. 
Based on the researcher’s observation and as an employee of the COCT, the decision to erect 
open toilets in Khayelitsha was reversed by the Western Cape High Court as a result of 
protest action by the public in Khayelitsha. Another example of (successful) protest action 
relates to high-profile, municipal-boundary and demarcation disputes such as that of 
Khutsong and Matatiele.  In this case, protest action by the public was the “first stage in full-
fledged delegitimation of the local state” (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). The cases above 
illustrate the “power of protest action”. 
Besides the fact that protest action played a major role in bringing about democracy in South 
Africa, Mottiar and Bond (2011:18) correctly point out that, “Sometimes the rationale for 
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protest follows decades-old cultural traditions, which, like during the apartheid era, reflect an 
inadequate opportunity for local political participation”.  Theron (2008:120) concurs and adds 
that the frustrated “beneficiaries of development” are left with no option but to protest, 
especially if formal participation structures such as the IDP, fail.  In fact, the option to protest 
has historically been part of public participation and democracy in South Africa and is also 
enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). This trend continued in a new democratic 
dispensation, as in the late 1990s when Nelson Mandela’s government was  protested against 
after only a brief “honeymoon” (Bond 2000: 217-223 in Mottiar & Bond 2011:3).  
In light of the ever escalating public protests in Khayelitsha, it is high time that protest action 
is viewed and documented in statutory literature as a public participation strategy. The 
question that needs to be asked is whether the South African authorities are willing to accept 
and institutionalise “protest” as a public participation strategy. If not, it could be because 
“protests and system monitoring are not popular activities among those who are protective of 
what they may perceive to be their prerogative to abuse the power they hold” (Korten 
1990:187). 
In India, public protests are widely accepted as part of normal politics and viewed as a way of 
getting into contact with the authorities (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). In essence, protest in 
India is viewed as complementing the official channels of political participation, such as the 
role WCs and Councillors are meant to play in South Africa (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). 
Based on the researcher’s observation, this seldom happens in South Africa with protests 
rather seen as the work of criminals which must be suppressed and be dealt with harshly.  
Regardless of the harsh realities protest action has endured, we have seen the “power of 
protest action” at play, for example, in the recent Local Government Turnaround Strategy 
(COGTA 2009:19) and the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on 
Service Delivery, 2010:47), both specific government responses to protest in South Africa.  
These reports state that a lack of municipal-public interface is what causes the public to “take 
to the streets and protest” and recommend that the WC model be refined to give effect to 
participatory democracy in communities (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18).  
Furthermore, protest action plays a pivotal role in soliciting reaction, drawing attention of the 
authorities to the public plight and even forcing authority’s hand to allow public participation 
in decision-making processes. The South African authorities need to follow the Indian 
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example and regard protest as a public-participation strategy. As Mottiar and Bond  (2011:18) 
posit:  “If social protest is taking hold as a way for aggrieved poor and working-class South 
Africans to articulate and enforce their interests, then a range of understandings of this 
phenomenon should be considered”.  
It is the opinion of the researcher that we will otherwise continue to witness the emergence of 
more confrontational approaches, such as the so-called “Arab Springs”, “Occupy Wall 
Street” (Schneider 2011:2) movements in the United States of America and here at home, the 
“Occupy Rondebosch Common” (Ndenze 2012). The current situation in South African 
municipalities in this regard (lack of authentic and empowering public participation 
opportunity) necessitates the public to adopt a more proactive approach (i.e. protest) to 
demand an increase in the present levels of their participation impact and resulting influence 
in decision-making, as shown in figure 3.3 and 3.4 above.   
Having located “protest” in the Mchunu Public Participation Model (see figure 3.3 above) 
and at the lowest level of the IAP2 spectrum (see figure 3.4 above) in support of DEAT’s 
(2002:3) modification of the spectrum, it is important to look at other elements of the 
spectrum. Confusion around public participation and its strategies rages on and is further 
compounded by the DEAT (2002:3) resolve to replace the term “participation” with 
“engagement”. In the same vein an email conversation between Larry Susskind and the IAP2 
members (Carson 2008:67) provide insight into the concerns about the effectiveness of the 
IAP2 spectrum in increasing the levels of impact on decisions (see Theron et al. 2007).  
To begin with, “inform”. The confusion surrounding it relates to it not being regarded as 
public participation, as it represents a “passive role” for the public. To have information 
disseminated to you does not mean you are participating in a meaningful way, although it is 
not seen as “passive” from a decision-maker point of view (Carson 2008:76). Theron 
(2005:117) argues that the manner in which concepts such as “inform”, “consult” and 
“involve” “are defined and implemented in South Africa, do not constitute authentic public 
participation”.  For DEAT (2002:4) “inform” is indeed a one-way information flow, however, 
it is not meant to influence or change opinions and attitudes, but to help “stakeholders to 
understand an issue at hand, alternatives, solutions or the decision-making  process” (IAP2 
2000).  
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Furthermore, for DEAT (2002:4) “inform” forms an integral part of its initiatives, in the 
sense that some instances require that people are informed, consulted, involved, etc. In other 
words, the project level, or the task at hand, dictates the course of action (DWAF 2005:10; 
Association for Water and Rural Development 2009:2). As noted above, in South African 
local government, particularly in relation to the IDP, consultation is promoted, but for some it 
connotes a pseudo process in which people are asked to give input, but the change agents 
define both the problem and the solution (Theron et al. 2007:8). This is more so because there 
is no obligation on the part of a change agent to respond to people’s needs; all he/she has to 
do is consult (Theron et al. 2007:8). The reason for this is, as the World Bank (1996:4) states, 
that “consult” is an essential element of participation, but should not be equated to 
“participation”, because the element of learning, from the beneficiary’s side, is still missing 
in “consult”. Consultation explicitly excludes the beneficiaries of development from 
decision-making (Theron et al. 2007:8).  
Involvement in South African local government does not fulfil the IAP2 intended 
requirements, in the sense that it suggests “co-optation, placation, manipulation and the like” 
(a manipulative mode of public participation) (Theron 2005:17 in Theron et al. 2007:9). 
Carson (2008:77) correctly argues that concepts like “involve” and “consult” should be 
combined, as the difference is subtle. 
The Association for Water and Rural Development's (2009:2) spectrum of public 
participation provides the first four levels of the IAP2 (2002) spectrum, but omits “empower” 
as an autonomous decision-making process. According to the Association for Water and 
Rural Development (2009:2), autonomous decision-making is non-existent in the South 
African legal context; only a collaborative manner of decision-making qualifies. This is true 
for South Africa and confirms the primary purpose of the spectrum; that it is not a “blue-
print”, does not give instructions on the correct way of conducting public participation, but 
acts as a reflection of various processes to aid decision-makers on how much input and 
influence they can count on and have to commit to (Carson 2008:77).  
Theron et al. (2007:11) maintains that “centralised, top-down legislation and administration 
create obstacles to grassroots, bottom-up participation of the collaborative sort”. As a result, 
administrative structures like the IDP value control highly and are constrained by rigid, blue-
print style guidelines set out in legislation” (Davids 2005:52-74 in Theron et al. 2007:11).  
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Theron et al. (2007:11) assert that “such structures are in conflict with the requirements of the 
hope-to-be empowered public, as they are inconsistent with collaboration”, although the first 
three can be regarded as being in line with the manipulation mode discussed above. South 
African local government legislation envisions the aspects of the spectrum of public 
participation. The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000), for example, requires that the public 
must participate in the development of the IDP. In practice this seems to be lacking, as 
evidenced by the prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha.   
A possible solution to this problem as Theron et al. (2007:11) suggest, will be for public 
participation practitioners in South Africa to adapt the “IAP2 principles” and the “spectrum” 
to apply to their development initiatives, as this will provide a solid platform for the 
development of public participation strategies and tools.  
While it is important to consider international guidelines for public participation, it is 
appreciated that participation facilitators must always (first) assess the local context(s) before 
an “appropriate mix” of strategies can be decided upon (Gwala & Theron 2012:8). 
Appropriate strategies will ensure that the public is provided with the scope to influence, 
direct, control and even own development interventions and decision-making processes. 
3.4 Obstacles to public participation 
 
The inclination for the public in Khayelitsha to resort to unconventional means of public 
participation indicates that there is a stalemate between the public and authorities 
representing the COCT. It is therefore important to consider the factors that negatively affect 
public participation. Oakley (1991:11) recognises three factors as obstacles to public 
participation, as it occurs in a highly-contestable, socio-political environment. These are: 
structural obstacles, administrative obstacles and social obstacles. 
3.4.1 Structural obstacles are prevalent in governments with a centralised political system. 
This system discourages grassroots participation in decision-making. As Kumar 
(2002:29) points out, it is “typified by a top down development approach”. 
Fortunately, at least on paper, the South African government has enacted laws that 
encourage public participation. The local government sphere, perceived to be closer to 
the people, has been entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the public 
participate meaningfully in the affairs that affect their lives. This is done through 
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IDP’s and the establishment of WCs.  
3.4.2 Administrative obstacles are caused by centralised administrative structures, which 
tend to have absolute control over decision-making and development planning and the 
allocation of resources, information and knowledge (Oakley 1991:11). This leaves the 
beneficiaries of development outside of the redevelopment interventions that are 
meant for their benefit. In essence, a set of guidelines are put in place, adopting a 
blue-print approach that usurps local people’s say in the decisions affecting their lives 
and which even swallows up their resources (Kumar 2002:29) .  
3.4.3 Social obstacles, like the mentality of dependence and culture of silence also impede. 
Domination by the local elite or even gender inequality militates against people’s 
participation” (Kumar 2002:29).  
3.5 Benefits of public participation 
 
As indicated above the dawn of democracy in South Africa raised hopes that the marginalised 
will finally enjoy the benefits of public participation, which previously benefited the selected 
few. These hopes emanated from the introduction of progressive laws such as the 
Constitution (RSA, 1996), Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 2000), Municipal Structures Act 
(RSA, 1998b) and a host of others. The legislation made public participation a democratic 
and fundamental right, as Mzimakwe (2010:504) points out in that “public participation is 
fundamental in order to sustain democracy and promote good governance”.  
The researcher argues that the prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha is caused by lack 
of authentic and empowering public participation, that will enable the public to influence, 
direct, control and own the development and decision-making processes meant to take them 
out of poverty. Because public participation in decision-making increases buy-in into 
government policies and ensure that the public understands the constraints within which 
service delivery occur (Nleya 2011:5).  This means that if the public in Khayelitsha was made 
part of decision-making processes, public protests will not be as widespread as they are 
currently. 
If the public in Khayelitsha is allowed an opportunity to decide on what is best for themselves 
and make decisions that affect their lives, the decisions stand a better chance of being 
accepted and embraced by the broader Khayelitsha citizenry. From the researcher’s 
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observation, the opposite is happening in Khayelitsha.  The public is made to embrace 
predetermined decisions, which contradicts the rationale of public participation. The public 
should be allowed participation from the formative stages rather than when the choices have 
already been made by the authorities (Mzimakwe 2010:504). 
Public participation in Khayelitsha will help resolve problems related to basic services 
delivery.  On the one hand, the public will be in a position to understand the operations of the 
municipality such as budget allocations, different government spheres competencies and 
mandates and related constraints. On the other hand the COCT will be in a position to 
understand the immediate needs and priorities of the public in Khayelitsha.    
Furthermore, Irvin and Stansbury (2004:3) provide the benefits that can be derived from 
public participation to both public participants and government in decision-making processes, 
as shown in Figure 3.5 below:  
   Advantages to   Advantages to Government 
   Public participants 
 
 
       Decision 
         Process 
 
 
         Outcomes 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.5:  Advantages of public participation in government decision-making  
 Source:  Irvin and Stansbury (2004:3) 
 
Kangwane (2008:19) lists the following potential benefits for public participation: 
1. It enhances allocative efficiency. 
2. It increases the chances of effectiveness by applying local knowledge in implementing 
public programmes and projects. 
 
 Education (learn from and 
inform government 
representatives) 
 Persuade and enlighten 
government 
 Gain skills for activist 
citizenship 
 
 Education (learn from and inform 
citizens) 
 Persuade citizens, build trust and 
allay anxiety or hostility 
 Build strategic alliances 
 Gain legitimacy of decisions 
 
 
 Break gridlock, achieve 
outcomes 
 Gain some control over policy 
process 
 Better policy implementation 
decisions 
 
 Break gridlock, achieve outcomes 
 Avoid litigation costs 
 Better policy and implementation 
decisions 
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3. It improves equity, since the ability and willingness to pay for services are better 
assessed at a local level. 
4. It enhances accountability, because if it is authentic empowering participation, local 
people can strongly demand transparency. 
According to Creighton (2005:17), public participation is designed to give an opportunity to 
decision-makers to engage in dialogue with the intended beneficiaries, before a final decision 
is taken. If this happens, it will mean that authentic public participation is practised and 
Khayelitsha residents, for example, will have no reason to embark on public protests.  
Creighton (2005:17) lists the following potential benefits that can be derived from public 
participation, i.e.: 
1. Improved quality of decisions – Deliberations between authorities and the public 
allow for the exploration of alternatives, thus choosing the best option.  The public 
have a better understanding of their locality and possess crucial information that may 
improve quality of decisions. It can authenticate available information on local needs, 
capacity and realities, which may lead to effective and efficient implementation of 
development interventions (Van der Waldt & Knipe 1998:144 in Davids 2009: 20). 
2. Minimising costs and delays – The public-participation process is time consuming 
(Davids 2009: 20), but time taken in following a process to a considered outcome, far 
outweighs the consequences of unilateral decisions. Unilateral decisions are made 
quickly, but may be very expensive to implement. They are prone to resistance, 
litigation and delays as evidenced by persistent public protests in Khayelitsha.  
Authentic public participation also creates a basis for understanding affordability 
issues and creating the necessary conditions for cost recovery (Davids 2009: 20).   
3. Consensus building – Strengthening partnerships between the public and authorities 
minimises controversies and gives legitimacy to government decisions. 
4. Increased ease of implementation – Participating in decision-making gives people a 
sense of ownership (Khosa 2000:227). Communities tend to commit themselves to 
such an extent, when there is public participation that they want to see and ensure that 
it works. In this way people accept responsibility for their development, thus 
promoting self-reliance (Burkey 1993:40). 
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5. Avoiding worst-case confrontations – Early enough participation by Khayelitsha 
residents in decision-making could reduce adversarial confrontations that usually 
come about as a result of the public protests, often leading to loss of lives and 
destruction of property. 
6. Maintaining credibility and legitimacy – Authorities in some instances have to 
make controversial decisions, for example the COCT erected open toilets for 
Khayelitsha residents. If residents were part of the decisions, they would have 
understood the rationale behind the decision, instead of resorting to costly mass 
action. 
7. Anticipating public concerns and attitudes – On-going public participation helps to 
educate and enlighten authorities about residents’ preferences, grievances and 
important issues, thus averting confrontations before they occur.  
8.    Developing civil society – Public participation provides opportunities for the public 
to learn processes of decision making, prepares and nurtures leaders, develops  a pool 
of future leaders,  builds social cohesion and teaches problem solving skills which are 
most needed in Khayelitsha. This means that public participation as shown by the 
building block theory, leads to capacity-building and empowerment, especially at an 
organisational level (Bryant &White 1982:15-16 in Davids 2009: 19). 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Although there is high-level confusion about the concept of public participation around the 
globe (Leal 2010:89 – 100), in South Africa this confusion is compounded by heavy reliance 
on terms such as “inform, consult and involve”, as if they will result in authentic public 
participation (Theron 2009b:119). Hence the development of typologies and theoretic modes 
of public participation aimed at providing clarity on what constitutes authentic public 
participation.   
This chapter has shown that lack of authentic and empowering public participation has 
deprived South Africans of dignity and an opportunity to have a say in decision-making 
processes. The dawn of democracy presented South Africans with an opportunity to reverse 
apartheid policies through the introduction of an integrated people-centred development 
approach; the principle of public participation being expected naturally to be part of such a 
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philosophy.  
This chapter argued that the people-centred development approach is premised in the building 
blocks of development, i.e. participation, the social-learning process approach, capacity 
building, empowerment and sustainable development. This means that the public should 
participate in development that affects their lives, leading to a social learning process where 
the public will be empowered to take charge of their own development. This will result in 
assuring the sustainability of development interventions.   
This chapter has also argued that “protest” should be accepted as one of the public 
participation strategies in South Africa. The new Mchunu Public Participation Model located 
protest between “public power” and “tokenism” to indicate that protest action is used when 
all else have failed and for the public to graduate to public power (the ideal level of public 
participation)  they have to exert protest power to compel the authorities to accede to their 
rightful and legitimate grievances.  
DEAT (2002) correctly locates “protest” as the first level of the spectrum, due to the fact that 
it has proven to be an effective tool to ensure that the authorities listen and act on the public’s 
grievances. In other words, even with public participation legislation and policies in place, “a 
culture of public participation is elusive” (Theron 2009b:132) and “authentic and 
empowering public participation will only become a reality if it becomes a process generated 
from within. The public themselves must be the primary actors in establishing the required 
“culture” so that the public is able to influence, direct, control and own decision-making and 
development interventions.  
Policy-makers must realise that if the formal structures for public participation for some or 
other reason (continues) to fail, that the intended beneficiaries of participation (often) have no 
other recourse than protest.  More so, if the public realise that protest delivers quick and 
direct results, then the South African government sits with a major legitimacy challenge. 
In the next chapter, the focus will be on key policy and regulatory framework for public 
participation in South Africa. The next chapter will also seek to analyse public attitudes to 
local government. Masango (2009:127) argues that “public opinion reinforces and sustains 
democracy since it contributes towards legitimacy and stability of the democratic process.” 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
POLICY CONTEXT, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
“When we introduced the new system of local government in 2000, we correctly positioned 
this as the sphere of government that is best placed to give practical meaning and substance 
to the basic political commitment that the People Shall Govern. We said to our people, 
through local government, together with you, we shall bring democracy to where you live. In 
our conceptualization of local government, we placed it at the cutting edge of addressing 
such basic national challenges as underdevelopment, unemployment, stagnation and poverty 
(Mufumadi 2005:1)”. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The above quotation gives substance to the present government’s resolve to reverse social 
and service-delivery imbalances of the past, through local government. It provides an 
undertaking that government will ensure that the grass-roots themselves are at the centre of 
any development meant to pull them out of poverty and inequality (Masango 2009:127). 
 
Apartheid policies and concomitant South African legislation perpetuated a race-based local 
government system, according to which black people were subjected to neglect and inferior 
and inadequate delivery of basic services (Edigheji 2006b:2). These policies and legislation 
laid a framework of extensive segregation, leaving blacks to live in inhumane conditions and 
face huge service delivery discrepancies. This subjected blacks to race-based poverty, 
inequality and exclusion from mainstream activities (Edigheji 2006b:2), much of which is 
still evident today as shown by persistent public protests in Khayelitsha. 
One of the important aims of the new democratic local government dispensation, which came 
into being in 1994, has been to reverse the apartheid scourge. The primary vehicle for redress 
has been a plethora of new local government legislation, by which government has sought to 
bring about equitable delivery of municipal services to the public, irrespective of race, colour 
and location (Masango 2009:129). These new policies and related legislation have been 
geared towards achieving a developmental, democratic and participatory local government.  
As much as apartheid local government was perceived to be illegitimate – particularly by the 
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black population component, as evidenced by their mass actions that characterised its tenure 
and was instrumental in its subsequent demise – the new democratic local government seems 
not to have been living up to expectations. The prevalence of public protest in Khayelitsha 
indicates diminishing trust in the COCT authorities and the public is demanding improved 
performance and greater accountability (Andoh 2011:119). 
It has now been 17 years since democracy was attained, but varied public attitudes to local 
government are discouraging. Ippolito, Walker and Kolson (1976:302) in Masango 
(2009:127) argue that public opinions and attitudes are the building blocks upon which 
democracy stands. Moreover, Masango (2009:127) argues that“public opinion reinforces 
and sustains democracy since it contributes towards legitimacy and stability of the democratic 
process”. These public attitudes have manifested themselves in distinct ways. One popular 
manifestation has been a country-wide wave of public protests, the scale of which often 
engulfing municipalities, which is similar to those during the apartheid era. 
The question arises whether the public is merely exercising their democratic right of public 
participation, as Hemson (2007:10) points out, that the public can participate through “invited 
spaces of participation”, i.e. through WCs and participation in IDP or through “self-invented 
spaces” of participation, i.e. social movements, protests, etc., or is the public now 
disillusioned with the new system of governance, which shapes their perceptions regarding 
local government?  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss key policy and legislative prescripts that 
shape the new South African local government dispensation. These are the Constitution (RSA 
1996), the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act 
(1998b), the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) and the Municipal Finance Management 
Act (RSA 2003).  
 
The importance of the above-mentioned policy and legislation in determining public 
participation is emphasised by the DPLG (2005:11) which states that these “provide a 
powerful legal framework for participatory local democracy”. This chapter will also analyse 
public attitudes to local government, using data from the prominent public attitudes 
institutions and individual researchers. 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
4.2       Public perceptions of local government 
 
In gauging public attitudes to local government, this section draws on background research 
conducted by Roefs and Atkinson (2010) for the South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(SASAS). This will be supplemented by internationally-benchmarked and nationally- 
representative surveys by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), South African 
Reconciliation Barometer Survey (SARBS), Afrobarometer, Idasa, Good Governance 
Learning Network (GGLN) and other organisations and individual researchers. The selection 
and utilisation of the above-mentioned data sources is based largely on the fact that they 
employ similar tools when gauging public attitudes. 
 
Roefs and Atkinson (2010:6) utilise the philosophy of DLG to gauge public attitudes. This is 
partly due to Draai and Taylor’s (2009: 115) assertion that DLG, arguably, hinges on public 
participation.  DLG emphasises the public’s active participation in finding sustainable ways 
to meet their basic needs and improve the quality of their lives. For the ideals of DLG to be 
realised, the public must be able to vote in elections, must have knowledge of participatory 
mechanisms (WCs and participation in IDP formulation); the public must be satisfied with 
the performance and must be able to influence, direct, control and own decision-making 
processes of the municipality.  Andoh (2011:123) cautions that“it is possible for a 
municipality to be judged successful in managing programmes and complying with 
regulations, whilst the overall wellbeing of the community may not have improved”. This 
seems to be happening in Khayelitsha. 
 
Public participation in these participatory mechanisms will enable the public to hold local 
government accountable and ensure that it is responsive to their needs, thus influencing 
municipal decision-making processes. Masango (2009:128) argues that responsiveness of 
policy-makers to public needs hinges on three important requirements i.e. 1) the public 
should be able to express their needs 2) policy-makers should adequately acknowledge the 
expressed public need and 3) policy-makers and public officials should not only be willing to 
take the identified and expressed public needs into account during the policy-making and 
implementation processes, but should actually take them to account.  If the above is achieved, 
the public will gradually direct, control and own development interventions meant for their 
wellbeing. In this way, the public will not be seen“as simply customers of municipal 
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services, but owners, co-producers of public services and evaluators of municipalities” 
(Andoh 2011:119; Govender et.al 2011:185). 
  
Responsiveness refers to the willingness of leaders to register the preferences of their 
constituents by paying attention to their requests and complaints and acting on them (Bratton 
2010:5). Accountability relates to municipalities holding participatory meetings with the 
public, i.e. izimbizo, mass meetings and Street Committee meetings, to account for plans, 
decisions and actions (GGLN 2008:18).  
 
In essence, the above indicators will be utilised to determine the public’s decision to vote or 
abstain from voting in the local government elections.  This section seeks to determine the 
relationship between voting patterns and degree of satisfaction with the delivery of public 
goods and the public’s attitudes towards local government as influenced either by their 
participation or non-participation in municipal participatory mechanisms. 
4.2.1    Citizens' knowledge of participatory mechanisms (WCs) 
  
As noted above, WCs were established to bridge the gap between the public and Municipal 
Councils. Public perceptions regarding WCs seem to indicate dissatisfaction with their 
functioning.  According to Piper and Deacon (2008:42), WCs are meant to attend to a broad 
range of public’s problems in a non-partisan way, such as campaigning for service payments, 
propagating the IDP process, the budgetary process, fostering decisions about service 
provision, by-laws and delimiting and chairing zonal meetings, yet they are embroiled in 
party politics.  
 
Smith and De Visser (2009:16) and Piper and Deacon (2008:41) contend that WCs are now 
viewed as the extensions of political party structures and do not represent the interests of the 
public they are meant to serve. Smith and De Visser (2009:16) attribute this state of affairs to 
nomination and election processes that are “deeply flawed”, thus compromising the quality of 
representation on WCs.  Roefs and Atkinson (2010:52) support this assertion and add that, in 
an event where a WC member resigns, Ward Councillors simply handpick a replacement to 
fill the vacant position.  
 
Furthermore, a crucial “missing link” in WCs is the lack of detailed “terms of reference and 
operating procedures” which makes WCs  suffer  credibility in the eyes of the public (Roefs 
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& Atkinson 2010:6; Nyalunga 2006:45).  Due to a lack of clarity on their roles, this leads to 
further tensions between WCs and Ward Councillors (Nyalunga 2006:45).  
          
In the light of the above-mentioned critical deficiencies, it would be unreasonable to expect 
WCs to function optimally. This state of affairs is reflected in the findings of the study 
conducted by DPLG (2005) to evaluate the WCs (Roefs & Atkinson 2010:54). In this study 
DPLG (2005), municipal representatives confirmed that WCs are not accountable to the 
public. At least 23 per cent of the respondents felt that WCs are not responsive, 26 per cent 
stated that less than half of WCs held regular meetings, 25 per cent of respondents said that 
only a minority of their Councillors hold regular meetings. WC members themselves felt that 
their Councillors are not responsive and not interested in the public messages that should be 
conveyed to Council (Roefs & Atkinson 2010: 54).  
 
Furthermore, a recent study conducted in 2011 by Thompson (2012:101) indicates that the 
status quo remains. Table 4.1 below shows that, on the one hand, a huge gap exist between 
Khayelitsha inhabitants and the COCT in terms of representative democracy at grass-roots 
level.  On the other hand, there is an awkward relationship between the Ward Councillor and 
the public with regard to public participation in municipal governance (Thompson 2012:101).  
 
Table 4.1 also shows that 74 per cent of the Khayelitsha public feel alienated from the COCT 
participation mechanisms with 70 per cent of the respondents believing that they are not 
made part of the development programmes meant to change their lives. With regard to the 
handling of public complaints, Khayelitsha Ward Councillors and COCT officials fared badly 
at 74 per cent. 
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  Table 4.1:  Perceptions of Ward Councillor’s ability to deal with public development       
          issues in Khayelitsha 
How well or badly would you say your ward   Percentage  % 
Councillor is handling the following:   
    
Allowing citizens like yourself to participate?   
Badly/Very badly 75 
Well/ Very well 20 
Don't know 5 
Making council's programmes known to ordinary people?   
Badly/Very badly 70 
Well/ Very well 24 
Don't know 7 
Providing effective ways to handle complaints about Councillors and officials? 
Badly/Very badly 74 
Well/ Very well 20 
Don't know 7 
 Source: Adapted from Thompson (2012:102) 
It is therefore not surprising that the public in Khayelistha  is to a certain degree disillusioned, 
particularly with the ethical behaviour of their Ward Councillors so much so that they have 
lost confidence and view them as incompetent (Thompson 2012:101). From the researcher’s 
observation, municipalities view the Batho Pele principles as only applicable to other 
government spheres. It is the researcher’s considered view that the opposite is true. 
Municipalities must inculcate these principles in the minds of municipal officials and 
Councillors as they are more relevant today than ever before (The White Paper on the 
Transformation of the Public Service, RSA 1997). 
 
Table 4.2 below shows that the above picture (lack of accountability and non-responsiveness) 
should not come as a surprise, in the light of Hemson’s (2007:11) findings that only 43 per 
cent of respondents have knowledge of the existence of WCs in their locality, 23 per cent 
have no knowledge, while 34 per cent indicated that they do not know. This study shows that 
less than half of the respondents know about the existence of WCs, hence the public feel that 
they are not accountable and are non-responsive. 
  Table 4.2:  Knowledge of Ward Committees  
 Source: Hemson (2007:11) 
Yes No Don’t know Total 
13, 108,409 6,974,074 10,474,172 30,556,655 
43 % 23% 34% 100% 
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According to Hemson (2007:11), those who do not know, may evenly be divided between 
those who in fact have a WC or do not have one at all. But what is important is to note that 
less than half of the adult population agree that a WC exists in their locality, which is not an 
ideal situation. This situation is worrisome, as WCs are supposed to act as “conduits” for 
active participation in municipal affairs. This means that public participation is lacking, 
which compels the public to seek participation through unconventional means (self-created 
spaces of participation). 
At a provincial level, of the nine provinces polled, Western Cape had the lowest score at 19 
per cent of those who have knowledge of WCs, as opposed to Eastern Cape’s 66 per cent. 
The Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Free State and Kwazulu-Natal provinces are mostly rural, as 
opposed to Western Cape and Gauteng that are urban. The survey indicates that rural 
provinces tend to have greater knowledge of WCs, as they fared best at a more than 60 per 
cent knowledge level, compared to only 40 per cent in urban provinces.  Roefs and Atkinson 
(2010:52) concur and add that the proportion of respondents that had never heard about WCs 
was largest amongst Coloured and Whites (at 28 per cent) and smallest among Africans (at 8 
per cent). 
According to Roefs and Atkinson (2010:52), this discrepancy, that Coloureds and Whites has 
less knowledge of WCs is indicative of one or more of the following: (a) general indifference 
as a result of a lack of political interest, (b) Whites and Coloureds never having been made 
part of WCs and/or (c) that report backs on the functioning of WCs are not made in these 
neighbourhoods.  
Based on the researcher’s observation, Whites and Coloureds are generally less enthusiastic 
about participating in governance issues. This can be traced back to the apartheid era when, 
to the virtual exclusion of the Black masses, Whites in particular, and, to a certain extent, 
Coloureds too, enjoyed preferential treatment in terms of voting rights and access to 
development services. The urge for participation in day-to-day issues of governance was 
consequently stunted and kept dormant. 
Further analysis of data in terms of type of settlement (see Table 4.3 below) and income 
levels reveals that, in line with rural province bias (as discussed above), settlements with high 
rates of poverty and deprivation are more likely to have knowledge of WCs (above 59 per 
cent) than formal settlement and small holdings (less than 40 per cent) (Hemson 2007:11). 
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Table 4.3: Knowledge of Ward Committees by type of settlement 
Type % Yes 
Urban informal 61% 
Tribal 59% 
Hostels 57% 
Urban formal 35% 
Small holdings 22% 
Farms 10% 
 Source:  Hemson (2007:11) 
The same revelations are witnessed among those respondents with “no or very little” income 
who have greater knowledge of WCs (51 per cent) and those who are “better off” and record 
low levels of knowledge of WCs (32 per cent)  (Hemson 2007:11). It has to be noted that, as 
the informal settlements are inhabited by mostly poor Blacks, the assumption therefore is that 
Blacks in general have more knowledge of WCs than other race groups. This indicates 
government endeavour in putting more effort into bringing the poor to mainstream 
participatory governance. This is evidenced by the HSRC (2011:9) study conducted in 2010, 
which indicated that the situation is steadily improving, as at least 58 per cent of the public 
was aware of WCs. However, the greater awareness is still among the poor.  
 
The question that needs to be answered is whether knowledge of WCs by the poor translates 
into authentic participation in local government affairs. According to Hemson (2007:12), 
greater knowledge of WCs does not lead to greater confidence or trust in the municipalities. 
In fact, between the periods 2004 and 2005, among the more knowledgeable poor, there was 
a sharp decline in the levels of confidence from 61 per cent to 50 per cent, whereas among 
those where WCs were not generally known, there was only a slight percentage decline in 
trust, from 37 per cent to 36 per cent (Hemson 2007:12).  
The above situation means that knowledge of WCs does not lead to greater confidence that 
municipalities will listen to and act on the needs of the poor. Thompson (2012:102) concurs 
and adds that qualitative research conducted in Khayelitsha in 2011 shows“that participation 
is regarded as a form of information sharing that has little to do with substantive community 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
input, as if community buy-in means keeping everyone informed”. Hemson (2007:12) sums 
this up by stating that the “WC system is not strengthening confidence in local government, 
since these are not functioning as they should”. This indicates that government is attempting 
to focus its energies on ensuring that the poor have meaningful participation in municipal 
affairs affecting their lives, but that the change agents tasked with this duty are somehow 
lacking in their ability to deliver on this expectation.  
 
As we take note of the steadily declining level of the public trust in municipalities, it will be 
interesting to see if this translates into voters shunning the ballot box during municipal 
elections.  As Mangcu (2011:1153) warns, “While elections give people a sense that they 
have some measure of influence over authorities, a heightened degree of political efficacy in 
turn leads to higher levels of electoral participation”. On the other hand, shunning the ballot 
box will be in line with the assertion of Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:14) that: “If citizens 
become increasingly sceptical and distrustful of political parties and institutions, and/or view 
them as corrupt, there is declining political participation.”  This outcome will be tested below 
under the heading “Voting in the municipal elections”. 
4.2.2    Participation in the IDP process 
 
The IDP, as a principal democratising instrument in local government, is meant to promote 
public participation in municipal planning and policy-making. As IDPs are regarded as the 
cornerstone of DLG in South Africa (GGLN 2008:53), it is incumbent upon every 
municipality to ensure that the public know and participate meaningfully in the IDP 
processes.  
Like WCs, IDPs are fraught with problems. Due to their complex nature, which “militates 
against meaningful participation” (GGLN 2008:53), municipalities are unable to draft 
workable models. This is so because most municipalities have opted for a more 
“technocratically-driven approach” to the IDP, which limits the ability of municipalities to 
engage widely with the public on matters affecting their lives and thus stay in line with the 
provisions of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (GGLN 2008:53). It is therefore not 
surprising that the public perceive IDP as exclusionary, and as being in a similar vein as 
WCs.   
According to Roefs and Atkinson (2010:55) a survey conducted in 2005 to gauge the extent 
of public participation in IDP processes, indicated that only 8 per cent participated.  Roefs 
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and Atkinson (2010:55) further state that the lowest participation rate (3 per cent) was 
recorded in the Western Cape, together with Gauteng and Mpumalanga. A recent study 
conducted by Thompson (2012:103) in Khayelitsha proves that the situation is not improving. 
Despite a carefully designed process of communication devolved to the level of Sub-
Councils, “the degree to which an average resident is even aware of participatory processes 
related to the development of IDPs remains minimal” (Thompson 2012:103). 
 
The highest participation rate was recorded in KwaZulu-Natal at 17 per cent, with the 
remaining provinces trailing at between 7 and 11 per cent. The most popular participation 
methods were izimbizo and public meetings (Roefs & Atkinson 2010:55). 
   
As may be expected, the two participatory mechanisms, i.e. WC and IDP, are closely aligned. 
The survey confirmed that participation in IDP is strongly related to awareness of WCs 
(Roefs & Atkinson 2010:55). About 94 per cent of those who participated know about WCs, 
versus 66 per cent among those who did not participate. The 6 per cent who participated in 
the IDPs, but have no knowledge of WCs, could be attributed to over reporting or is an 
indication of dysfunctionality of WCs in their areas. Of those who participated, 96 per cent 
were willing to vote as opposed to 82 per cent of those who did not participate.  
 
With this confirmation, it remains to be seen whether the poor’s high levels of knowledge of 
WCs means that they will also participate in IDP processes. On the other hand, the behaviour 
or attitude of those who seem to be less engaged in politics, needs to be analysed, as this 
behaviour may be due to disillusionment with the local government system. 
Table 4.4 depicts the two groups of respondents (high participation and low participation 
groups) who were subjected to a survey to analyse public attitudes to local government in 
South Africa. 
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Table 4.4: Two political types 
Statement High participation Low participation 
No. of respondents         23.5 million 7.2 million 
Age group         Older than 16 years Older than 16 years 
Voting commitment         High Low (do not know, do not want               
to vote, declined to answer) 
Social status          Poor “Better off” 
Income levels          Less than R5000 (89%) Less than R5000 (77%) 
  Source:  By Author 2010 
Hemson’s (2007:12) analysis of the two political types provides some answers to the above 
questions. The first group comprises 23.5 million respondents who are older than 16 years 
and are committed to voting in municipal elections (high participation) group. The second 
group of 7.2 million respondents (low participation) are less interested in voting in municipal 
elections. The latter group comprises those “who do not want to vote, do not know or 
declined to answer” (Hemson 2007:12). It is important to also note that the group that has 
high participation potential, are mostly poor, with 89 per cent having a personal income of 
less than R5 000, as opposed to 77 per cent of the low participation group with income of less 
than R5 000 (Hemson 2007:12). 
 
Table 4.5 below demonstrates that the high participation group, in comparison to the low 
participation group with almost non-existent participation, has more knowledge of IDP and 
participation in its formulation, although, in general, participation is very low.   
Table 4.5: Knowledge of Integrated Development Plan 
Question regarding IDP High 
Participation(%Yes) 
Low 
Participation (%Yes) 
Do you know of an IDP for your 
municipal area? 
12% 7% 
Do you participate in formulation 
of IDP for your municipal area? 
5% 1% 
 Source:  Adapted from Hemson (2007:13) 
  
As for the levels of confidence in local government, Table 4.6 below shows that the high 
participation group has high confidence levels at 52 per cent, knowledge of WC at 49 per 
cent and knowledge of a Councillor at 51 per cent. The low participation group trails behind 
the high participation group in all aspects. This would indicate that there is a link between 
knowledge of participatory structures and voting, as shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. This 
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mirrors the WC situation above, where knowledge of WCs is strongly related to voting 
intentions, meaning that the likelihood of voting is higher among those who have knowledge 
of WCs, as opposed to those who do not have the knowledge. 
 
Table 4.6: Attitudes to local government 
Questions High 
Participation (%Yes) 
Low 
Participation (%Yes) 
Do you trust your local 
government in South Africa? 
52% 34% 
Do you have a Ward Committee 
in your locality? 
 
49% 26% 
Do you know a Councillor in 
your local municipality/Council? 
51% 30% 
 Source:  Adapted from Hemson (2007:13) 
4.2.3    Efficacy/ perceived influence on local government 
 
According to Roefs and Atkinson's (2010:56), further analysis in the 2005 SASAS survey 
indicates that 91 per cent of those who participated in IDP processes felt they had “some” to 
“much” influence on local government decision-making. This was compared to only 28 per 
cent of those who had not participated. Western Cape recorded the lowest and Limpopo the 
highest percentage. Thirty eight per cent of Africans felt they have significant influence 
versus only 15 per cent of Coloureds and 14 per cent of Indians and Whites.  Of those who 
felt they have influence, 93 per cent would vote, versus 81 per cent of those who thought they 
did not.  
This intention to vote trend is further illustrated by Table 4.7 below. In the analysis of the two 
political types voting attitudes, the high participation group unanimously agree that it is the 
duty of the public to vote in the municipal elections, at 86 per cent as compared to 67 per cent 
of the low participation group. This is indicative of the public’s perceptions that voting in the 
elections affords the public some degree of influence in municipal decision-making processes 
(power of the vote). Of interest is the low participation group’s disapproving voting attitudes. 
Forty four per cent of the low participation group feels that voting makes no difference and 
that politicians cannot be trusted. This means that the low participation group is not 
convinced that their vote will translate to their ability to influence municipal decision-making 
mechanisms. 
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Table 4.7: Voting attitudes 
 Source:  Adapted from Hemson (2007:13) 
In a different study conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) namely the 
SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey (SARBS) (IJR 2011:14), the perceived influence on 
decision-making declined when compared to the Hemson (2007:13) survey findings. Only 40 
per cent of the public feel that they have the power to influence decisions made by local 
government that affect their neighbourhood (IJR 2011:14).   
 
A further 27 per cent disagreed and 33 per cent were uncertain. Interestingly, on average 
voters in the North West agreed the most strongly that voting made a difference (on a scale of 
1 to 5, m = 3.97) and that the public could influence local government decision-making (on a 
scale of 1 to 5, m = 3.50), though turnout at elections in that province (53.47 per cent) was 
lower than the national average (see Figure 4.1 below). 
 
 
 Figure 4.1: Average mean, political efficacy by province 
 Source:  Adapted from SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey (IJR 2011:14)  
 
Furthermore, Figure 4.1 above shows that the public in the nine provinces of South Africa 
feel very strongly that to vote in the municipal elections matters, as seen by it surpassing the 
perceived power to influence decisions. It is also encouraging to note that above average 
Statement High 
Participation (% Agreement) 
Low 
Participation (% Agreement) 
It is the duty of all citizens to 
vote in the election 
86% 67% 
Whether I vote or not makes no 
difference 
25% 44% 
Voting is meaningless, because 
no politician can be trusted 
28% 44% 
After being elected all parties 
are the same, so voting is 
pointless 
24% 38% 
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respondents feel that they have power to influence decisions made by local government. This 
signifies that democracy is maturing within the South African local government framework. 
A recent study conducted by Thompson (2012:106) in Khayelitsha (Western Cape) paints a 
different picture (see Figure 4.8).  A staggering 61 per cent of respondents feel that they have 
no influence over what government does. This is more so because 87 per cent of respondents 
feel that politicians do not care much about what the public think.  This is a “sorry state of 
affairs” which vividly indicates that the spaces provided for by the invited spaces are closed, 
hence the public resort to inventing their own spaces, from which they find solace. 
 
Table 4.8: Perceptions of personal agency in relation to government and political 
       leaders in Khayelitsha 
Strongly agree/agree Percentage % 
People like me do not have any influence over what government does 61 
Politicians do not care much about what people like me think 87 
Source: Adapted from Thompson (2012:106) 
As hinted above, it is important to assess where the low participation group finds solace. Is it 
through association with social movements or taking an “I-don’t-care” attitude? The latter is 
possible, as indicated by low levels of participation in participatory structures. Greenberg and 
Mathoho (2010:14) posit that “people may feel that their views will not be taken into account 
and that participation is a worthless exercise and linked to political power plays”. If this 
happens, citizens will be “put off” “invited spaces” and create their own spaces of 
participation; often seen by authorities as confrontational and subsequently suppressed – as 
seen by the alleged use of excessive force and spraying of blue dye by the police against the 
marchers during the so-called “Occupy Rondebosch Common” event, within  COCT limits 
(Ndenze 2012:1).  
Table 4.9 below, depicts a strong feeling among both groups that the public have a right to 
form or join organisations freely.  The enthusiasm for the right to freely organise is not 
matched by the assertion that mass action is acceptable in expressing one’s democratic rights, 
as only 35 per cent of the low participation group agree to this notion, in contrast with a 
staggering 76 per cent of the high participation group. This indicates that it is likely that half 
of the low participation group will participate in protest action if they find “invited spaces” of 
participation less attractive. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
Table 4.9:  Attitudes to social mobilisation 
Statement High participation           
(% Agreement) 
Low participation          
(% Agreement) 
Citizens should have a right to form/join 
organisations freely 
86% 84% 
Mass action is an acceptable tool to express views 
in a democracy 
76% 35% 
I talk about politics often or very often 20% 15% 
 Source: Adapted from Hemson (2007:14) 
 
The low levels of “talk about politics” among South Africans, as both groups show in Table 
4.9 above, is worrisome. This indicates that frequency of political conversations among South 
Africans is at a very low ratio as opposed to protest action.  Mattes (2002:32) confirms this 
assertion by stating that “South Africa now has one of the most passive citizenries in 
Southern Africa”. According to Mattes (2002:32), in year 2000 only 11 per cent of 
respondents indicated frequent engagement in political conversations and only 12 per cent 
agreed to paying attention “always” or “most of the time” to current political events and 
government in general. This is the lowest recorded figure for the seven Southern African 
countries (Mattes 2002:32). This state of affairs is worrisome in the sense that South Africa 
has better communication media, i.e. radio, television and newspaper coverage, when 
compared to its Southern African counterparts. 
 
Based on the researcher’s observation, municipal participatory structures are dysfunctional, 
so much so that the enthusiasm brought about by the new democratic dispensation has 
dissipated. High expectations regarding the improvements in the public’s socio-economic 
conditions remains a “pipe dream”, hence the public’s resolve to invoke unconventional 
means of participation, similar to those used to bring the apartheid government to “its knees”. 
 
Table 4.10 below confirms the assertion that the public is less interested in political activity. 
Khayelitsha residents prefer to associate themselves with religious activities (at 64 per cent) 
as opposed to 30 per cent of association with political activity.  Street committees and school 
governing bodies are also not popular with the Khayelitsha residents (at 6 per cent 
respectively).  
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Table 4.10: Levels of participation in organised groups in Khayelitsha 
Participation in organised groups (this question covered any level of  Percentage % 
involvement from leaders and members to no-members who attend 
meetings)   
 
  
A religious group 64 
A political party 30 
A community policing forum 5 
A street committee 6 
A school governing body 6 
 Source: Thompson (2012:105) 
This is indicative of the levels of public disillusionment with the COCT public participation 
approaches. If the municipality does not improve, Khayelitsha will continue to be labelled 
a“protest prone area” (Nleya 2011:3; Thompson 2012:100). 
 
It is however, important to note that this disillusionment is translated to protest action as  
Nleya (2011:11) points out that the participation rate in protests by informal settlement 
inhabitants is 50 per cent, compared to 36 per cent in formal housing. 
       4.2.4    Voting in the municipal elections 
 
The South African local government elections have consistently experienced relatively low 
voter turnout.  This trend had been the norm for the first two democratic elections and only 
recently, in the 2011 municipal elections, was this trend broken. The municipal elections of  
2000 and 2006 attracted only 48.06 per cent before a 9 per cent increase pushed it to 57.6 per 
cent for the 2011 elections (Herzenberg 2011:1). This is in sharp contrast with both national 
and provincial elections which have consistently had higher voter turnouts (Herzenberg 
2011:1). These disparities are indicative of an international trend, where local elections are 
viewed as less important. However, this trend seems to be changing in South Africa, as 
evinced by the 9 per cent increase in the latest turnout.  
There are a myriad of factors that determine the levels of voter turnout during elections, 
particularly in South Africa.  For Struwig et al. (2011:1122), the role of the Independent 
Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) is pivotal in ensuring credible, free and fair 
elections. This is achieved through proper management of elections i.e. prevention of 
fraudulent behaviour and irregularities, as well as the supervision of the occurrence of 
intimidation, coercion and violence (Struwig et al. 2011:1122). This means that a conducive 
voting environment contributes to influencing voter turnout. 
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Alongside the proper management and supervision of elections, it is the responsibility of the 
IEC to conduct voter education campaigns and communication networks, to prepare voters 
for the elections (Struwig et al. 2011:1122). It is also the duty of the IEC to educate the 
public how the electoral system works, including registration and voting procedures (Struwig 
et al. 2011:1122). In this regard the media plays a pivotal role. Fakir and Holland 
(2011:1149) attributes the high levels of voter turnout, especially to the run up to 2011 local 
government elections, to the media placing greater emphasis on the elections and the quality 
of media coverage. According to Fakir and Holland (2011:1149) this contributed to the 
vibrancy of the elections.  
Furthermore, the HSRC (2011:8) points out that previous participation in elections and an 
interest in politics, as well as satisfaction with political leadership, accountability, 
responsiveness and efficacy are all factors that positively impact on the intention to vote. On 
the other hand, Friedman (2004:2) and Habib and Naidu (2004:5) are of the view that the 
South African public still vote according to identities, i.e. race, language and religion. It is 
highly likely that an unfamiliar candidate will deter them from voting and thus contribute to 
low voter turnout. This practice is referred to by Friedman (2004:2) as irrational. 
 
For Mangcu (2011:1155), the presumed irrational voter behaviour declines with the passage 
of time, particularly if public needs are not met. Thus, “the public adopt a rational decision 
making process that takes into account past experiences with those political parties” (Mangcu 
2011:1155). The 9 per cent increase in the number of voters in 2011 elections signals a new 
trend in voter behaviour. In the same vein, a one (1) per cent increase in the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) voters’ share is indicative of the new trend in voter behaviour. 
 
According to Friedman (2004:2) identity voting has both advantages and disadvantages. “It 
can inhibit government accountability and responsiveness if it guarantees an electoral 
majority to a party”. On the other hand, identity voting behaviour “bodes well for 
community/social cohesion within homogenised communities” (Fakir & Holland 2011:1150). 
Also, on a positive note, low voter turnout is overcome as identity voting triggers enthusiasm 
for electoral participation (Friedman 2004:2).  Rule (2004:9) concurs with the issue of 
identities shaping voter behaviour. He however cautions that race plays a minimal role, but 
names an assortment of issues, such as “a better life, jobs, liking the party, trust or belief in 
and affection for a party”. 
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According to Herzenberg (2011:2), in the South African context, there are other reasons that 
contribute to low levels of voter turnout. She cites “Comparative National Elections Project 
2009 national survey” and “IEC/HSRC 2010 survey”. These surveys pointed out that the 
public have less trust in the three spheres of government, compared to other political 
institutions. The other reason she blames for low voter turnout relates to the public’s 
annoyance and discontent with delivery of services. This, it is said, led to the upsurge of 
public protest in the run up to the elections.  
It is therefore important to point out that, although the above mentioned factors are not an 
exhaustive list, they nonetheless provide an indication of the determinants for low or high 
voter turnout in the municipal elections. This means that the prevailing factors during any 
given voting period will dictate the levels of turnout.  
  
In the light of the above, it is clear that satisfaction with the delivery of services and trust in 
local government alone, will not translate into participation in politics and elections, as the 
public’s decision to vote will be shaped by, among others, the“identities”. This assertion is 
collaborated by Roefs and Atkinson (2010:63) study which found that “higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with services and higher levels trust in national government, correlated with a 
higher willingness to vote in the 2006 local elections”. 
The prospects that the upsurge in public protest would negatively affect voter turnout as an 
act of vengeance against the ruling party proved to be unfounded, as the 2011 elections 
turnout increased by 9 per cent. It is interesting to note that those areas which experienced an 
upsurge in protest action, recorded an increase in voter turnout (Herzenberg 2011:2, Fakir & 
Holland 2011:1147). 
The question that arises as a result of this paradox is why the public turn out in numbers to 
vote when they have clearly shown displeasure with the incumbent government? Mattes 
(2002:33) argues that South Africans understand democracy to mean the delivery of a range 
of socio-economic goods, even when progress is very slow. This could mean that protests are 
meant to exert pressure on government to speed up delivery, and should not be seen as an 
indication of a possible shift in allegiance to the governing political party.  
 
The researcher has observed that the recent mass action by the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), demanding an end to labour broking and the e-toll system, which 
the COSATU Secretary General referred to as an “Occupation of the City of Johannesburg”, 
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not a protest, was meant to put pressure on government to accede to its demand, not really to 
render the province ungovernable. Herzenberg (2011:2) supports this view and adds that 
citizens utilise protest action as “leverage to attract government’s attention and make their 
demands known”.  
 
The different view put forward by Friedman (2004:210) that “a mobilised, politically-active 
citizenry may mean that democracy is flourishing or that the public is motivated by deep 
dissatisfaction with an undemocratic society”, does not detract the public from participatory 
politics. The high voter turnout indicates that, despite the difficulties, the public still view 
local government as legitimate. 
 
According to Mattes (2002:33), the apartheid struggle inculcated a culture of protest in the 
public’s mind, meaning they are likely to protest at every given opportunity. He further 
argues that the low participation rates in between elections is caused by the lack of incentives 
to do so, as the study shows that less than one in a sample of 400 COCT residents could name 
the Mayor, let alone their Ward Councillor, and very few attend public meetings or voiced 
opinion on local issues yet viewed their Ward Councillor as not responsive (Seekings et al. 
2004:16). The researcher has observed that this situation is steadily improving in the light of 
the 9 per cent increase, although the level of engagement between politicians and the public is 
only visible to the run up to the elections, when their votes are sought.  
It is this gap (between politicians and public) that the public exploit to invent their own 
spaces of participation in municipal affairs. Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:13) succinctly 
sum this up by submitting that “by definition, these invited spaces are at the state’s behest 
and on its terms, even if the government may genuinely be interested in hearing from the 
grassroots”. The public will wait for government to approach them, but, if not, they will 
resort to “self-invented spaces” in the form of protest action. This is because the public is 
willing and open to participation, but government is often inaccessible. 
 
On the question of voting patterns in local government, Booysen (2011:3) states that the 
Thomas, Neilson and Sores Research Survey (2011) assert that those respondents who voted 
for the candidate in 2009 “are more than twice as likely to vote as those no longer happy with 
their 2009 choice”. Furthermore, Booysen (2011:3) cites previous studies by Idasa and AC 
Nielson, conducted just before the 2006 elections, where it was already known that the public 
was not happy with service delivery. New research confirms that those who intend voting are 
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more likely to be the ones who are happy with service delivery than those who are unhappy 
(Booysen 2011:3). This indicates that “South Africans are not ready to storm out and use the 
ballot to oust incumbents and install new governments” (Booysen 2011:3).  
 
Figure 4.2 below illustrates this point. Africans and Coloureds are less likely to ditch their 
party, but would rather abstain from voting. Fifty per cent of Whites and Asians are willing to 
ditch their party rather than abstain from voting.  
  
  
       
Figure 4.2:   If you felt that you could not vote for the political party that you normally 
support, would it be wise to…? By Race (N=3851) 
 
Source:  Electoral Commission of South Africa (2009:24) 
 
According to Davids (2010:73), in a survey carried out in 2003, only 38 per cent of the public 
were satisfied with local government.  In 2006 there was a slight improvement in the levels of 
satisfaction to 39.5 per cent.  In 2011 a perception (satisfaction survey) conducted by Idasa 
(2010) in the run up to the local elections, indicated that only one in 10 citizens was satisfied 
with local government.  In the light of the fact that government stepped up its efforts, this is a 
significant decrease compared to 2006, which would indicate that satisfaction levels should 
forthwith increase dramatically. Van Hoof (2011:1-2) cites three reasons for this decline.  
 
Firstly, there is an increasing “service delivery gap” that exists between people’s expectations 
and what municipalities are realistically able to deliver. According to Van Hoof (2011:1-2), 
the increase in the expectancy gap is not caused by demographic factors such as migration 
and population growth, but  the expectation on the part of the public is that government 
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should do more than before, as a result of politicians' unfulfilled promises of delivery of free 
services. 
  
Secondly, lack of responsiveness from Councils in dealing with public issues that were 
already raised some years back, contributes to the decline in satisfaction levels. Van Hoof 
(2011:1-2) asserts that a backlog is caused by competing demands where municipalities have 
 to satisfy national government’s  defined priorities and the public issues within   
municipalities’ “limited power and discretionary resources”. This stretches municipalities’ 
capabilities as the public is continuously demanding services. This is further compounded by 
dysfunctional participatory structures and lack of accountability mechanisms, which result in 
disillusionment on the part of the public and consequently violent protest follows (Van Hoof 
2011:2). 
 
Lastly, the public witness negative factors e.g. lack of communication, lack of transparency, 
increased levels of corruption and nepotism in their municipalities. These contribute to a lack 
of delivery of quality services, which in turn leads to public protests. As one protester put it: 
“We are burning stuff because those who are our Mayors took money for themselves” (Van 
Hoof 2011:2).  
  
The state of local government in South Africa explained above, is confirmed by the report of 
the State of Local Government in South Africa (GOGTA, 2009b) which acknowledges that 
“much of local government is in distress and that this state of affairs has become deeply 
rooted within our system of governance” (Van Hoof 2011:2). According to an Idasa (2010:3) 
citizen’s survey, distress is caused by politicians’ contempt for “basic democratic governance 
principles and values, which, in most instances, are forgone for individual self-enrichment 
and political power (Van Hoof 2011:2).  
4.3 Review of local government legislative framework 
  
According to Nyalunga (2006:16), the new democratic government inherited a local 
government system that racially delivered municipal services for the minority Whites to the 
detriment of the majority Blacks, who were subjected to neglect in terms of access to 
employment, health and other basic services. This meant that the democratically-elected 
government had to do away with oppressive laws to make way for new laws that could 
address and undo the apartheid legacy.  
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The new local government dispensation began in 1993 with the enactment of the Local 
Government Transitional Act (209 of 1993), the so-called “Genesis” of democratic local 
government. This legislation ushered a new paradigm, geared for transforming local 
government from a racially segregated institution into a democratic and autonomous sphere 
of government. 
The other important legislation necessary for the transformation of local government was the 
Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995) which, according to Nyalunga (2006:16), sought 
to change the “mind-set” of local government and was to guide them to be more participatory 
in the delivery of public goods and services. Moodley and Govender (2006: 825) submit that 
Act 67 is aimed at facilitating a transparent developmental process that benefited both 
participants and local government.  
It was through the Development Facilitation Act (RSA 1995) that the DLG principle was 
coined, symbolising a paradigm shift (Nyalunga 2006:16).  The Municipal Demarcation Act 
(No. 27 of 1998) (RSA 1998c) sought to reconfigure the racially-arranged geographical areas 
to ensure that every area fall within a democratically-elected, local government, the so-called 
“wall-to-wall local government” (Nyalunga 2006:16). 
The Constitution (RSA 1996) galvanised local government as a developmental sphere of 
government by pronouncing on its autonomy as a “distinct government sphere with 
executive, legislative authority and powers” (Nyalunga 2006:16). These legislative abilities 
set the tone for a new DLG to address inequality, poverty and any resistive apartheid 
legacies. 
 
The following section deals with the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) and 
legislative frameworks for public participation in South African local government. In this 
vein, the Ward Committee Resource Book (DPLG 2005:11) asserts that the Constitution 
(RSA 1996) and key legislation such as Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act (RSA 2000) and Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 
(RSA 1998b) provides a powerful legal framework for participatory local democracy. 
4.3.1    The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) 
  
The Constitution (RSA 1996) is the principal legislation that supersedes other legislation. 
This means that any legislation passed should not be in conflict with it.  The Constitution 
(RSA 1996) spells out broad parameters in relation to participation. In so doing, it paves the 
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way for subsequent local government legislation that provides details of the manner in which 
public participation should be placed at the centre of municipal governance.  
 
This is to ensure a harmonious relationship between the authorities and the public and to 
guide the public participation discourse in the municipalities. Local government, as a sphere 
that is closest to grass-roots,  is poised to ensure the attainment of sustainable, democratic and 
developmental local government, in line with the objects of local government as outlined in 
section 152 (1) of the Constitution (RSA 1996), which are to:  
  
1. Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities.  
2. Ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner.  
3. Promote social and economic development.  
4. Promote a safe and healthy environment.  
5. Encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in the 
matters of local government.  
 
For municipalities to achieve these objectives, Section 153 of the Constitution (RSA 
1996:81-82) emphasises that municipalities must play a developmental role, in that they 
must:  
  
1. Structure and manage their administration and budgeting and planning processes so as 
to give priority to the basic needs of the community and promote the social and 
economic development of the community. 
2. Participate in national and provincial development programmes.   
 
The Constitution (RSA 1996) emphasises the importance of basic values and principles in 
governance as stipulated in Section 195 (1) (c) “public administration must be 
developmental-oriented” and (e) that “people’s needs must be responded to and the public 
must be encouraged to participate in policy-making”. This means that municipalities must be 
democratic, responsive and accountable to the citizens.  
On the status of municipalities and in relation to other spheres of government, Section 151 of 
the Constitution (RSA 1996) provides that: 
1. The local sphere of government consists of municipalities, which must be 
established for the whole of the territory of the Republic.  
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2. The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its 
Municipal Council.  
3. A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
government affairs of its own community, subject to national and provincial 
legislation, as provided for in the Constitution.  
4. The national or relevant provincial government may not compromise or 
impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its 
functions.  
The public’s right to protest feature prominently in the Constitution (RSA 1996). Section 17 
of the Constitution (RSA 1996) stipulates that “everyone has a right, peacefully and unarmed, 
to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions”. Furthermore, Section 18 
guarantees public’s right to freely associate.  
It has, however, to be borne in mind that the Gatherings Act (205 of 1993) regulates the 
staging of protests.  The Gatherings Act (RSA 1993a) defines a gathering as a march, picket, 
or parade of more than 15 people taking place in a public space, such as a street, park or on 
the steps of a building, etc.  This Act (RSA 1993a), for the first time in South African history, 
affirmed the public’s right to participate in demonstrations and protest marches (De Vos 
2011:1).  
The Act (RSA 1993a) also provides for the procedures to be followed in the event that the 
protest is staged. According to De Vos (2011:1), the Act (RSA 1993a) provides that there 
should be discussions between the authorities and the organisers of the protest action. This is 
to ensure an orderly procession and minimal disruption for the non-participants and members 
of the public. The right to protest is crucial for the strengthening of democracy, in that it 
guarantees the public a continuous right of participation in-between the elections normally 
held every five years. 
The above-mentioned constitutional provisions provide local authorities with a base for 
opening up new spaces for the public’s direct participation in the formulation of participatory 
governance policies and legislation and to further the aims of DLG agenda. On the other 
hand, however, it also provides the public with the mechanisms to demand responsiveness 
and accountability from their local authorities and affords them a right to provide input for 
decision-making processes that are meant to shape their future. 
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If the above-mentioned constitutional provisions are not realised, they are likely to further 
alienate the public from decision-making and possibly lead to loss of trust in the municipal 
processes noted above. 
4.3.2 White Paper on Local Government, (Notice 423 of 1998) 
 
The White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) gave practical meaning to the 
Constitutional provisions by bringing DLG principle to the fore. According to Patel (2004:1), 
the introduction of the new system of DLG is the most fundamental part of local government 
transformation.  Davids and Maphunye (2009:60) and Smith and Vawda (2003:29) assert that 
DLG is underpinned by four pillars, i.e. “cultivating citizens through participation in service 
delivery, good governance, democratising development and fostering economic growth”. 
Schmidt (2008:121) and Moodley and Govender (2006:829) add “integration, coordination, 
leading and learning, focus on vulnerable groups and environmental sustainability” as pillars 
underpinning DLG (See Parnell et al. 2002, Van Donk et al. 2008). 
These pillars guarantee the public rights of access to basic services and active participation of 
individuals and the public in deciding on the appropriate mechanisms for the delivery of 
services (Smith & Vawda 2003:29).  Everett et al. (2010:224) submit that the White Paper 
(RSA 1998a) provides for the introduction of a “pro-poor DLG” where the public participate 
effectively in municipal activities.  In other words, the White Paper (RSA 1998a) advocates a 
shift away from a situation where the public is just the passive recipient of municipal plans, 
including the IDP, but rather becoming active participants. 
The White Paper (RSA 1998a) stresses the importance of a partnership between government, 
the public and community organisations in finding viable and long-lasting ways that will 
address their economic, social and material needs and subsequently bring about 
improvements in their well-being. These ideals form part of the elements required for 
successful DLG.  
 
According to Davids and Maphunye (2009:60), municipalities must be developmentally 
focused.  The White Paper (RSA 1998a) also suggests that municipalities should develop 
mechanisms to ensure public participation in policy initiation and formulation and the 
monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation.  
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The National Policy Framework for Public Participation (DPLG 2007:9) provides the 
following approaches that can assist in achieving this:  
 
1. Forums to allow organised formations to initiate policies and/or influence policy 
formulation, as well as participate in monitoring and evaluation.  
2. Structured stakeholder involvement in certain Council committees, in particular if 
these are issue-oriented committees, with a limited lifespan rather than being 
permanent structures.  
3. Participatory budgeting initiatives aimed at linking public priorities to capital 
investment programmes.  
4. Focus-group, participatory-action research, conducted in partnership with NGOs and 
CBOs, can generate detailed information about a wide range of specific needs and 
values.   
In this endeavour, according to Smith (2007:7), municipalities must prioritise and “promote 
the participation of marginalised and excluded groups in public processes”.  Smith (2007:7) 
further states that the White Paper (RSA 1998a) envisaged the potential barriers to authentic 
public participation, particularly for women. To counter these barriers, municipalities must 
“adopt inclusive approaches to foster public participation, including strategies aimed at 
removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in 
the local community” (Smith 2007:7).   
Furthermore, the White Paper (RSA 1998a) warns that participatory processes could impede 
development processes and the elite could enrich themselves and benefit, at the expense of 
the marginalised (Smith 2007:7). In this regard, municipalities must devise participation 
strategies that enhance, rather than impede the delivery processes (Smith 2007:7).  
The White Paper (RSA 1998a) envisages active participation of the public at four levels, i.e.: 
 
1. As voters: to ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected political 
leadership for the policies they are empowered to promote.  
2. As citizens: who express, via different stakeholder associations, their views before, 
during and after the policy development process, in order to ensure that policies 
reflect community preferences as far as possible.  
3. As consumers and end-users: who expect value-for-money, affordable services and 
courteous and responsive service.  
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4. As organised partners involved in the mobilisation of resources for development via 
for-profit businesses, non-governmental organisations and community-based 
institutions (DPLG 2007:9).   
4.3.3    Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) 
  
As noted above, the Constitution (RSA 1996) provides broad parameters in relation to 
participation. The Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b), in line with the Constitutional 
provisions, particularly Section 152(1) (a & e), provide for the establishment of different 
categories of municipalities and governance structures of each municipal category, as well as 
the establishment of participatory structures, such as Sub-Councils and WCs.  
 
According to DPLG (2005:14), the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) also provides for: 
 
1. A framework for the powers and functions of WCs. 
2. The term of office. 
3. Procedures for dealing with vacancies.  
4. A ruling on remuneration. 
5. Procedures for dissolution of ward committees.  
  
It is only the Metropolitan municipalities that can establish Sub-Councils, while both 
categories A and B municipalities can establish Ward Participatory Systems (Cameron 
2005:335).  Due to their proximity to the public, WCs are the structures that make it possible 
to narrow the gap between municipalities and the public since WCs have the knowledge and 
understanding of the public they represent (DPLG 2005:11).  
 
The COCT is one of the metropolitan municipalities that utilises the system of Sub-Councils 
as one way of bringing government closer to the public. It has 22 Sub-Councils decentralised 
across the Metro. They have the responsibility of participating with the public and 
disseminating information on service delivery issues to their ward or through WCs (Mfundisi 
2007:67). According to Mfundisi (2007:67), for Sub-Councils to be established, a bylaw 
needs to be passed by the Council of the municipality, thus legitimising its existence and 
ensuring it comprises Ward Councillors and other Councillors elected through proportional 
representation. 
As for the WCs, they are chaired by the Ward Councillor and must comprise not more than 
ten members representing different interests in the ward, with “women equitably represented” 
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(Piper & Deacon 2008:4). With regards to their role, Section 74 (a) states that WCs “may 
make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward (i) to the Ward Councillor, or (ii) 
through the Ward Councillor, to the Metro or local council, the executive committee, the 
Executive Mayor or the relevant Metropolitan Sub-Council”.  
According to Piper and Deacon (2008:41), the WC's role is further clarified in Ministerial 
Notice 965 of 2005, which states that the “duties and powers” delegated to WCs may not 
include executive powers (Section 5(3) (d), but instead emphasise their role in 
communication and mobilisation.   
4.3.4    Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) 
  
After the enactment of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b), that ushered in Sub-
Councils and WCs, the mammoth task to democratise local government continued with the 
introduction of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) 
spelt out participatory obligations for local government, like the creation of formal 
participatory structures such as the IDP.  
According to Pieterse (2002: 64), “IDP as a chief democratising instrument in local 
government distinguishes itself from previous local government in that it combines 
democratic governance, participatory planning an efficient modern managerial practice”. 
Theron (2009c: 135) hails “the IDP, in a DLG context, as a theoretically best thought out 
framework to engage in municipal-community partnership”. 
Patel (2004:1) asserts that IDP was born out of deliberations on the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) and was elaborated upon in the White Paper on Local 
Government (RSA 1998a).  The formal introduction of IDP was in the Municipal Systems 
Act (RSA 2000) which became a requirement for the 2000 local government elections (Patel 
2004:1). 
Section 16 of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA  2000) is explicit in prescribing the need for 
municipalities to “develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal 
representative government with a system of participatory governance” and must, for this 
purpose, encourage and create conditions for the public to participate in the affairs of the 
municipality, including in the:  
i)    Preparation, implementation and evaluation of IDP.  
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ii)   Performance management system.  
iii)  Monitoring and review of performance in preparation of the budget.  
iv)  Strategic decisions regarding municipal services.  
It is the responsibility of incumbent municipalities to contribute to capacitation of the public 
to participate meaningfully in municipal affairs and for the Councillors and officials to foster 
public participation (Davids & Maphunye 2009:62).  
With regards to the mechanisms, processes and procedures necessary for public participation, 
Section 17 of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) requires, among others: 
1. Public participation of the public in municipal affairs must take place through: 
a) Political structures for participation in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (117 
of 1998) and 
b) The mechanisms, processes and procedures for participation in municipal 
governance established in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000). 
2. A municipality must establish appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures to 
enable local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality and must, for 
this purpose, provide for:  
a) Receipt, processing and consideration of petitions, complaints lodged by 
members of the public. 
b)   Notification and public comment procedures when appropriate. 
c)   Public meetings, hearings by the municipal council and other political 
structures and political office bearers of the municipality when appropriate. 
d)  Public participation sessions with locally organised public organisations and, 
where appropriate, traditional authorities, and 
e)   Report back to the public.  
On communication of public participation information, Section 18 calls, inter alia, for the 
municipality to communicate to the public, information concerning: 
a) The available mechanisms, processes, procedures to encourage and facilitate 
public participation. 
       b)  The matters with regards to which public participation is encouraged. 
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            c)  The rights and duties of members of the public, and  
       d)  Municipal governance, management and development. 
4.3.5    The Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003) 
 
Having discussed the local government legislative framework that spelt out different 
mandates for local government, it is pivotal that the public participate in municipal budgetary 
processes and thus ensure that municipal finances are guided by a set of regulations to 
counter any undesired behaviour in financial management. 
The DPLG (2005:17) provides the following in relation to the purpose of the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (RSA 2003):  
 
1. Brings about transparent and effective financial management in municipalities and 
municipal public entities. 
2. Sets up a Municipal Financial Recovery Service to allow the National Treasury (NT) 
to intervene where a municipality faces a financial emergency. 
3. Shows the difference between short-term borrowing and long-term capital investment.  
 
Section 22 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003) is explicit in providing 
for the publication of annual municipal budgets and inviting the public to make 
representations in relation to the budget.  Furthermore, Section 23 provides for the public 
being consulted on tabled budgets.  It is a requirement of this legislation that the Mayor of the 
municipality must be given an opportunity to respond to submissions made and, if necessary, 
to revise the budget and accordingly table amendments for consideration by the full Council. 
According to De Visser (2009:11), the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA 2003) 
“established a robust framework for local government finance, dealing with financial 
management, accounting, revenue, and expenditure and debt management responsibilities for 
accounting officers and mayors as well as financial supervision by national and provincial 
governments”. This provision provides for financial checks and balances in municipal 
finances to ensure prudent financial management. 
4.4       Conclusion 
 
The above discussion shows that the public has lost confidence in local governance. This is 
caused by lack of public participation and corruption. These shortcomings have resulted in 
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municipalities spurning their responsibilities to be accountable and responsive to their 
citizens. The public’s response to this stalemate has been to embark on public protests to 
demand that their voices be heard, in order to be able to influence, direct, control and own 
development that is meant for their economic and social upliftment. 
This chapter has also argued that, despite these difficulties, the public still turn up in numbers 
to exercise their democratic right to vote.  What is amusing though is that they still seem to 
vote for the very same party that they have lost confidence in. This is caused by the fact that 
the South African electorate still votes according to identity (Friedman 2004:2). 
In this chapter it has been shown how public institutions function within the confines of 
legislative frameworks that guide their operations. Local government is not immune to this 
rule. The legislative frameworks above provide a basis for a transformed, democratic, 
participatory, effective and efficient local government structure, geared at actively providing 
services to the public that ultimately lead to the betterment of their lives. 
The mandates of local government are explicitly defined in legislation. These mandates 
include a developmental approach, a need for public participation through participatory 
structures i.e. WCs and IDPs, as well as financial prudence. This chapter has argued that 
municipalities should not rely only on “invented spaces” for participation, but must seek to 
utilise effectively and even legitimise the “self- invented (public)” spaces of participation.  
While the “invented spaces” have proved to be ineffective, attempts must be made to ensure 
that they live up to expectations, in line with the recommendations contained in the State of 
Local Government in South Africa (GOGTA, 2009b).  It can also be argued that municipal 
authorities’ enforcement, application and compliance with local government legislation will 
go a long way in ensuring that the public participate in decision-making, thus reducing or 
curbing public protest. 
The next chapter will examine public protests that have plagued Cape Town in general and 
Khayelitsha in particular. It will also briefly discuss the theories of protests in order to 
provide a theoretical grounding of protests. It will further explain the reasons behind public 
protests and the linkage between public participation and public protests. Lastly, the next 
chapter will provide the mechanisms through which public protest can be managed. 
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  CHAPTER FIVE  
 
PUBLIC PROTESTS IN CONTEXT 
5.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa’s public participation discourse draws mainly on two ingredients: the anti-
apartheid struggle and the new Constitution (1996) (Skenjana & Kimemia 2011:55). On the 
one hand, the struggle against apartheid challenged the apartheid regime’s suppression of 
public participation, particularly by the Blacks, which inadvertently infused a culture of 
protests to the public discourse. On the other hand, the Constitution (RSA 1996) legitimised 
and affirmed the right to protest.  
In contrast with the ideals of the Constitution (RSA 1996) and the international trends of 
opening up participatory spaces so that the public could participate in decisions meant to 
improve their lives (Cornwall 2008:11), South African municipalities, including the COCT 
are mired in dysfunctional “invited spaces”, of their own making, for participation, thus 
curtailing the democratic rights of the public (COGTA 2009b:8). It has now been 17 years 
since democracy was attained, but this is sufficient proof that participatory approaches are not 
living up to the promise of empowerment and transformative development for marginal 
people (Hickey & Mohan 2004:3).  
Furthermore, the preceding chapter alluded to the fact that the public has lost confidence in 
the municipal “invited spaces” (WCs and IDPs) for participation. In the same vein Masiko-
Kambala et al. (2012:68) contend that “the current edifice of public participation provided for 
by local government legislation, is largely inadequate for facilitating meaningful and 
inclusive expressions of voice, particularly for the poor and the marginalised”.  As a result, 
the public has sought to invent their own spaces of participation as reliable vehicles to 
champion their cause. These invented spaces have been in the form of public protests which 
at times turn violent. 
The persistent and violent nature of public protests in most South African municipalities and 
the COCT’s attainment of the status of a protests prone municipality has been a cause for 
concern. This concern emanates from and is exacerbated by the similarity of the current 
protests to those that brought about democracy and allegations of political agitation of 
protests raised by the COCT Executive Mayor.  Pillay (2011:1) posits that “during a highly 
repressive pre-1994 period, it was mass action at a local level that brought the state to its 
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knees”. The question that needs to be asked is: Could this be interpreted as the recurrence of 
the pre-1994 era, or is this a signal that the conventional mechanisms of state-public 
engagement have failed and that alternatives must be explored? 
The latter may be true, in line with the contention of Van Donk (2012:18) and Gwala and 
Theron (2012) that the current state of affairs in municipalities (dysfunctional participation 
mechanisms) can be attributed to the fact that, in practice, public participation has more often 
than not been approached as an activity, an event or perhaps even a regrettable legislative 
requirement, with little bearing on local priority-setting and development.  To this end 
Mogale (2003:223) points out that “invariably, participation has degenerated into a kind of a 
feel-good slogan, coined to convince local audiences that local government has recognised 
the necessity for involvement of people in development activities”. 
The above-mentioned “sorry tales” of participation gives credence to Cooke and Kothari’s 
(2001:1) case for “participation as tyranny of participatory processes undertaken 
ritualistically, which had turned out to be manipulative, or which had in fact harmed those 
who were supposed to be empowered”. These “sorry tales” are manifesting through the 
emergence of a relatively new trend of social movements, such as the so called Arab Spring, 
the Occupy Movements and persistent, world-wide public protests. 
This calls for a better understanding of protests and their violent nature, the causes/reasons 
for protests occurrences, theoretical constructs of public protests, as well as how protests can 
be managed as one of the valuable strategies for public participation. 
5.2 The meaning of public protests 
 
The phenomenon of public protests is not new. Pillay (2011:1) and Nleya (2011:3) pointed 
out that it was one of the apartheid struggle instruments that brought about democracy, but 
the expectation has been that, with the dawn of democracy, the public will effectively utilise 
invited spaces of participation, instead the public inventing its own spaces (protests). The 
effectiveness of the invited spaces would have resulted in the envisioned ideal situation that is 
succinctly summed up by Carrim (2011:1): 
“If communities are more involved in local government, they are more likely to have an 
understanding of the possibilities and limits of service delivery and take greater 
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responsibility for both the achievements and the failures of delivery. They are more likely, in 
other words, to have a sense of ownership of the programmes of a municipality”. 
 
The preceding chapters provided theoretical grounding for public protests; however it is 
important to define protests and to draw distinctions between protests and social movements 
as concepts, as well as to define the theories underlying these concepts.  
Table 5.1 below provides definitions of protests obtained as a result of the comparative 
research done by the researcher. 
  Table 5.1: Definitions of protest 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defines protest as a “formal statement or 
action of dissent or approval, it is a demonstration of objection to official policy”. 
Francisco (1995:270) in Nam (2007:98) defines protest as “an act of defiance challenging 
the political or economic regime”. 
“An expression or declaration of objection, disapproval, or dissent, often in opposition to 
something a person is powerless to prevent or avoid” (Definitions.net 2012:1). 
According to Wilki.answers.com “a protest means to get your point across about 
something that has bothered you personally/physically”. Example: The man protested 
about the law just passed. Usually it's in a formal manner. 
Source: The Author: (2012) 
The definitions above point out that for a protest to occur there have to be an objection, 
disapproval or dissent over something that the public has no power to prevent and avoid. As 
explained in Chapter 2, a working definition is devised in the event where an established 
definition is not known; in this regard a working definition is used to clarify the meaning of 
the concept or phrase to avoid misunderstandings (Google.com.). Based on this and on the 
above comparative research on the definitions of protests, the researcher formulates a 
working definition for protest in line with the hypothesis of the study: 
 
A physical act of demonstrating discontent to the authorities over public concerns (some 
long-standing) aimed at compelling authorities to accede to public grievances and change 
the status quo. It is a demand for dignity, acknowledgement of basic human rights and return 
of power that has been stripped from the public. It is a demand to be able to influence, direct, 
control and own the development and decision-making processes. 
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Moreover, there is a need to define a social movement, so as to clarify its relationship with 
protest. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977: 217-18) in Meyer (2007:8), a social 
movement is “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for 
changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution within a society”. 
Meyer (2007:10) sees social movement “as collective and sustained efforts that challenge 
existing or potential laws, policies, norms or authorities, making use of extra institutional 
political tactics”.  For Oberschall (2000:26) a social movement is a “challenger that seeks a 
collective good for a constituency by means of a variety of tactics, some of which entail 
unconventional, even illegal, pressurising of the target”. 
It is clear from the definitions above that the public do not mobilise in cavity but in response 
to a crisis situation.  In other words, social movements advocate for a radical change to the 
status quo; in this case, poor service delivery and lack of public participation.  Due to 
similarities between protests and social movements, it is surmised that protest is a tool used 
by social movements to coerce authorities to conform to public demands. Therefore these 
concepts will be used interchangeably in this study. 
Furthermore, the emergence of new social movement activities, such as the so-called 
“Occupy Movements” and “Arab Spring”, necessitate that a distinction be drawn between 
different types of protests, in order to locate accurately public protests, the subject of this 
study.  
 
In this vein, Fakir (2007:10) declares that public protests can be categorised into four types, 
i.e. (1) a social movement/civic activity, (2) a spontaneous, unorganised activity, (3) 
spontaneous eruptions grounded in specific need(s) and a definite alternative policy and (4) a 
political trajectory opposed to current dispensation.  
The researcher has observed that Fakir’s (2007) categorisation of protest omits the emerging 
social movement activity, i.e. Arab Springs.  The researcher has also noted that this (Fakir 
2007:10) categorisation makes provision for the so-called Occupy Movement type of 
activities, but the latter differs from the former in terms of the tactics and strategies. 
Therefore, the researcher adds the insurrectionary, well-organised, civic-activity category that 
relates to the so called Arab Springs: 
 
1. Social movement/civic activity: This type of public protest sometimes demonstrates 
aggressive / unpleasant / offensive characteristics which, in itself are indicative of a 
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desperate position. Participants have a strategy which may be lacking in substance. 
They may have an alternative policy and a political objective. Their political activity 
is organised, indicating a distinct ideological and political position. In this type of 
civic action the movement is usually well organised, i.e. has a political identity, has 
organised structures (such as branches) and holds regular meetings. Examples from 
this category are the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), People Against Gangsterism 
and Drugs (PAGAD) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
 
2. Insurrectionary, well-organised civic activity: This category is characterised by 
revolutionary, armed, popular uprisings such as that of the so-called Arab Springs, 
which seek to overthrow the incumbent government. This is evidenced by the major 
slogan used by these demonstrators in the Arab world: ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam, 
meaning “the people want to bring down the regime”. Participants have a strategy 
with some substance, which is to employ pro-democracy rebellions to topple 
autocratic rulers (Zader 2012:1). Their political activity is well organised and planned 
in advance; well before the actual start of the armed rebellion (Zader 2012:1). It is 
therefore clear that the Arab Springs phenomenon differs from the Occupy Movement 
due to the fact that the latter depends on peaceful protests.   
 
3. A definite alternative policy and political trajectory, opposed to the current 
dispensation: In this activity, in terms of the South African scenario, some protests 
are instigated by an opposition party or some other small party with political intent; 
some emerge from the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners. 
This type of activity often occurs as a result of not being placed in a favourable 
position on a party list, being replaced by another candidate or having been kicked out 
of the party for ill-discipline, corruption or non-performance. Recent examples of this 
category is the United Democratic Movement (UDM) which came into being as a 
result of its current leader’s expulsion from the ANC and then the formation of the 
Congress of the People arguably, as a result of the ANC’s recall of former President 
Thabo Mbeki. 
 
4. Spontaneous eruptions grounded on specific needs: This activity is triggered by 
perceptions of a slow pace of delivery, which may be due to the government’s lack of 
capacity.  Public protests fit into this category, as they are usually described as being 
sporadic.  These protests are furthermore described as low to medium key and are 
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triggered by annoying/disgusting occurrences in a neighbourhood with significant 
social ties. During the protest action, participants can raise grievances such as 
corruption, lack of delivery of basic services and lack of proper public participation.  
 
According to Alexander (2010:26), methods used during  such protest actions 
involves acts of mass action, streets blockades, burning of tyres and torching of 
vehicles, private and public buildings, construction of barricades, delivering 
memorandums and petitions to local authorities, toyi-toying, processions, 
confrontations with police and demand for removal and resignation of elected public 
officials. 
 
In this category of protests, democracy is viewed as deficient and manifests itself in 
the crisis of a perceived lack of representation.  Participants feel that government is 
out of touch with the public needs. Government is seen as not responsive to the needs 
of the people and is deemed unaccountable.  A protest about service delivery only is a 
misnomer; protests are also about public service.  Community organisations such as 
Abahlali Basemjondolo (shack dwellers), Backyarders Associations of the Cape Flats 
and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, fall in this category of social 
movements. 
 
5. Spontaneous, unorganised activity: This activity takes place through social 
movements. In this type of activity there are no organised structures, branches, 
meetings, fixed identity, policy and political project. It is concerned with seeking 
alternatives to current neo-liberal state trajectory (the poor becoming poorer and the 
rich richer) in a peaceful manner.  Even if there is improvement in service delivery, 
the participants in this activity will not be satisfied, unless the gap between the poor 
and the rich is narrowed.  
 
The so-called “Occupy Movements” are a case in point here. The Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) is a “diffuse group of activists who say they stand against corporate greed, 
social inequity and the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations 
over the democratic process” (Barron & Moynihan 2011:2). The  OWS were 
instigated by the emergence of the so-called Arab Springs as Barron and Moynihan 
(2011:2) point out that the idea, according to some organisers, was to camp-out for 
weeks or even months to replicate the kind, if not the scale, of protests that had 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
erupted earlier in 2011 in places such as Egypt, Spain and Israel.  
 
According to Barron and Moynihan (2011:2) the protesters demands are 
straightforward and criticise a financial system that favours the rich and large 
corporations at the expense of the poor. In this way the occupiers want the rich to pay 
higher taxes, the banks to be held accountable for reckless practices and the provision 
of jobs for the unemployed. 
 
The criticism levelled against the OWS is the lack of specific policy demands despite 
Schneider’s (2011:1) assertion that OWS protesters employ a diversity of tactics as its 
official modus operandi and that the use of violence is discouraged at all cost. This, 
according to Schneider (2011:1), is seen in the protest march guidelines promulgated 
by the occupation’s Direct Action Committee, i.e.: (1) Stay together and KEEP 
MOVING!  (2) Don’t instigate fights with cops or threaten pedestrians with physical 
violence. (3) Use basic hand signals. These folks are empowered to make directional 
decisions and guide the march. (4) We respect diversity of tactics, but consider how 
our actions may affect the entire group. 
 
As noted above, central to OWS movement’s “Diversity of Tactics” is non-violent 
protest action. Participants are to decide on their own on what they want to do and 
how to do it and are not obliged to take orders from any person from the top. In other 
words, they challenge top-down decision-making and organising and empower 
participants to take direct actions in the world around them. This type of action setting 
encourages a sense of consensus and direct democracy.  
 
According to Graeber (2011:1) and Schneider (2011:2), non-hierarchical, lack of 
practical demands and decentralised structures are synonymous with anarchist 
principles.  Graeber (2011:1) explains “anarchism as a political movement that aims 
to bring about a genuinely free society-that is, one where humans only enter those 
kinds of relations with one another that would not have to be enforced by the constant 
threat of violence”.  In other words anarchism envisions a society based on equality 
and solidarity, which could exist solely on the free consent of participants. 
 
Other anarchist principles used by OWS are the refusal to recognise the legitimacy of 
existing political institutions. The occupiers have never handed a memorandum to the 
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authorities because to do this will be seen as recognising the legitimacy or the power 
of the authorities. In this vein anarchists differentiate between protest action and 
direct action (Graeber 2011:1). Protest is seen as an appeal to authorities to behave 
differently, while direct action is the defiant insistence on acting as if one is already 
free (Graeber 2011:2). 
 
The second principle that is related to the first one, relates to the refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of the existing order, instead conforming to the moral order. The illegal 
occupation of the park is an act of disobedience in the belief that those laws should in 
the first place not exist. Thirdly, the refusal to create an internal hierarchy, but instead 
create a form of a consensus – based on direct democracy – ensures the avoidance of 
co-option or being coerced (Graeber 2011:2). This also means that the majority 
cannot bend the minority to its will, as decisions are made through general consent.  
 
Moreover, Schneider (2011:3) points out that this seemingly chaotic situation is in 
fact a pragmatic tactic. He points out that law-enforcement agencies receive high-
level intelligence information on the activities of the OWS.  In the event the occupiers 
veer from their plans which police had prepared for, the police resort to violence, 
which reinforces the non-violence of the occupiers and subsequently leads to further 
growth in support. 
 
Lastly, there is the embrace of pre-figurative politics9. The encampment at Zuccotti 
Park and subsequent encampments became spaces of experiment in creating the 
institutions of a new society – not only general assemblies, but kitchens, libraries, 
clinics, media centres, all operating on anarchist principles of mutual aid and self-
organisation (Graeber 2011:2). 
 
The power of “diversity of tactics” is also confirmed by Atlee (2011:3) by positing 
that “the logic is similar to guerrilla warfare in that, if a movement like this is 
unpopular, it will be defeated. But if a significant sector of the population supports it, 
then demonstrating the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the powers-that-be will 
ultimately force those powers to change or be replaced”.  
                                                 
9  According to the Wikipedia.org, the term pre-figurative politics is widespread within various activist 
movements, and it describes modes of organization and social relationships that strive to reflect the future 
society being sought by the group  
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Schneider (2011:3) sums this up succinctly by quoting “a widely-cited Freedom 
House report from 2005, which found that movements which rely on non-violence 
methods are considerably more likely to result in democratic outcomes, rather than 
simply replacing one type of authoritarianism with another”. 
5.3 Are protests about service delivery or public service? 
 
The protests afflicting municipalities in South Africa are generally poorly understood so 
much so that there are conflicting views on what public protests are about.  This has fuelled 
speculation on why protests occur. Maytham (2012) and Heese (2012) argue that the phrase 
“service delivery protests” is used by the media as a “catch all phrase” that covers a wide 
variety of issues facing the public. For example, and as observed by the researcher, the 
protest that turned violent in Kagiso (Gauteng) was triggered by the lack of speed bumps on 
the road which led to the road accident which incensed the public at a local government level. 
On the other hand the violent protests in Sweet Home Farm in Cape Town appear to have 
been triggered by the lack of communication between the public and authorities (Maytham 
2012). In other words the public seem not to have been aware about progress on the question 
of the land in dispute. The above examples illustrates that protests in the two areas were 
triggered by service delivery and governance issue respectively.  
 
One school of thought argues that public protests are about service delivery or lack thereof 
(Booysen 2007:33; Mathekga & Buccus 2006:4). Another school of thought attributes public 
protests to public service (Seokoma 2010:1; Nemeroff 2005:2). This confusion has the 
potential of deflecting government’s attention from the real problem and the subsequent 
taking of corrective measures.  It is therefore important that this be clarified before the 
discussion on the reasons and causes of public protests.  
 
According to Booysen (2007:23), protests do not follow the same pattern in all communities, 
but change from one to the next and, furthermore, there will always be a myriad of reasons 
for protests by the public.  On the one hand, Booysen (2007:24) and Mathekga and Buccus 
(2006:4) argue that protests are about service delivery and Allan and Heese (2008:1) agree 
and warns that to link protests to only service delivery is not accurate, but only serves to 
describe what is occurring at a local level and which is fuelled by lack of service delivery.  
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On the other hand, Seokoma (2010:1) and Nemeroff (2005:2) opine that protests are about 
public service, particularly the huge gap that exists between the public and authorities.  
Pithouse (2007) in Alexander (2010:25), sharply differs with the view regarding service 
delivery and argues as follows, “Protests are about ‘citizenship’, understood as the material 
benefits of full inclusion... as well as the right to be taken seriously when thinking and 
speaking through public organisations”.  These sentiments are also echoed by Ludwig and 
Nagel (2012:1) when they state that, “there is a lack of political will in terms of engaging with 
the public directly. The public is not viewed as subjects, but instead as objects and passive 
recipients of service delivery by the City (COCT)”. 
 
Friedman (2009:1) agrees that it is incorrect to label protest, service delivery protests. He 
does this by differentiating between service delivery and public service concepts. According 
to Friedman (2009:1), service delivery entails officials taking decisions for people and 
imposing these on them. In other words the public is not given an opportunity to provide 
input or choose regarding the nature of the service delivery. Public service, on the other hand, 
begins with the recognition that in a democracy, government is not expected merely to 
deliver, but to listen to the people and respond to their needs and, if it is impossible to 
respond effectively, government must work with the people to do what is at least closer to 
what they ask (Friedman 2009:1).  
 
Friedman (2009:1) further argues that protest about public service is public participation in 
governance. While to protest is a democratic right, enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996), 
democracy is about allowing the public to take part in decision-making and action, taken 
collectively, particularly on issues affecting the lives of the beneficiaries. In other words 
authentic and empowering public participation provide the public with the scope to influence, 
direct, control and even own decision-making and development intervention. 
 
Based on the different points of views expressed above, the researcher surmises that public 
protests are about both public service and service delivery. In this instance public service 
relates to issues of governance, i.e. public participation (in the sense of direct contact with the 
public by the authorities) and reaching consensus on issues affecting themselves, mutual 
accountability and responsiveness of the authorities to public needs. Service delivery relates 
to timeous provision of municipal public basic goods, such as water, sanitation, houses, etc. 
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5.3 Theories of public protests 
 
Having defined and clarified protests and social movements, it is important to utilise protest 
theories to explain how and why social movements are formed and why the public 
participate. Dalton et al. (2009:3) cautions that extensive research on social movements has 
emerged from the highly-industrialised countries, as opposed to the developing countries. 
This makes it difficult to generalise, as political, social and economic conditions differ 
tremendously. According to Dalton et al. (2009:3), theories of protests and mass movements 
are categorised into two groups, i.e. macro and micro levels and tend to provide political, 
psychological and socio- economic explanations on mass movements. 
 
For the purposes of this study, focus is on four main, macro-level theories that provide 
political and socio-economic explanations of protests, i.e. political opportunity, theory of 
collective action, relative deprivation and resource mobilisation theories. These theories 
provide sufficient arguments for explaining protest formation and participation in this study.  
 
To begin with the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory, which provides a political 
explanation to mass movements, puts forward three factors that must be present for the 
successful development of social movement, namely deprivation, resources and political 
opportunity (Meyer 2004:134).  POS theory argues that the availability or the non-availability 
of political opportunity in the political structure determines the actions of the protest 
participants (Meyer 2004:134).  
 
Tarrow (1989) in Meyer (2004:134), defines political opportunity as "consistent but not 
necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political struggle that encourage the public 
to engage in contentious politics”.  In other words, political opportunity relates to the degree 
of political openness or inaccessibility of the political structure. Oberschall (2000:31) adds 
that political opportunity has huge positive impact on participation, in the sense that when the 
probability of success is high, the cost of participation decreases.  This may function as an 
incentive for protest participants. 
 
Eisinger (1973) in Meyer (2004:128), states that governments that are both “open” and 
“closed” for the public to participate are most likely to encounter protests. This implies that 
governments that are open to public participation will invite participation to address 
grievances through conventional means, while those that suppress public participation will be 
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repressive (Meyer 2004: 128). Kitschelt (1986) in Dalton et al. (2011:3) disagrees and argues 
that the inaccessibility of the structure serves to induce the public to abandon the 
conventional means of communication and engage in protest action. This is even more so in 
South Africa, where the apartheid government, which was perceived to be “closed”, was 
challenged through mass mobilisation and was eventually brought down. In this new 
democratic dispensation, polity is perceived to be “open” to public participation, but this does 
not deter the public from engaging in protest action. It is therefore clear that the openness or 
accessibility of polity has no bearing on protest action.  
 
Secondly, the theory of collective action moves from the premise that citizens who are 
excluded from political activity choose between conventional and non-conventional means to 
demand a say in the policies that are meant to shape their future (Oberschall 2000:25).  
According to Oberschall (2000:25) the perceived intransigence of the regime provokes the 
public to utilise unconventional means, such as pickets, marches, protest and disorder to 
persuade government to accede to its demands. Oberschall (2000:28) add that four conditions 
must be met for collective action to take place, namely discontent, beliefs, capacity (i.e. 
resources) and political opportunity. However, the unavailability of one condition makes 
collective action unlikely.  
 
The above-mentioned conditions reflect the situation that Khayelitsha inhabitants find 
themselves in. As noted above on numerous occasions, commentators argue that the 
prevalence of protests in Khayelitsha is as a result of dissatisfaction with the non-delivery of 
basic services. Inhabitants attempt to use “invited spaces” of public participation, but these do 
not yield the desired results. As a result, citizens’ beliefs filter and frame their dissatisfaction 
as they witness delivery occurring in other and neighbouring townships. These observations 
have been transformed into grievances against the municipal authorities. The public are 
seemingly, from their own perspective, left with no other alternative but to resort to “self-
invented” spaces of participation (e.g. Street Committees and protests).  
 
The theory of collective action assumes that the public have the capacity to act collectively 
through Street Committees, have access to the means of mass communication and freedom to 
organise.  Political opportunity in this instance functions as a “bargaining tool” for the public, 
i.e. the public in Khayelitsha is perceived to be loyal to the African National Congress (ANC) 
in a Democratic Alliance (DA) run municipality. This increases the probability that the goals 
and demands of the protesters will be achieved because they are being staged in anticipation 
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of timely delivery of public goods that will induce voting for the DA in future elections. 
 
Thirdly, the Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory moves from the premise that, for people to 
mobilise there must be inequalities and grievances (Canel 1997:191). The formation of a 
social movement is dependent on the availability of sufficient resources and changes in 
opportunities (Tilly1978:99 in Canel 1997:191). These are utilised to mobilise against the 
authorities, in order to coerce it into tackling inequality and grievances. Resources include 
money, media coverage, knowledge, solidarity and internal and external support of the elite.  
Changes in the opportunities relate to rationality, where individuals first weigh the costs and 
benefits of movement participation (Nleya 2011:4). For them (individuals) to participate, 
benefits must outweigh the costs. 
 
Oberschall (2000:31) argues that it is not only resources that are crucial in the formation of 
mass movements. In the absence of resources, the public can still engage in a protest action 
by using shared symbols and falling back on protest repertoires embedded in their culture. 
Canel (1997:191) points out that placing inequality as a precondition for the occurrence of 
protest weakens RM theory, in the sense that inequality and dominance is found at every 
level of society. RM critics cite its heavy reliance on resources, in particular financial 
resources. The researcher has observed that the public in Khayelitsha do not need financial 
resources to mobilise, instead rely on the power of the collective, in other words, the high 
number of the participants in a protest action increases the probability that their voices will be 
heard.   
 
Lastly, Gurr’s (1968) theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) provides explanation on the 
violent behaviour associated with protests. Gurr (1968:251) makes three psychological 
assumptions that act as sources of violence, namely that violence is instinctual, learned and 
innate. This means that these would have to be provoked by external factors such as 
unemployment and/or corruption for them to manifest.  
 
According to Gurr (1968:250) this behaviour is explained by the frustration-aggression 
theory that assumes that the perception of frustration provokes anger, which functions as a 
drive. Therefore extreme and continuous anger may function as an autonomous drive, leading 
to aggression. RD functions as a precondition for violence and, if RD is severe, the 
probability and intensity of violence is high. The RD approach shows weak association with 
protest, particularly in developed countries, but stronger correlation is present in low-income 
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countries (Dalton 2010 in Nleya 2011:4). 
  
Flowing from the discussion above, POS, RD and the theory of collective action the 
conclusion can be drawn that there is unanimous agreement that deprivation plays a role in 
the formation of mass movements and in enticing the public to participate in protest action.  
RM emphasises the availability of resources as a precondition to mass movement formation 
and participation. RM acknowledges that there must be inequality and grievances for a mass 
movement to be formed.  
 
It can thus be argued that these two factors, i.e. inequality and grievances emanate from 
deprivation. Political opportunity appears in both the theory of collective action and POS. 
This signifies that it is one factor that must be considered when contemplating protest action, 
as it may be a risk factor in the event that the regime suppresses public participation. This 
study will therefore move from the premise that deprivation and political opportunity are 
necessary preconditions for both the formation of mass movements and participation in 
protest action.  
5.4 The reasons/causes of public protests 
 
There are different points of view put forward by commentators on the reasons or causes for 
the public to abandon conventional ways of voicing their dissatisfaction with local 
government authorities  (Oldfield 2008:493; Van Donk 2012:7; Mathekga & Buccus 2006:4). 
As noted above, the right to protest is enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996).  In other 
words, protest is regarded as one form of public participation which must be embarked upon 
in a manner that does not infringe on the right of the non-participants.  
 
There are conventional ways, such as voting in the democratic elections held every five years, 
that can be used to voice dissatisfaction with the authorities. There are also invited spaces or 
participatory mechanisms such as WCs and IDPs that are meant to provide a platform for 
interaction between the public and authorities.  
 
As shown in the preceding chapter, however, these participatory mechanisms do not instil a 
sense of trust in the general public, so much so that it has compelled sections of the public to 
resort to self-invented spaces of participation (in the form of public protests) to voice their 
dissatisfaction. The number of public protests seems to be increasing at an alarming rate 
which indicates that protest is increasingly becoming an acceptable way for the public to put 
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forward their grievances. This calls for the identification of reasons and causes why the 
public resort to public protests.   Figure 5.1 below illustrates major public protests from year 
2004 to July 2012. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Major public protests by year (2004 to July 2012) 
Source: Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots Monitor10 (2012)  
 
The Municipal IQ (2012:1) data shows that protests ballooned in years 2009 and 2010 and 
declined slightly in 2011 (see Figure 5.1). This decline is attributed to the municipal elections 
of May 2011 which, as noted above, introduced a higher public participation rate since the 
first local government elections (Van Donk 2012:14; Herzenberg 2011:1). Based on the 
researcher’s observation, this decline can also be attributed to the fact that the run-up to the 
elections is normally characterised by political campaigns where politicians listen to public 
grievances and present their respective party manifestos. In other words during this period 
(high interaction between the public and politicians), the public abandon protest action in 
anticipation of improved public service after the municipal elections. It can thus be argued 
that if this high participation activity can be sustained even after the elections, the levels of 
public protests activity in Khayelitsha can be minimised thus serving as one of the protests 
mitigating mechanism. 
 
                                                 
10As per the Municipal IQ (2012),  the Municipal IQ Hotspots Monitor records major protests either violent or 
peaceful, staged by the public against a municipality, as recorded by the media, raising issues that are the 
responsibility or perceived responsibility of local government (such as councillor accountability, the quality and 
pace of basic service delivery, and in metro areas, housing). Issues falling outside of local government’s service 
delivery mandate such as demarcation, industrial relation disputes or internal political party issues (including 
candidate lists) are excluded. Where protests are sustained over several days or weeks, these are recorded as a 
single entry, with qualitative details updated on the database. Municipal IQ”s reliance on media reports lends it 
to inaccurate reporting as some protests may not be captured by the media, particularly when they are perceived 
not to be newsworthy. 
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This year (2012) has seen one hundred and thirteen public protests which, according to the 
Municipal IQ (2012:1), shows that 2012 accounts for 22 per cent of protests recorded 
between January 2004 and July 2012, with 1 January to 31 July 2012 recording more protests 
than any other year since 2004 (see Figure 5.1 above). In essence this means 2012 have set a 
new record in protest activity rate in South African municipalities since the dawn of 
democracy.  
 
Moreover, Figure 5.2 below shows that from January to July 2012, the Western Cape is 
leading in the number of public protests, at 24 per cent, even surpassing Gauteng’s 12 per 
cent, a province known to be prone to protests. On the other hand, Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
point that Gauteng has always been leading in the number of protests. From 2004 to 2012 
Gauteng has had 28 per cent of public protests, followed by Western Cape at 17 per cent. As 
noted above, this high number of protests indicates that a gulf exists between public 
participation theory (WCs and IDPs strategies) and practice (implementation by change 
agents) (Cooke and Kothari 2001:4). The question is why a significant drop in Gauteng and a 
sudden increase in the Western Cape? 
 
  
Figures 5.2 Public protests by province: Figure 5.3: Public protests by province: 
       January - July 2012                                       2004 – Quarter 1 2012  
 
Source:  Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots Monitor (2012) 
 
Furthermore, in figure 5.4 below, Cape Town accounts for 72 per cent of public protests in 
the Western Cape, as compared to a decline in Gauteng, under which the City of 
Johannesburg (COJ) falls. Despite some high-profile protests in Gauteng (COJ), it has had a 
far quieter year in terms of protests than is typically the case. The researcher argues that the 
distinction lies in the different approaches that the municipalities use to mitigate the levels of 
public protests.  
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Gauteng government called upon the Speakers of Municipal Councils and the Speaker of 
Gauteng Legislature to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the view of 
working together to hold government accountable for service delivery and to improve public 
participation in both the local and provincial legislatures (South African Government 
Information (SAGI 2012). According to the SAGI (2012) the MOU committed the Speakers 
to set up provincial frameworks for oversight, public participation and law making. This was 
followed by the adoption of a five year strategic plan which among others provided for the 
reduction of violent public protests in Gauteng through meaningful public participation 
(SAGI 2012).  
Moreover, the reduction in the number of public protests in Gauteng can be attributed to the 
COJ’s road shows driven by officials to encourage the public to use constructive democratic 
mechanisms to raise their grievances (Heese 2012). The researcher has observed that the 
Gauteng Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for COGTA is often the first at the 
protest scene. This sentiment is also echoed by the Municipal IQ (2012:1) which further 
attribute the reduction in the number of protest in Gauteng to rapid and high-level political 
engagement with protestors and also to what the Municipal IQ (2012:1) refers to as a 
“policing solution11”, which appears to be paying off.  
The Municipal IQ (2012:1) argues further that a policing solution to contain violence and 
destruction of property is critical, but it is also important for politicians, particularly 
councillors to acknowledge protests as legitimate without condoning violence and to be seen 
acting on public grievances. The Gauteng’s approach can be regarded as a “soft approach12” 
to mitigating the levels of protests. 
However, the opposite seem to be happening in Cape Town. It can be argued that although 
protest action is partially accepted as expressing legitimate grievances of the public this is not 
fully acknowledged in the COCT. The Executive Mayor, in response to a question on 
whether protests were not related to service delivery, declared that protest were “organised 
illegal ANC demonstrations with the express purpose to destroy property” (Nkomo, 2012). 
                                                 
11 As per Allan (2012), this policing solution involves the use of non-confrontational strategies that seeks to 
contain violence and the destruction of property. 
12 For the purposes of this study the “soft approach” refers to a non-confrontational approach to dealing with 
protests and that seeks to inculcate the culture of authentic and empowering public participation in municipal 
affairs. 
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This is despite confirmation from the senior police official that “there is no evidence that the 
ANCYL was behind recent protests” (Nkomo, 2012).  
It also appears as if protest action is regarded as an irritant, as the Mayoral Committee 
member for safety and security (COCT) puts it that protests had displaced the City’s stretched 
resources and that “instead of people getting the policing that ratepayers are paying for, the 
metro police are at service delivery protests” (Mtyala 2012:3).  
The rapid response to attend to the protesters in the COCT seem to be coming from the law 
enforcement agencies who are first to be at a protest scene which can be associated with the 
“hard approach13” to protests mitigation. It appears that the politicians respond to protests 
when they turn violent, for example the Executive Mayor responded to the plight of Sir 
Lowry Pass later, a day after the protests started (Maditla 2012:1). This point is further 
clarified by Booi (2012:1) of Eye Witness News in that it is the law enforcement agencies 
that respond immediately to protests, followed by the COCT officials who met with the 
leaders of the Sweet Home Farm informal settlement a day after the public have clashed with 
the police from the previous day.  
In contrast with the COJ, the high level political engagement of the protesters in the COCT, 
seem to be through tallying the costs of protests damage, seeking to interrogate theories of 
political agitation on certain public protests (De Lille 2012:1) and instituting criminal charges 
against political opponents. It can thus be argued that the COCT must learn some lessons 
from the COJ “soft approach” to mitigating protests. Moreover, Heese (2012) asserts that the 
COCT officials need to encourage COCT politicians to follow the COJ example. The 
researcher has observed that the public in the COCT is raising legitimate grievances that must 
be attended to urgently. These grievances are not unique to Cape Town but exist throughout 
South African municipalities. The distinction lies in the manner in which protests are 
mitigated. The COCT must (first) fully acknowledge protests as raising legitimate grievances, 
a demand for the public in the COCT to influence, direct, control and even to own decision-
making processes and development interventions meant for the betterment of their lives. 
Flowing from data illustrated in Figure 5.1, 2 and 3, the researcher argues that the gulf that 
exists between the COCT participation strategies and implementation alienates the public, 
                                                 
13 The “hard approach” relates to a confrontational approach of responding to public protests, including the law 
enforcement agencies use of excessive force to deal with protesters. The local politicians respond when protests 
turn violent. 
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leading to public disengagement from the participation discourse, hence fuelling the 
persistent public protests in Khayelitsha and elsewhere. De Lille (2012:1) confirms the gulf 
as mentioned above and adds that there is a breakdown in the relationship between 
government and the public and that the public feels excluded and neglected by the COCT. In 
other words, the public in the main, is disillusioned with the delivery rate of basic public 
services, but increasingly, governance factors such as lack of public participation, 
maladministration, nepotism, fraud and corruption, have been brought to the fore (GGLN 
2012:7).  
Governance factors (including lack of public participation) as contributory factors to the 
upsurge in public protests, are also reaffirmed in State reports such as COGTA: The State of 
Local Government Report (2009b:8-10), National Treasury’s Local Government Budget and 
Expenditure Review (2011:24) and the National Development Plan (National Planning 
Commission 2011:365), GGLN (2012:7) and Van Donk (2012:13). This is government’s 
acknowledgement that there is a disconnect between the public and the COCT in what 
Cornwall (2008:11) and Van Donk. (2012:15) call “governance deficit”.  
IDASA (2010:4) and Booysen (2007:23) assert that public protests differ and take various 
forms from one municipality to the other, but in all instances members of the public want to 
be “heard and taken seriously”, as they are aware of their rights and demand those rights. 
This assertion is also echoed by Heese (2012:1) by stating that 90 per cent of public protests 
are fuelled by public frustrations with government. CIVICUS (2011:12) concurs and asserts 
that protesters strive for dignity and question the current rules of engagement (WCs and 
IDPs). In other words, in as much as these participatory mechanisms governing the relations 
between the public and authorities are not delivering, a “social contract” (CIVICUS 2011:48) 
must be renegotiated, but this time, primarily on the public’s terms. This call seems to fall on 
deaf ears. 
 
IDASA (2010:4) states that “protesters are adamant that, for as long as government officials 
continue to assume that the mandate they get at the polls gives them right to act in a unilateral 
and top-down manner, these protests will continue. This means that the public feel alienated 
from decision-making processes. Protests are aimed at reminding the authorities that the 
public’s right to be heard is sacrosanct. 
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According to Allan (2010:20), public protests cannot be forecasted and points out that public 
protests do not take place in South Africa’s poorest municipalities, as alleged.  In supporting 
this argument, Allan (2010:20) cites the Census 2001 data which pointed out that between 
2004 and 2009, 48 per cent of households earned less than R800 a month, but less so than a 
national average of 57 per cent.   
 
Furthermore, public protests are not very prevalent in municipal wards with the worst 
service-delivery backlogs. For example, “of the 23 per cent not receiving access to basic 
services they are still on aggregate better off than the national citizen, where an average 27 
per cent of ward residents did not receive basic levels of service delivery in 2001” (Allan 
2010:20). According to Allan (2010:20) the above picture shows that it is neither absolute 
deprivation nor the very poorest of the poor that are behind the public protests. 
 
Protests are fuelled by relative deprivation measured against neighbours in wealthy 
municipalities (Van Donk 2012:21). Data also shows that rapidly-growing urban areas, with 
high levels of inequality levels, implied by higher levels of economic growth on the one hand 
and deep unemployment on the other, are at risk of being engulfed by public protests (Allan 
2010:21).  
 
The discussion above absolves being the poorest of the poor and suffering absolute 
deprivation as being the causes of public protests, so then, what are the real reasons for and 
causes of these persistent public protests? According to CIVICUS (2011:55) the root causes 
of the public protests can be traced from the economic crises which have exacerbated 
unemployment rates and inequality, to the manner in which politicians and change agents 
implement development interventions. This assertion is echoed by Allan (2010:20) who states 
that public protests have taken place at wards with high unemployment levels – at 43 per cent 
– although poverty levels and access to services there are not worse than the national average. 
 
According to Allan (2010:20), “there is a link between public protests and the performance of 
the local economies and municipalities as measured on the Municipal IQ Productivity Index”. 
The Western Cape Province score in the Municipal IQ Productivity Index is currently (2010) 
“high at 74.47 per cent more than expected” (Allan 2010:20). Therefore, the higher the 
aggregate provincial score, the greater the level of public protests. This is seen by high levels 
of migration from poor-performing provinces to better performing. Allan (2010:20) points 
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out that there is a link between people entering a municipal area for economic opportunities 
and public protests. The COCT is not immune to this trend. 
 
The points above are illustrated in the IDP (COCT 2007-2012). Over the last 20 years the 
COCT experienced rapid urbanisation which has resulted in its population almost doubling to 
its current total of 3.5 million people. The   COCT (2007-2013) attributes this growth rate to 
the 1 per cent annual growth through natural family formation and the continued influx of 
approximately 50 000 people (18 000 households) per year.  The influx is mainly from the 
Eastern Cape Province, to Cape Town in the hope for employment opportunities.  
 
According to the IDP (COCT 2007-2012) “this urbanisation trend presents Cape Town with a 
number of major challenges, particularly when one considers that around 91% of households 
in the city earn less than R6 400 per month, and therefore depend on the state for their 
housing needs”. This explains why protests are prevalent in COCT and Khayelitsha (at 72 per 
cent) as opposed to other districts in the Western Cape (see Figure 5.4 below). In essence, 
protests do not occur as a result of an area being considered the worst for service delivery or a 
municipality as one of the worst performing. 
 
Figure 5.5 below illustrates the worsening/climaxing of public protests during winter months 
(June, July and August) in the Western Cape, when the shacks in the informal settlements get 
flooded as a result of frequent rain and are prone to fire hazards, due to increased levels of 
open-fire heating (Allan 2010:19; Van Donk 2012; Karamoko 2011:8). 
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Figure 5.4: Western Cape protests by district:   Figure 5.5: Protests by month in Western Cape    
       February 2007 – May 2011                              (to end September 2009) 
         Source: Karamoka (2011:8)    Source: Municipal IQ (2012:19)  
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Oldfield (2008:493) and Buccus and Hicks (2008:528) are of the view that the public resort 
to protests when frustrated with a municipality’s participatory processes. The confusion is 
caused by what the State (more so, local government) calls “public participation”, which is 
nothing more than a limited “consultation” and “involvement” process, which is not 
empowering (Theron 2009b:119). When the public feel that they are being asked to approve 
and accept decisions that have already been made and they subsequently feel that they will 
not be able to get what they want, they resort to protests. This means that the public is able to 
make rational decisions based on the choices presented to it. 
 
This is explained by the fact that social movements are often led by activists who are 
“socially well connected, better educated” than the followers. In this way they are able to 
make rational decisions. This may be true as, for example, during the “toilet saga” in 
Khayelitsha, the “ring leader”, who was a member of the ANC Youth League, is now serving 
as a Ward Councillor. Meyer (2007:2) argues that “to a large degree the government shapes 
the kind of opponents it will face, the tactics they will employ and the issues they will press”. 
Thompson and Nleya (2010:223) argue that the public is well aware of the various 
approaches that can be used to voice their dissatisfaction, but these are exhausted first and 
protest comes as a last resort. Meyer (2007:3) concurs and adds that when the “ring leaders” 
decide on a course of action, they sift through a myriad of tactics ranging from political 
violence to mainstream political participation and they are well aware of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each tactic.  
 
The public do not just decide to mobilise, but as a result of a culmination of numerous 
frustrations, often building up over a long period of time (Atkinson 2007:58). There are 
triggers that initiate and lead to mass action and differ from one municipality to the other. 
Botes et al. (2007:6) argue that “no community will wake up and suddenly decide to protest”. 
Mathekga and Buccus (2006:11) state that: “while part of the problem at local government 
level can be explained as a matter of poor service delivery, the problem is also perpetuated by 
lack of public participation and engagement at local government level”. Carrim (2010:2) 
agrees and emphasises that “people are protesting because they do not have adequate access 
to councillors, council officials, WCs and other municipal structures”. In other words, 
participation spaces are relatively “closed”. 
The above sources indicate that there is a huge gap between the authorities and change agents 
on the one hand, and the beneficiaries of development on the other hand.  According to 
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Kornhauser (1959) in Meyer (2007:3), this discrepancy makes the public feel that they are 
not sufficiently connected to the government through their social groupings, hence their 
decision to protest. Mathekga and Buccus (2006:15) raise the issue of “community 
orientations” which refers to the rich culture of public participation in South Africa that 
developed and became entrenched during the fight against apartheid. This culture is evoked 
by the top-down approach which prevailed during the apartheid era and is still evident in 
most municipalities in South Africa, including the COCT.  
Booysen (2007:21) explains a top-down approach as a process through which policies, their 
implementations and budgets are determined by the authorities. It can be alleged that the 
public’s frustrations are as a result of the top-down approach, as it alienates them from the 
centres of power. In other words it denies the public an opportunity to influence, direct, 
control and own development processes. 
The discussion above shows that there are a myriad of reasons for public protests. It is clear 
that  although not all of them manifest themselves in the run-up to a particular protest, they 
all have the following dimensions, i.e. structural, systemic, governance, political, economic 
and psychological (Carrim 2010:1). Figure 5.6 below depicts the above-mentioned 
dimensions of public protests, though the list is not necessarily exhaustive. 
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 Figure 5.6: Dimensions of public protests 
 Source: By Author (2012) 
5.5 The violent nature of protests  
 
The apartheid dispensation’s intransigent system of local government gave birth to an 
insurrectionary-minded civil society which continues to haunt the democratically elected 
government. Insurgency has infused itself in the minds of the public as an “integral element 
of civil society mobilisation and of struggles for citizenship” (Von Holdt 2011:5). Public 
protests provide the public with an opportunity for expanded citizenship as enshrined in the 
Constitution (RSA 1996). However the staging of such protests is often accompanied by 
violent acts, which result in the destruction of public and private property, severe injuries and 
loss of lives, disruptions in schooling and economic activities, as well as confrontations 
between armed police and stone throwing crowds. 
 
According to Carrim (2010:1), the violent nature of some protests reflects a far more 
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acute sense of marginalisation and social exclusion”. This is not an ideal situation in the light 
of the fact that violence does not lead to a “win-win” situation and, as GGLN (2008:19) 
declares, “the most extreme form of public participation is violent public protests”. On the 
one hand, public protest and violent protest can be viewed as acts of expressing one’s 
democratic rights, complementing the democratic practices of elections, while also making 
up for the deficits inherent to the latter (GGLN 2008:19). On the other hand, direct violence 
demeans a society and devalues democratic practices. In other words, it reverses the gains 
that have already been achieved. 
 
Figure 5.7 below depicts the number of violent protests that has occurred between the periods 
2007 and 2010.  The figure below shows a pattern of an increase in violent protests during 
winter months (June/July/August) as opposed to other seasons in the year depicted as 
“remainder” (non-winter).  In 2007, nearly 50 per cent of violent public protests were 
recorded in winter. Compared to 2007, there is nearly a 10 per cent decline in violent winter 
protests in 2008 (Karamoko 2011:14).  
 
Figure 5.7: Proportion of protests turned violent, winter versus rest of the year 
Source: Adapted from Karamoko (2011:14) 
 
The 2009 period saw a slight increase (compared to 2008) in violent public protests, followed 
in 2010 by the greatest increase in the periods under review, reaching a peak of nearly 60 per 
cent. It is important to note that winter months surpass other seasons in violent public 
protests. From the researcher’s observation, winter months are characterised by wet and cold 
weather, with shacks being flooded by rain water particularly in the informal settlements. 
This added discomfort renders the situation unbearable for the public in Khayelitsha. 
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As noted above, violent protests are more prevalent during winter months. This correlation, 
however, does not imply that those that occur during the remainder of the year cannot be 
violent (Karamoko 2011:14). It indicates that the upsurge in the number of protests in winter 
months has an increased probability of violence.  It can thus be argued that the former 
apartheid government (service delivery backlogs) alone cannot be blamed for this state of 
affairs. If the democratic dispensation is in harmony with the needs of the public, violent 
protests will be minimal if not non-existent. 
According to Tseola (2012:161), the violent public protests, particularly by the impoverished 
public can be attributed to the lack of an advocacy planning approach. Tseola (2012:161) 
argues that the current “regulatory planning approach” emphasise the attainment of “the 
optimal allocation of resources between all of the competing needs or users within a society”, 
leading to the delivery of impure goods to the impoverished. The advocacy planning 
approach according to Tseola (2012:161) will ensure equal access for the impoverished in 
terms of quality and quantity, as the approach itself  seeks to mobilise and channel resources 
to new social objectives or a major re-alignment of existing objectives.  
Tseola’s (2012:161) advocacy planning approach is closely related to the “third sector” 
approach as propounded by Sibanda (2011:814). The third sector organisations (voluntary 
and non-profit organisations) are mainly preoccupied in seeking new ways of delivering 
public services through civil society participation in governance, so that the active citizenry 
can emerge and drive the delivery of public services. According to Sibanda (2011:815), a 
stalemate that exists between the public and authorities in Khayelistha can be remedied. 
Sibanda (2011:815) argues that “third sector organisations are not only seen as offering 
choice and responsiveness in service delivery, but also as providing opportunities for general 
trusts, civic virtue and social capital through participation in community and public life”. 
The researcher argues that Tseola’s (2012:161) advocacy planning and Sibanda’s (2011:817) 
third sector approaches can go a long way in addressing the “scramble” for minimal services 
in the COCT and will ensure the equitable distribution of resources to the public in 
Khayelitsha. These two approaches are synonymous with a “bottom-up” approach to 
development in the sense that they are people-centred. Furthermore, these approaches 
guarantee the public authentic participation that will provide scope for the public to influence, 
direct, control and even to own the development processes.  
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It has to be noted that the COCT as part of the national government directive has approved an 
Informal Settlement Master Plan Framework in November 2007, which aims to integrate 
informal areas with the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial, social and economic 
exclusion (COCT IDP 2007-2012). This initiative accommodates an estimated 230 informal 
settlements in Cape Town, accommodating almost half of the city’s households. Central to 
this plan is the provision of in situ essential services, such as water, sanitation and electricity. 
These services will be delivered in phases, aiming for upgrades of existing informal 
settlements through equitable participation (COCT IDP 2007- 2012). It can be argued that if 
the COCT can adopt the two approaches mentioned above, the violent public protests in 
Khayelitsha can be minimised as the public itself will be owning the development processes. 
However these two approaches should not be seen as a panacea to the social ills but as 
contributing to the minimisation of the triggers of violent public protests. 
Further analysis of the violent nature of protests relates to psychological interpretations. To 
explain the violent nature of the protests, Burger (2009:2) utilises the theory popularly known 
as the Davies J Curve to explain the discrepancy between reality and expectations of humans 
concerning levels of progress. Burger (2009:2) argues that under normal circumstances, the 
situation the individual finds himself or herself in does not result in “conflict” or 
“frustration”; it is only when there is a sudden change that a huge gap is created between 
expectations and reality.  
The huge gap leads to “frustration” and “discontent” and, ultimately, to protests.  Prolonged 
frustration, in turn, will lead to violence. Hough (2008:1) concurs with Burger (2009:2) and 
states that “the more severe and widespread the deprivation, the greater the possibility of 
violence”. The nature of public protests in Khayelitsha could be explained as action resulting 
from a sudden change which has not been addressed by the authorities/ leaders or properly 
explained to the public. Prolonged frustration on the part of the public has now boiled over 
into violent protests. 
The question that needs to be answered is what is this sudden change? What are these 
prolonged frustrations that have resulted in frustration and ultimately public protests? Allan 
and Heese (2008:2), Seokoma (2010:2) and Booysen (2007:2) are unanimous in indicating 
that the prolonged frustrations that lead to public protests are caused by lack of authentic and 
empowering public participation. In other words the public finds it difficult to influence, 
direct, control and even own the development and decision-making meant for its betterment. 
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Furthermore, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:15), provide a model within which collective 
violence needs to be understood. The model for collective violence traces the root causes of 
violence. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:14) argue that collective violence does not occur 
within a vacuum; there has to be a combination of a set of events and or conditions for it to 
occur. To explain the occurrence of collective violence, Table 5.2, below provides a model 
for understanding it and differentiate between three factors that play different roles in the 
occurrence of collective violence, i.e. root causes, proximate and immediate factors. 
Table 5.2:  A model for understanding collective violence 
     Source: Adapted from Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:15) 
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Root causes, such as poverty, unemployment, inequality and a history of violent interaction 
between the state and the public, act as prerequisites for collective violence to occur 
(Bandeira & Higson-Smith  2011:14). The above mentioned factors are structural and affect 
the public on a daily basis.  Due to their intrinsic nature, they elicit social tensions, that, when 
combined with other conflict behaviour, result in collective violence. It has to be noted that 
these factors cannot be eradicated within a short space of time; hence they require long term 
prevention measures. 
Unlike the root causes, proximate causes, such as poor service delivery, political conflict and 
political entrepreneurship and poor local governance, require medium-term prevention, as 
they can be solved by an accountable and responsive local government structure. These 
factors increase the probability of collective action, as the public perceives them to stem from 
ineffective municipalities. As noted above, these factors form part of the list of grievances in 
Khayelitsha. 
Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:14) caution that accelerators, like the role of the police in a 
public protest, political entrepreneurship, criminal and political opportunism and the role of 
the youth, may not be causally related to the conflict, but, can instead accelerate the process. 
In other words, these factors serve as determinants of whether or not the situation is 
conducive for collective violence.  
Decelerators include such factors as the role of the police and that of the leaders. Police, who 
are there to maintain law and order and who are not provocative, may reduce the risk of 
violent action. Similarly, public leaders, who are able to control their followers and are 
respected by the public, can deter violent action before it occurs. 
Furthermore, a Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on Service Delivery 
(2010) confirmed the above arguments and attributed the violent nature of protests to the 
following factors: 
1. Aggression fuelled by intense frustrations. 
2. A sudden downturn in the economy, triggering frustration and discontent, often 
leading to social unrest. 
3. The reinforcement of violence as being acceptable in families and communities, often 
leads to a vicious cycle of violence in those families and communities. 
4. Vindictiveness, anger, arguments and provocation can lead to violence. 
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5. Lack of confidence, due to the legacy of apartheid, perceived racism and/or 
discrimination; as well as threatened masculinity in gender relations. 
6. Substance or alcohol abuse can lead to increased aggression. 
7. The existence of gangs and criminal activities within a community can result in the 
exploitation of protests by criminal elements for their own objectives. 
 
The above conditions closely relate to social, economic and psychological factors that are 
prevalent in Khayelitsha. It can thus be argued that the violent nature of protests in 
Khayelitsha can inter alia be attributed to these factors.  
5.6 The management of protests 
 
The management of protests in this study refers to the mechanisms that can be used to 
control/mitigate public protests to avoid a situation where they turn violent. The preceding 
chapters have shown that the public is frustrated with the invited spaces of participation 
available to it. As a result of the failure of these spaces to deliver on the promise of 
participatory development, the public has resorted to protestations through invented spaces. 
Gaventa (2004:27) points out that protests are an international phenomenon, which shows 
governance deficits. This, calls for better public participation strategies to ensure that 
democracy can be deepened. 
 
South Africa has made significant strides in deepening democracy through WCs, 
participation in IDPs, regular municipal elections, as well as through legislation to ensure that 
local government is accountable and responsive to the needs of the marginalised. These 
interventions, however, are not yielding the desired results, hence the escalation of violent 
protests. From the researcher’s observation, bearing in mind that South African municipal 
legislation has been labelled one of the most progressive globally, there is evidence of lack of 
political will on the part of politicians to ensure the deepening of democracy. 
 
To this end, Gaventa (2004:27) calls for the reconceptualisation of public participation. This 
requires that new strategies aim at bridging the public-State gap by “recasting citizenship as 
practised, rather than as a given”. As Cornwall and Gaventa (2000) in Gaventa (2004:29) put 
it, “active citizenship will recognise the public as makers and shapers, rather than as users 
and choosers of interventions or services designed by others”. This calls for local government 
authorities to allow the public to influence, direct, control and own development and 
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decision-making processes. If the above is achieved, there will be no reason for the public to 
become violent as they will be the “makers and shapers” and even owners of development 
interventions meant for their betterment. 
 
These active citizenry and social compact sentiments are also echoed by the NPC (2011:429). 
It requires inspirational leadership at each level of society. This will enable the public (or 
parts of the public) to be “mobilised to take charge of their future, raise grievances and 
assume responsibilities for outcomes” (NPC 2011:429). In the event where the public raises 
their grievances through protests, the authorities need to listen and act swiftly on the 
grievances. In other words, the authorities need to seriously deem protests as a legitimate 
form of public participation as the response to protest action is the key determinant of how 
destructive they become (Smith 2007:29). This means that the channels of communication 
are open and everyone is part of the problem and of finding a solution, with the resultant 
proper management of protests. Andoh (2011:118) sums this up by declaring that 
“participation is an important response, in an environment where the public displays a 
diminishing trust in the municipality”. 
 
Smith’s (2007:29) assertion above that authorities response to protests determine and shape 
protests, for example the alleged  use of force by law enforcement agencies when responding 
to protests, calls for the enhancement of negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills, 
not only on the part of these agencies, but the change agents as well. According to Smith 
(2007:30) such an approach will go a long way in diffusing tensions before escalating to the 
extent of violence. 
 
As noted above, the invited spaces are state sanctioned, while the invented spaces are a public 
response to the deficits of invited spaces. The irony is that the invited spaces are a product of 
the struggle against apartheid, in other words the demise of apartheid ushered in local 
government legislation, such as the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) which provided 
for the establishment of WCs, the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) that spelt out 
participatory obligations for local government for the public to participate in IDP processes 
and the Constitution (RSA 1996) with the entrenched right to electoral participation. This 
calls for the reconfiguration of both these types of spaces to ensure their mutual and 
productive coexistence. 
In the light of the above, Carrim (2011:1) argues that there is a need for both the invited and 
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invented spaces of participation to co-exist; after all, the invited spaces were not created by 
the government alone. Moreover, it was through the original invented spaces (mass action) 
that the invited spaces were born.  The reconfiguration of these spaces should ensure, 
according to Cornwall (2008:60), that the public are allowed to invent their own spaces so 
that they can construct and consolidate positions, gain confidence to speak up and gain access 
to a broader constituency of support.  In this respect, “the invented spaces should contribute 
to widening and changing invited spaces for the better and these spaces could in turn be used 
to invent more space” (Carrim 2011:1). In other words, the public voice must be amplified. 
This therefore calls for what (Carrim 2011:1) refers to as “a dialectical relationship between 
invited and invented spaces”.  
 
The co-existence or a dialectical relationship between these spaces of participation should not 
be viewed as an endeavour of co-option of the invented spaces, but as an attempt to open-up 
closed spaces of participation, to strengthen and empower them, ensuring that they are 
capacitated to deal with public development issues. Not all the invited spaces are 
dysfunctional, so the idea should be to extract the lessons, both positive and negative, and 
build on them. In essence, the invented spaces should seek to influence the direction of the 
invited spaces and play a monitoring role. This type of an arrangement does not diminish the 
public’s constitutional right to protest, but provides for the early indication of warning signs 
of possible occurrence of public protests, thus providing an opportunity to develop 
mechanisms for their management. 
The essence of opening up spaces for the public to participate in, is to provide for the 
establishment of a reciprocal relationship, a partnership in learning (Kotze & Kellerman 
1997:39). This provides the stakeholders in a development process opportunity to adapt, 
share and learn from each other’s mistakes and past experiences. Similarly, the coexistence of 
these spaces will allow for deliberations, consensus and forecasting of public protests. Public 
protests will therefore occur only in the event of a deadlock in deliberations. In this way the 
beneficiaries of development will be in a better position to influence, direct, control, and 
eventually, to own the development interventions meant for their upliftment. 
Through public participation people develop and establish dignity and self-esteem and share 
in, belong to and own the development process (Bryant & White 1982: 205-228). For dignity 
to be established, rights must first be attained as enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). 
Cornwall (2008:20) points out that inviting the public to participate should not be seen as a 
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favour or a privilege, but a basic right, one that is fundamental to claiming many other rights. 
Gaventa (2004:29) concurs and suggests that “if the rights and citizenship are attained 
through agency, not only bestowed by the state, then the right to participate – for example, 
the right to claim rights – is a prior right, necessary for making other rights real”. If the 
change agents in the COCT understand, accept and believe in these fundamentals, public 
protests will be managed, if less so, the public will be obliged to demand their basic rights by 
embarking on protest action. In the event where protest action is suppressed and basic rights 
denied, the public have a right to seek relief in the courts of law. The open toilet saga in 
Khayelitsha is a case in point, as noted above. 
Cooke and Kothari (2001:3) explain that a gulf exists between public participation theory and 
practice. The researcher argues that South African municipalities have fallen into this trap 
due to heavy reliance on concepts like involvement/consultation (Theron 2009b:119), which 
even confuse the COCT officials and lead to frustration. The invited spaces of participation 
frustrate the beneficiaries of development, hence the escalation of violent public protest.   
This is collaborated by Gutas (2005) who found that the COCT officials do not understand 
the holistic development context in which participatory strategies should be planned and 
implemented. As argued above, these concepts fall short of authentic public participation. 
This calls for change agents to be trained to inculcate the culture of public participation.  
To this end, Chambers (2002) asserts that establishing a culture of public participation calls 
for the training of change agents who engage with beneficiaries of development 
interventions. This means that change agents are to be empowered to empower the 
beneficiaries of development. The beneficiaries of development need to be empowered to 
participate meaningfully in their own development. Their meaningful participation will 
provide them with the scope to influence, direct, control and own decision-making processes 
and development meant for their betterment. 
Cornwall (2004) reminds us that spaces for participation are not neutral but are themselves 
shaped by power relations that surround and enter them. Gaventa (2004:34) introduces the 
issue of boundaries that shape spaces and determine who enters with which identities, 
discourses and interests. He maintains that saying it is for everyone to participate, is a 
misnomer. This means that “development activists” as such must be identified and be 
empowered to enlighten the public on the development discourse. It has to be noted that not 
all members of the citizenry are able to drive development, but democratically-elected public 
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representatives drive development on their behalf and are directly accountable to the public.  
The researcher argues that the public’s frustration can be managed by keeping constant 
contact with the public. As President Zuma stated in his address at the New Age /SABC 
Business Briefing in Bloemfontein, the State, through its policies and programmes, 
endeavours to speed-up the delivery of basic services. The problem lies with the lack of 
regular communication of plans, progress made and challenges to the public at ward level, 
which “leaves the public uninformed and vulnerable” (Government Communication and 
Information System 2012:1).   Public participation enables citizens to be part of the problem, 
thus becoming part of the solution.  It can thus be argued that until such time as authentic and 
empowering public participation is practiced public protests, some violent will persist. The 
authorities will devote much of their time devising public protest management strategies 
instead of developing development strategies in collaboration with the public. Authentic and 
empowering public participation has a potential for dealing with and minimising the violent 
public protests within the COCT area, Khayelitsha in particular. 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that the deficiencies of the invited spaces of participation compels the 
public to invent own spaces as a reliable vehicle to champion their cause. These participatory 
mechanisms, governing the relations between the public and authorities are not living up to 
expectations; as such this “social contract” must be renegotiated, but primarily on the public’s 
terms. It has been shown that the root causes of public protests are poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. These are aggravated by the in-migration of people from other provinces in 
search of employment opportunities. This does not only add to the existing service delivery 
backlogs but also over-stretches the limited resources of the COCT. 
 
This chapter has shown that disillusionment on the part of the public is caused by lack of 
public participation. In other words the COCT fails to listen to the public’s grievances which 
lead to protests. The ideal situation will be for the COCT to explain its difficulties to the 
public in Khayelitsha, so that the public fully understand the municipal delivery mechanisms. 
As such two approaches, i.e. advocacy planning and third sector, though there is a need for 
further development,  can play a role in bringing about authentic public participation, thus 
minimising violent public protests in Khayelitsha. 
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This chapter argued for a need for the invited and invented spaces of participation to co-exist. 
In other words a dialectical relationship between these two spaces will encourage reciprocity, 
where the rules of engagement will be centred on deliberations and consensus seeking. This 
arrangement will enable the public to influence, direct, control and own development and 
decision-making processes, without which, violent public protests will persist in Khayelitsha.   
 
The next chapter will present the research result, interpret and present findings obtained 
through personal interviews, focus group discussions and observation.   
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS, INTERPRETATION AND PRESENTATION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The researcher has obtained different perspectives on other research findings related to the 
topic of this study. It is incumbent upon the researcher to establish whether the lack of 
authentic and empowering public participation contributes to public protests in Khayelitsha. 
In the research problem, the researcher posed five objectives the study sought to achieve: (1) 
to analyse the developmental approaches that underpin public participation in local 
government,  (2) to evaluate the theoretical and legislative framework currently in place for 
public participation in local government, (3) to determine the extent to which the perceived 
lack of public participation in the COCT contributes to public protests, (4) to analyse the 
probable factors that cause public protests to turn violent and, lastly, (5) to assess if public 
protests are set to remain a preferred public participation tool, so that management of protests 
can be improved on. Secondary data had to be gathered to achieve the above mentioned 
objectives of the study. 
In line with the research methodology explained in chapter 1, this chapter presents an 
analysis of primary data obtained from personal interviews with: two COCT officials, i.e. an 
IDP Practitioner and a Public Participation Practitioner; two Ward Councillors aligned to the 
main opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), and two Proportional 
Representative Councillors aligned to the governing Democratic Alliance (DA). It is 
important to note that the ANC won all wards in Khayelitsha during the last local government 
elections. The selection of Councillors from the two main political parties was done in order 
to obtain a balanced view of the prevailing conditions in Khayelitsha in relation to public 
participation and public protests and to minimise bias. 
Personal interviews were also conducted with the chairperson of the social movement known 
as Abahlali Basemjondolo, the chairperson of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) was also interviewed in order to get a balanced view and to avoid bias. Moreover, 
both SANCO and Abahlali Basemjondolo are popular organisations in Khayelitsha and 
SANCO has close links with the popular grassroots structure in Khayelitsha called Street 
Committee.  
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Four focus group interviews were conducted with the newly-appointed WC members. Each 
focus group comprised of a WC member and members of the public, ranging from four to 
fifteen participants. The researcher, as an employee of the COCT, had the opportunity to 
observe, amongst others, the IDP consultation workshops (that had been organised by the 
Executive Mayor) and public protests in Khayelitsha. The researcher also engaged in some 
informal discussions with COCT officials and the general public to enhance the researcher’s 
“insider view”. The researcher compiled a list of questions that were used as a guide for 
conducting the interviews (See annexure A). 
6.2 Analysis of the COCT officials’ responses  
According to the respondents, the COCT strives to explore strategies/mechanisms that work 
best in ensuring that government is brought closer to the public. One such strategy was the 
establishment of Sub-Councils, decentralised through 24 areas within the COCT, and 
subsequent formation of WCs. Sub-Councils are open to any member of the public to attend 
and address it on any matter. The working of each Sub-Council is coordinated by a structure 
called the Forum of Chairpersons of Sub-Councils (FOCOS). It is this structure that 
continuously explores and advises on the best possible strategies for public participation.  
The respondents noted that the COCT public participation strategies seek to speak to the 
public wherever they are. For example, the Council uses e-participation strategies to 
communicate with the public in affluent areas. On the other hand, in areas such as 
Khayelitsha, Street Committees are utilised to communicate with the public. Over and above 
these strategies/mechanisms the COCT’s public consultation is via e-mails, newsletters and 
public meetings. 
The COCT has both public participation and IDP offices, whose roles are to advise line 
departments and their functionaries on the best possible strategies to engage with the public. 
This means that the responsibility to engage with the public in terms of development 
programmes/projects lies with the line departments. According to the respondents this system 
works well, as line departments are experts in their respective fields, and, as such, know 
better concerning the appropriate strategies to engage the public in their development 
endeavours. 
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The respondents acknowledged that the COCT public participation strategies smack of a top-
down approach and that the ideal is a bottom-up approach, which will be centred at the grass-
roots level and will respond to the public directly. 
It was the respondents’ view that WCs need to be capacitated to respond better and 
understand their duties. However, the respondents pointed out that the functioning of WCs 
differs from one area to another, for example, WCs work well in affluent areas, due to better 
socio-economic conditions and satisfactory levels of literacy. In Khayelitsha, the same cannot 
be said. The socio- economic conditions are worse and the public have to contend with the 
reality of not being given proper feedback in languages they can understand, all of which may 
contribute to protest actions.   
According to the respondents regarding the IDP, the process is considered little more than 
“lip service” to participation, despite it managing to reach more than a million members of 
the public, including  Khayelitsha, The public is invited to participate in IDP planning 
processes only once plans and budgets have already been finalised. This practice contributes 
to public protest, as it means having had no part in developmental planning. It is therefore 
difficult for the public to identify with the IDPs and they find it difficult to understand the 
concept. 
Furthermore, the respondents felt that the COCT officials’ “silo approach” to planning and 
their Councillors’ apathetic unresponsiveness fuel public protests, particularly when 
Councillors ignore that they were elected by the public. The respondents are of the view that, 
if a Councillor is not physically present in the community or when the members of the public 
in Khayelitsha feel he/she shows little interest in those issues that are of communal concern, 
the public may disengage the formal system, resulting in public protests. 
According to the respondents, the legacy of apartheid plays a major role in fuelling protests. 
In other words the COCT inherited an apartheid city with huge service-delivery backlogs and 
glaring inequality gaps. The City’s resources are too stretched to cope with these backlogs, 
further strained by a constant in-migration or influx of people from other provinces to the 
City. The inability of the City to resolve these issues speedily causes the disenchanted public 
to protest as they have run out of patience. 
This situation is exacerbated by foreigners in the area who compete with the locals for scarce 
resources; hence public protests are often accompanied by an upsurge in xenophobic attacks. 
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The respondents noted that the public in Khayelitsha see some people in their neighbourhood 
living under better conditions than themselves. This prompts them into protesting their 
conditions, in the hope that this will somehow help to improve theirs so as to match those of 
others in their neighbourhood. 
The respondents contended that violence is caused by the police/law enforcement agencies, 
who feel they have power over the public, as they have bullet proof vests and firearms. 
Criminal elements and delinquent youths who participate in public protests are also behind 
some of the violence that often accompanies protestations in Khayelitsha. The respondents 
felt that the public need to use creative ways of engaging the COCT, such as the so-called 
“Occupy Movement’s encampments”, popular in European countries. 
When asked as to whether protests action is set to become an acceptable public participation 
strategy in the City, the respondents felt that, as protest is a right as such, it can become a 
public participation strategy, provided it is done in a peaceful manner.  
 
6.3 Analysis of the focus groups’ responses 
Participants at the focus group discussions in Khayelitsha indicated that, although the WCs 
are used as one of the public participation strategies, the most popular forms of participation 
are Street Committees. These are participation structures that had been used in the fight 
against apartheid. The Street Committees are affiliated to South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) that is aligned with the ANC. The Street Committee representatives 
report to the Block Committee, which in turn reports to SANCO. This tiered structure enables 
the public to participate at street or grass-roots level, at the same time gaining representation 
at higher levels of influence. 
The focus group’s participants felt that the criterion for appointing WCs is problematic, in the 
sense that members are drawn from Community Based Organisations (CBO’s). For example, 
the focus group’s participants pointed out that their CBO was asked by City officials to 
nominate a member to represent them in Council. The result was that the ward members were 
ignorant of the CBO member’s elevation to a ward representative. In some instances, wards 
do not have CBOs, which means that they are excluded from the participation process 
through representation in WCs; as such Street Committees experience that gap. The focus 
group’s participants were divided on the knowledge of WCs. Some participants have no 
knowledge of WCs and their functions, while some do. Those who have no knowledge have 
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faith in Street Committees. A strong suggestion from the focus group’s participants was that 
the COCT must organise awareness workshops to educate the public about the WCs 
existence and their functions. Most focus group participants indicated that they are confused 
about which participation mechanism to use, as there are many structures.  In the same vein, 
the focus group’s participants indicated that they had never heard of the IDP, which partly 
explains resorting to protests.  
The majority of focus group participants know their Ward Councillors, but were divided on 
whether Ward Councillors report back to the public and call meetings. Participants who 
agreed that Ward Councillors did provide feedback indicated that the Ward Councillors 
experience problems in raising public concerns in Council, where there is no keen interest in 
pro-ANC Khayelitsha. Overall, the majority of participants felt that their Councillors do not 
report back on progress made in addressing their grievances, which leads to frustrations and 
subsequent protests. The participants felt strongly that a Councillor needs to report back to 
them even if he/she encounters problems, so that the public knows about his/her problems, 
rather than avoiding public participation.  
Most participants in the focus group’s discussion lamented the lack of contact, information 
and minimal political education from Ward Councillors. The participants felt a sense of 
betrayal, as Ward Councillors, who once used to be part of their day-to-day struggle during 
the fight for delivery of services, now that they were in a position of power, ignored their 
grievances and disregarded the needs of the public. 
The majority of participants felt that City officials contribute to protests in that they are very 
slow at delivery, but good at corrupt practices, such as selling the so-called RDP houses and 
plots for building. The City officials also seem to be representing political parties in the 
execution of their duties, rather than being neutral. 
The focus group’s participants indicated a myriad of reasons why they protest: e.g. the public 
have no voice in municipal affairs; the COCT authorities do not listen to them when they are 
polite, so they have to mobilise in order to amplify their voice; there is lack of transparency in 
the Council’s affairs and promises are not kept; the major problems relate to lack of housing, 
unemployment and information. 
Similarly to City officials’ responses above, focus groups’ participants felt that frustrations 
and anger caused by poverty are compelling reasons for resorting to violent protests. In this 
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respect, a participant remarked that, “we have been voting for years; the term of office of the 
Councillor comes to an end and the new Councillor is elected, but there is no change to our 
lives”. The participants pointed out that they have on numerous occasions demanded that the 
unemployed database, introduced by the COCT, be discontinued, as the administration of the 
database is fraught with nepotism ‒ instead of equally distributing employment opportunities 
among the public in Khayelitsha, only a select few benefit.  
Furthermore, the participants were of the view that they first need to destroy property in order 
for the authorities to listen. The participants acknowledged that, in most cases, public protests 
attract criminal elements that get an opportunity to further their own aims.  
When asked whether violence yields the desired results, the response was that “in some 
instances violence works because it draws the attention of the authorities to our problems, in 
fact they even come to address our concerns. We have seen it happening in other areas where 
people end up getting what they were fighting for. The problem with violence is that when 
the police catch you, you will end up in jail and with criminal records”. 
The focus group participants noted that protestations and the subsequent violence come as a 
last resort ‒ they first explore different avenues, like demanding answers from the Ward 
Councillor or demand that the Executive Mayor come and address their concerns. If all else 
fails, the public in Khayelitsha engage the COCT through violent protestations. 
According to the focus group’s participants, public protests can be mitigated through timeous 
response from Councillors to public grievances and their constant contact with the public. 
6.4 Analysis of Khayelitsha social movement’s responses 
6.4.1 Abahlali Basemjondolo 
Abahlali Basemjondolo observed that the COCT relies on the invited spaces of 
participation, i.e. WC and the IDP, as the standard approach to public participation. 
This social movement sees these invited spaces as mainly dysfunctional and therefore 
suitable as tools for the ANC to gain political support. These structures are not 
democratic enough to further the aims of participatory democracy. Instead of closing 
the gap between the public and the municipality, they widen it further, as they are 
highly partisan and not catering for the different political formations in Khayelitsha, 
but only favour ANC members. 
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The respondent sees the IDP process as closed to free public participation. The IDP is 
mainly for compliance purposes and more of a “public relations exercise” in the sense 
that its projects/programmes and the budget are approved before inviting the public to 
participate in the IDP processes. 
The respondent contended that Street Committees were popular during the apartheid 
era and once played a pivotal role in mobilising the public against the oppressive 
regime. During the dawn-of-democracy, the Street Committees were aligned to 
SANCO, an ANC alliance partner. This alignment weakened the efficiency of Street 
Committees as it meant that they had to further the aims of a political party, not the 
needs of the broader public in their areas. 
This respondent was adamant that the COCT needs to come up with a new 
participatory mechanism, i.e. an Urban Democratic Forum that comprises apolitical 
public organisations, such as the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali 
Basemjondolo.  
On the question of Ward Councillors and their contribution to protests, the respondent 
felt that a Ward Councillor, as an individual, has no powers, but derives his/her power 
from the collective. The Ward Councillor’s status and power to deliver services to the 
public is therefore determined solely by his/her status in the collective, since decisions 
are taken by the collective. In other words Ward Councillor’s views must be 
convincing enough in the collective for them to be actioned. 
This respondent felt that public protests are caused by lack of public participation in 
developmental planning processes, as the manner in which such projects are 
conceptualised deter the public from natural participation. The officials fail to 
understand complex community dynamics but are sold on the notion of “wanting to 
do more for less”. The lack of, or failure to commit adequate time and resources to an 
understanding of community dynamics, leads to officials imposing “development” on 
the public. According to the respondent, this practice is contrary to the aims of a 
participatory development approach, which requires that the public must be able to 
influence, direct, control and even own development meant for their advancement. 
For development to be sustainable, it must take into account the views and aspirations 
of the people involved. In this way the public will come to “own” development, 
resulting in the reduction of a need for public protests. 
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On the violent nature of protests, the respondent was of the opinion that the law-
enforcement agencies lack the capacity to handle public protests, for example, the 
indispensable element of community policing. The law-enforcement agencies have to 
attend to other policing matters as well, such as shooting rubber bullets in order for 
protesters to disperse, which leads to them provoking members of the selfsame 
community. It was the view of the respondent that it is during this confrontational 
period that the protesters’ hard-line stance is emboldened and protests turn violent. 
Furthermore, violence is caused by prolonged protests that drag on for days as a result 
of the initial non-responsiveness of the authorities. The protesters get frustrated 
because of the feeling of neglect and uselessness. According to the respondent, 
violence is used as a strategy to draw the attention of the authorities to their cause, i.e. 
by the closure of, for example, the N2. They know well enough that closure of such a 
major road disrupts normal public life and crucial business activity in the metropolitan 
area. The disruption of business activities will always compel the authorities to attend 
to, or even to accede to, the demands of the protesters.  
The respondent concurs with the focus groups’ participants that, it is difficult for the 
organisers of a protest action to control who participates in the protests, in this way 
criminal elements gets an opportunity to infiltrate and further their aims. There is an 
element of frustration on the side of ANC Councillors, caused by the DA being in 
such a commanding position. These Councillors communicate and transmit their 
accumulated frustrations of impotence to the masses and thus protests are started to 
force the hand of the DA to accede to ANC Councillors’ demands. 
The respondent felt that, by declaring that protests happen spontaneously and are 
instigated by COCT officials not attending to their rightful demands, the authorities 
can be proactive and depoliticise the protests. By attending to the public’s demands, 
protests can be mitigated and potentially explosive situations defused timeously.  
6.4.2 South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO)  
The respondent supports the use of WCs as a public participation tool and is of the 
view that a move from Ward Forums to WCs will make a difference. When asked 
about the differences between Ward Forums and WCs, the response was that there 
were no real differences, except that Ward Forums would have up to 20 members, as 
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opposed to the maximum of 10 of WCs, and that the DA run COCT established Ward 
Forums for political reasons, mainly  to defy  national government’s legislation. 
The respondent is of the opinion that it is only now that the WCs can be effective, as 
the Ward Councillors have ensured that the Street Committee members will swell the 
ranks of WCs. When asked on the partisan nature of SANCO, i.e. that it caters for 
only ANC members as alleged by Abahlali Basemjondolo, the response was that 
SANCO is of the view that Street Committees are not partisan but represent all 
political organisations’ members at the grass-roots level.  
The respondent stressed the point that capacity-building, given to WCs, must be 
provided for Street Committees as well, as they form an integral part of the tools of 
participation, due to their proximity to the grass-roots and ability of mitigating the 
shortcomings of WCs, i.e. that WCs are drawn from CBOs ‒ which not all Wards 
have. 
The respondent lamented the ineffectiveness of the IDP process. For example, the 
2011/12 IDP process, particularly as dealt with in Khayelitsha, was just meant for 
compliance purposes, as the Executive Mayor only presented the outstanding list of 
projects to the public, which had had little input from the public. The respondent 
noted that the ANC Ward Councillors took the issue up with the full Council, but the 
Speaker of the COCT referred the matter to the vote where they were outnumbered by 
the majority members of the DA. According to the respondent, this means that for the 
next 5 year IDP cycle, the public in Khayelitsha will be excluded in the development 
process of the City as they were not given an opportunity to be heard. 
The factors that contribute to public protests, according to the respondent, are: lack of 
housing, mushrooming of foreigners’ shops in Khayelitsha and unemployment. The 
people of Khayelitsha are, however, divided on the foreign ownership of shops, as a 
part of the community feels that their presence is a welcome relief, as they provide 
goods at an affordable rate and are able to provide loans to the locals during difficult 
times. 
The respondent felt that violent protests are caused by the non-responsiveness of the 
authorities. The respondent cited an example of the recently-built Khayelitsha 
Hospital, where the public demanded that 60 per cent of employees in the hospital be 
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drawn from Khayelitsha. The Provincial government failed to give such an 
undertaking as demanded, where after, the public demanded that the Premier of the 
province come to address them. What transpired was that the Premier kept on 
promising that she would, but failed to arrive. It was then that the people of 
Khayelitsha felt that they were not being taken seriously and resorted to violence, just 
to put pressure on the Premier to come and address their concerns. 
The respondent also lamented the poor intergovernmental relations. The example 
cited for this, was an instance where the national Police Minister called for an imbizo 
in Khayelitsha, but his provincial counterpart also organised a parallel meeting in 
Khayelitsha. SANCO’s interpretation is that the DA-run provincial government defies 
and refuses to work with the National Government. 
The respondent was asked about the possibility of making public protests an official 
public participation strategy. The response was that this could encourage the public to 
protest willy-nilly, and that, in essence, protests are an indictment of the relevant 
Ward Councillor. According to the respondent, “protest action say, we are talking to 
you but you are not listening (sic)”. The respondent felt that protest action should 
come as a last resort.  In other words, only when all else fails, the public may embark 
on protest action. 
6.5 Analysis of Khayelitsha Councillors’ responses  
6.5.1 Ward Councillors (ANC) responses 
Ward Councillors utilise ward meetings, WCs and Block Committees/Street 
Committees to communicate with the public of Khayelitsha. As ward Councillors 
their responsibility is to serve all of Khayelitsha’s public, irrespective of their political 
affiliation.  
WCs are selected from CBOs in Khayelitsha. The Councillors acknowledged that the 
selection criteria for WCs have the potential of excluding some members of the 
public. The Ward Councillors took it upon themselves to alert community 
establishments, like crèches and religious organisations about the appointment of 
WCs, to ensure a wider reach of public representation. The respondents also 
acknowledge the fact that wards are too big to be served by one Ward Councillor, 
hence the need to strengthen Block/Street Committees for them to support the Ward 
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Committees, as they are closer to the grass-roots. Ward Councillors attend the Block 
Committee meetings to share Council’s development plans and information. 
Another public participation structure that the Ward Councillors in Khayelitsha 
utilise, are Ward Development Forums. These forums are the sub-structures of the 
Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). This structure is composed of community 
sector structures, similar to the ones that the WCs are composed of. Its effectiveness is 
derived from it having wider representation of sub-structures and other stakeholders 
in Khayelitsha.  
According to the respondents, when the Executive Mayor called an IDP consultation 
workshop, the public promptly responded to the call and the venue was full to 
capacity. The public felt this would provide them with an opportunity to report the 
WC and Ward Councillor failures and to share their concerns with the Executive 
Mayor and her Executive Team.  The Executive Mayor communicated development 
projects that had already been implemented. The public felt this was a disservice to 
them, hence the meeting ended before crucial issues could be communicated to her. 
According to the respondents, public protests were caused by that happening, as the 
final IDP documents do not reflect the aspirations and demands of the people. 
Overall, in South Africa, both the invited spaces and invented spaces of participation 
work well, but the problem in Cape Town is that Khayelitsha’s public aspirations are 
ignored by Council, because Khayelitsha is served by ANC Councillors and 
Khayelitsha residents are, by extension, seen as their supporters. They are implying 
that there is some form of official and political victimisation at work here, which 
denies Khayalitsha’s citizens their rightful position and treatment. 
The respondents unanimously agree that public protests in Khayelitsha are caused by 
a myriad of factors that are beyond Ward Councillors’ control, i.e. lack of housing 
and sanitation facilities, a high unemployment rate, Councillors’ alleged nepotism and 
involvement in the allocation of building sites and houses, ever-increasing in-
migration or influx of people from other provinces, feelings of being neglected by the 
powers-that-be and high rates of crime in the area. The respondents felt that the major 
problem is that originally Khayelitsha was not properly planned for purposes of 
human settlement and habitation and COCT development planning continues to 
exclude Khayelitsha inhabitants. The respondents cited the example that Khayelitsha, 
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as the biggest township in the area, continues to receive an inequitable share of only 
three per cent of the COCT budget. Khayelitsha residents are aware of this; which is 
why they protest. 
According to the respondents, violent protests are caused by disillusionment on the 
part of the public. The public is tired of promises that are not kept. The accessibility 
of public protestations attracts different people with different motives, including 
criminals, who participate in order to pursue their own (criminal) agendas. Ill-
discipline, particularly among the youth is a major problem. The public is very strong 
at mobilising others; protests action is therefore one of its strong points in drawing the 
attention of the authorities. In most cases protests are peaceful; they only turn violent 
when provoked by the police who undermine the protesters by shooting rubber bullets 
at them. 
The respondents felt that protest action has always been an effective participation 
tool, as it delivers good results. It is therefore the responsibility of Ward Councillors 
to encourage and advise the public to draft memorandums and participate in peaceful 
processions. Protests are an effective public participation strategy, as long as they are 
peaceful and well managed. 
It is also the responsibility of the protest organisers to ensure that protests remain 
peaceful, in line with the Gatherings Act (RSA 1993a) and COCT regulations, to 
avoid deaths and destruction of property. On the other hand, Ward Councillors must 
advise the public to engage by peaceful means. It is important for the Ward 
Councillors to be visible and available to the public and report constantly to the 
public. The COCT wants Ward Councillors to report to the public on a quarterly 
basis, but Khayelitsha Councillors claim they provide reports to the public on a 
monthly basis. 
6.5.2 Proportional Representation (PR) Councillors (DA) responses 
The respondents agree that WC, and Block and Street Committee meetings are used to 
communicate with the public in Khayelitsha. However, according to them, these 
structures are failing for not providing proper information to the public, as they are 
bent on portraying the DA-run municipality as a failure in the eyes of the public. The 
respondents maintain that this lack of information being denied the public in 
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Khayelitsha is the main cause of public protests. The respondents are, however, also 
mindful of the fact that it is the public’s democratic right to protests. 
The respondents apportion the blame for the lack of dissemination of proper 
information to ANC Councillors who fail to communicate to the public the municipal 
programmes aimed at alleviating poverty, such as the Indigent Grant Policy. 
The respondents are dismissive of the participation of certain structures, such as WCs 
and Street Committees, as being mere political tools of the ANC. WC members are 
appointed by the ANC, who in turn put only their comrades and family members in a 
position to serve in these structures. In other words, the system of appointing to the 
WCs is easily manipulated as Councillors decide who should serve. This act defeats 
the purpose of WCs; as such a WC fails to communicate Council policies to the 
public. It is done in an attempt to derail development and pit the public in Khayelitsha 
against the COCT.  
The respondents feel that these participatory structures have a potential to be 
effective, but there are gaps that need to be filled, i.e. the functioning of WCs is not 
monitored in terms of report-back reports and reporting lines are vague. The Street 
Committees also need to be depoliticised if they are to be effective. The present 
ineffectiveness of these participatory structures contributes to public protests in 
Khayelitsha. 
The respondents cite an example of an IDP consultation workshop where the Ward 
Councillors fed the Executive Mayor with inaccurate information to deliver to the 
public, hence the distribution of forms for the public to list their priorities for 
inclusion in the final IDP documents. The IDP is meant for the public to participate in 
the development that affects their lives, if the members of the public do not see their 
input on the IDP reflected, they are likely to protest. The public can rightfully protest 
because they are effectively excluded from their own development. The resultant 
behaviour is public protests in Khayelitsha. The respondents agree that the public in 
Khayelitsha have so many demands that they cannot be solved in one IDP circle. This 
requires that the public be taught on the functioning of the IDP.  
The respondents identified the following reason for protestations in Khayelitsha, i.e.  
ANC Councillors are not fit for the purpose; they are unable to deliver services 
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efficiently to the public in Khayelitsha. The voting public were given Councillors that 
were not selected by them and they are now revolting against these Councillors. This 
refers to the new ANC system, where the public nominate potential Ward Councillors 
but the final decision for nomination rests with the leaders of the organisation. The 
respondents allege that protests are instigated by ANC politicians in an attempt to 
make the COCT ungovernable. The Ward Councillors make promises that they cannot 
fulfil, therefore the public now see them as liars and have lost confidence in 
governance, which in turn detaches the public from development processes. The 
general public does not know how the representative system functions. 
According to the respondents, protests turn violent as a result of anger over being 
betrayed by the Councillors who used to be part of their community before being 
elected. Politicians are reluctant to address the public during protests. This further 
fuels anger as they feel neglected. Protests are instigated by ANC politicians in an 
attempt to make the COCT ungovernable. The police’s confrontational actions lead to 
violence. During protests, youngsters and criminal elements get an opportunity to 
further their aims. 
6.6 Researcher’s observation 
The researcher has observed that the IDP consultation workshop, attended by the 
Executive Mayor and some Mayoral Committee members, did not serve its purpose of 
soliciting public views for incorporation in the final IDP and budget. The meeting 
ended before the public in Khayelitsha could tell the Executive Mayor of their 
immediate problems. The first part of the meeting was dedicated to the Executive 
Mayor, who used a power-point presentation to tell the public of Khayelitsha of the 
programmes/projects that the COCT will be implementing. The public was not happy 
with the presentation, citing as reasons that the programmes/projects had already been 
implemented. This led to the meeting being discontinued. 
The interviews with the Ward Councillors were done after the Executive Mayor’s 
consultation workshop. The Ward Councillors indicated that there was no follow-up 
consultation workshop and that they hope Khayelitsha’s public views will be obtained 
through comment forms that were distributed before and during the workshop. It is 
the researcher’s view that it will be difficult to blame the public if they resort to 
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protests, as it is clear that they had not been given sufficient opportunity to influence 
the development planning process. 
The researcher has observed that it often takes considerable time for the authorities to 
respond to public demands from Khayelitsha ‒ if they are ever respond to. In most 
cases it is the police who react by arriving at the protest scene before municipal 
authorities do, but it is only when protests turn violent that the politicians are quick to 
respond. 
The researcher has had an opportunity to observe the beginning of a protest action in 
rainy, cold Cape Town weather, when a small group of youths gathered and started 
singing political songs. The group soon grew to a large crowd and then started 
burning tyres which they had on hand. When the researcher asked why they were 
gathering and burning tyres, the response was that they wanted the new Executive 
Mayor to come and hear their demands, as the former Executive Mayor, who had not 
kept his promises, was gone. The researcher’s conversation with the protesters was 
disrupted by the arrival of the police who demanded that the crowd disperse before 
they would use force to disperse them.  
 
6.7 Research findings 
1. Research shows that 98 per cent of the respondents are not satisfied with the 
functioning of the WCs. WCs are supposed to encourage participation of the 
marginalised in the COCT’s development planning. As the DPLG (2005:11) point 
out, due to their public proximity, WCs are the structures that make it possible to 
narrow the gap between municipalities and the public, since WCs should have 
knowledge about and understanding of the public they represent, but the opposite is 
happening.  
 
2. As a result of the ineffectiveness of the WCs, the public in Khayelitsha see the gap 
and invent their own spaces of participation, in this case the Street Committees that 
they utilise as a tool to engage in public protests. The respondents therefore 
unanimously agreed that Street Committees are their preferred way of participating, 
due to sensing them as being within close proximity and the fact that Street 
Committees are “owned" by themselves. The COCT is still of the view that it was 
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doing them a favour when it introduced and opened  the now dysfunctional WCs. 
Cornwall (2008:20) points out that inviting the public to participate should not be seen 
as a favour or a privilege, but a basic right ‒ one that is fundamental to claiming many 
other rights. 
 
3. Pieterse et al. (2008:7) contend that IDPs were meant as platforms for engaging the 
public with regards to policies and programmes, but the public in Khayelitsha are 
being fed information one-sidedly by the COCT, rather than the latter seeking their 
input, which is equivalent to the anti-participatory mode discussed above. As a result 
of this practice by the COCT, 95 per cent of the respondents feel that the public is 
invited to participate in IDP planning processes only when the plans and budget have 
already been concluded. Harrison (2008:327) confirms this shortcoming in the IDPs 
by positing that IDPs reinforce a top-down approach, which tends to be prescriptive 
and is driven by municipalities, thus excluding the input of the beneficiaries of the 
development. This explains why the public in Khayelitsha find public protests a 
suitable mechanism to demand that they be enabled to influence, control, direct and 
own the decision-making process leading to development.  
 
4.  The research shows that the majority of respondents are agreed on the following 
factors as being the main causes of protests, i.e. 
• The inability of the COCT to ensure that the public authentically participate in the 
decisions and development that affects their lives. 
• Poverty and lack of employment opportunities that exist. 
• Lack of proper housing and sanitation facilities for the public in Khayelitsha that 
remain unresolved. 
• Corruption related to and interference by Councillors in the process of allocation 
of houses.  
• The glaring gaps of inequality that exist, while neighbours are visibly leading 
much better lives. 
• The legacy of apartheid that persists (as identified by all Councillors and City 
officials). 
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• The increased competition for limited resources caused by the continuous in-
migration or influx to Cape Town of people from other provinces and African 
countries. 
• The unemployment data base, created by the City that is unjustly selective in 
proving employment opportunities. 
• Councillors who seldom provide progress reports. 
 
5. The research found that the respondents unanimously agree that violent protest are 
instigated by the police and law enforcement’s use of unreasonable levels of force 
during public protests. The respondents contended that most of the public protests are 
peaceful, only turning violent in retaliation to the police’s use of unnecessary force. 
The respondents contend that public protests turn violent after being frustrated by the 
refusal of the authorities to recognise and attend to their demands. This fortifies the 
realisation that using violence will compel the authorities to attend to their demands. 
As one respondent pointed out, the usual course of action is “venting anger on 
anonymous private persons – for when important persons are affected, authorities start 
panicking and attend to our demands”. 
 It is interesting to note that the majority of respondents felt that violence does not 
always work for them, as it derails development and in most cases people get arrested 
and, when sentenced, end up with criminal records blotting their names. 
 The respondents lamented the fact that it is difficult for participants to monitor and 
control protests and as criminal elements are aware of this they will, as a result, use 
protest to further their criminal activities by for example looting foreigners shops in 
the area. The element of ill-disciplined youth as a contributory factor to violence 
during protestations came out strongly. 
6. The respondents unanimously agreed that public protest has always been a public 
participation strategy/tool and should remain so as long as protests are peaceful. 
7. Lastly, the respondents feel that public protests can be managed if Ward Councillors 
are visible and provide constant feedback. The COCT must be quick in responding to 
the demands of protesters.  
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6.7 Generalisations 
The findings of this research are applicable and can be generalised to all South African 
municipalities and, to a certain extent, some overseas (foreign/) countries who share a similar 
system of local governance. It is important to note that, though they can be generalised, one 
should take cognisance of the fact that the COCT is one of the few municipalities in South 
Africa that is administered by the DA, which claims that it has an individual approach to 
governance. However this study could not find any unique approach employed in the COCT, 
except that it is the only municipality that introduced the system of Sub-Councils and that the 
previous political administration opted for a Ward Forum participatory approach (which has 
now been changed by the new administration) as opposed to a WC approach used throughout 
South Africa.  In fact in the first quarter of 2012, the COCT recorded a high number of public 
protests, surpassing the COJ. 
Nleya (2011) asserted that the Street Committees in Khayelitsha are no longer a popular 
participation strategy, but the respondents in this research unanimously agreed that Street 
Committees are still popular and they are the only structures that are considered to be close 
enough to the grass-roots and, consequently, in which the public have faith – opposed to the 
City’s invited spaces of participation that are rejected. 
Furthermore, research done on the Mayor’s Listening Campaign in 2005 (Gutas 2005) 
concluded that, although the campaign was the first major attempt to open up spaces for 
public participation, it emphasised consultation which is not sufficient for authentic and 
empowering public participation.  
Lastly, the public grievances, particularly those related to service delivery, at times falls 
outside the scope and competency of local government but to other spheres of government 
i.e. provincial and national governments. This raises the question of whether 
intergovernmental relations functions as envisaged in the Constitution (RSA 1996).  It will be 
important for this factor to be explored through empirical research, particularly in relation to 
its contribution to public protests.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the study was to determine the factors that contribute to public protests 
in Khayelitsha. The study hypothesised that the lack of authentic and empowering public 
participation in the decision-making and development processes lead to public protests in 
Khayelitsha. In other words, the study sought to show that authentic and empowering 
participation entails the creation of participatory spaces in which the participating public, as 
beneficiaries of a particular programme, project or process, can influence, direct, control and 
own the process. 
Based on the analysis of the research findings, the researcher will make recommendations 
that can assist South African municipalities and the COCT in particular, to minimise or even 
successfully curb public protests in areas such as Khayelitsha. 
 
7.2 Recommendations on how public protests can be better managed 
7.2.1 The practice of public participation 
The COCT’s strategy of decentralising public participation through Sub-Councils and 
FOCOS must be lauded; however, it falls short of authentic and empowering public 
participation. Municipal officials must be capacitated to evoke valid public 
participation. To have a public participation unit official advising a line function, the 
public participation process is not sufficient; instead, a public participation official 
must participate throughout the complete public participation process. 
The officials that deal with public participation, i.e. in both the IDP and public 
participation unit, must be capacitated for the purposes of public participation through 
courses offered by the institutions of higher learning, such as that of the University of 
Stellenbosch. The number of public participation officials in the unit must be 
increased to match the actual demands for public participation and the reputed 
importance allocated, by the City, to an effective participatory process. 
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7.2.2 The functioning of invited spaces of public participation 
This research has revealed that the COCT’s invited spaces of participation, i.e. WCs 
and IDP participation processes; smack of lip service to authentic participation and 
these processes demonstrate a top-down approach. The COCT seems instead to be 
engaging the public mostly for compliance purposes. This deprives the public in 
Khayelitsha of an opportunity to influence, direct, control and own the development 
process meant for the betterment of their lives. The insufficient inclusion of resident’s 
own priorities, views and aspirations in the final IDP, leaves them with no alternative 
but to demand, through public protests, proper inclusion of their views in 
development planning. The COCT therefore needs to ensure that there is authentic 
and empowering participation in Khayelitsha. This can be achieved by adhering to 
point 7.2.3 below. 
The appointment of WCs leaves much to be desired. Mere sourcing of WC members 
from community organisations is insufficient if democracy has to be deepened. Wards 
are too big to be serviced by a WC member, hence a need to make effective use of 
social movements and Street Committees, as discussed in 7.2.3 below. 
  
7.2.3 The recognition and effective utilisation of social movements and 
community organisations 
  
Public protests in Khayelitsha have been organised under the auspices of social 
movements, such as Abahlali Basemjondolo and the Western Cape Anti Eviction 
Campaign. In the same vein, most of the protests are facilitated by a grassroots 
community structure, called Street Committees. These two community structures are 
popular in Khayelitsha. The COCT needs to recognise and utilise these participation 
structures in order to reach the grass-roots, when public protest occurs. This will be 
necessary in order to deepen democracy down to the grass-roots.  
 Once having recognised the structures, the COCT must build capacity and empower 
these structures. This capacity-building must include training regarding the different 
mandates of the three spheres of government, in terms of powers and functions 
delegated to each sphere. Training similar to the WCs will be ideal for these 
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structures. The COCT must not seek to co-opt these structures but to empower them 
to play a meaningful role in public participation processes. 
 
7.2.4 Management of public protests 
Public protests are caused by a myriad of factors; however the findings above indicate 
that there is a gulf that exists between the public and the municipal authorities. The 
public voice seems not to be heard by authorities, which leads to the public engaging 
in public protests. Public protests come only as a last resort, after all public 
participation avenues have been exhausted including the failure of the authorities to 
respond timeously to public demands. It is the City’s failure to respond to public 
demands that leads to frustrations on the part of the public. The COCT needs to 
consider doing the following in order to curb the scale of and mitigate the resentment 
inherent to violent public protests:  
1. The COCT need to explore ways for both the invited spaces and invented 
spaces of participation to co-exist. This will provide for early detection 
(warning signs) for the levels of frustrations and subsequent protests. 
2. COCT authorities must respond to public demands for relevant information, 
by providing regular public progress reports. 
3. In the event of a protest already occurring, the COCT must dispatch top 
politicians to explain the problems hindering the delivery of services. 
4. The COCT must include the youth in development programmes that 
emphasise skills development. 
5. A specialised law-enforcement unit must be established to deal with protests. 
They must be capacitated to address public protests effectively, in order to 
quell violent protestations, using a minimum of force.  
6. It is the responsibility of municipal authorities to educate the public about the 
consequences of violence. 
7. The public must be educated about policies regulating public protests, with the 
view of empowering them rather to explore alternative constructive and 
creative means of engaging municipal authorities.  
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8. The COCT must consider educating the public about other possible complaints 
and dispute resolution mechanisms i.e. the Human Rights Commission, Public 
Protector and even the court of laws. 
7.3 Conclusion 
Based on the evidence that has been gathered, legislatively all efforts to turn around local 
government have been made and continue to be put in place. However, as shown, there is an 
urgent need for Councillors and municipal officials to take public participation seriously, by 
not merely decentralising public participation to line functionaries within municipalities, but 
to ensure that officials are capacitated to better understand authentic public participation and 
its proper implementation.  
Lack of authentic public participation is the key factor contributing to public protests. This is 
attributable to a huge gap existing between the public and authorities, due to ineffective usage 
of the available invited spaces and the implied disregard by the COCT for the potential of 
invented spaces. It is incumbent upon the COCT to take the lead and capacitate WCs and the 
public to understand IDP and budget; thus ensuring that they fully understand how the local 
government machinery functions. 
This study indicates that if public participation in the COCT can be strengthened and not 
done only for compliance purposes, the public will be able to hold Ward Councillors 
accountable for their actions and they (public) will be in a better position to influence, direct, 
control and even own the development and decision-making processes. 
The study presented here will be of assistance to the City of Cape Town (as well as other 
municipalities who are faced with similar challenges) to deal with public protests effectively. 
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ANNEXURES 
 
Annexure A: Interview and focus group discussion guide questions 
 
1. Which public participation strategies does the City of Cape Town use to engage the 
public at a ward level? 
 
2. Do you think lack of public participation plays any role in public protests? 
 
3. In your opinion, what is the role of participatory approaches (Ward Committees and 
Integrated Development Plans?  
 
4. Do Ward Committees and public participation in the formulation of Integrated 
Development Plans have any bearing on public protests? 
 
5. To what extent do the City of Cape Town officials contribute to public protests? 
 
6. To what extent do you think Councillors contribute to public protests? 
 
7. What do you think are the reasons behind public protests? 
 
8. What do you think causes protests to turn violent? 
 
9. Are there any other factors outside of the City of Cape Town (external), you think 
contribute to public protests? 
 
10. Do you think the City of Cape Town should adopt protest as one of the public 
participation strategies? 
 
11. How can these public protests be managed? 
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